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ABSTRACT
The mobility attribute of a mobile agent implies deployment thereof in untrustworthy 
environments, which introduces malicious host threats. The research question deals with how
a security framework could be constructed to address the mentioned threats without 
introducing high costs or restraining the mobile agent’s autonomy or performance.
Available literature have been studied, analysed and discussed. The salient characteristics as 
well as the drawbacks of current solutions were isolated. Through this knowledge a dynamic 
mobile agent security framework was defined. The framework is based on the definition of 
multiple security levels, depending on type of deployment environment and type of 
application.    
A prototype was constructed and tested and it was found to be lightweight and efficient, 
giving developers insight into possible security threats as well as tools for maximum 
protection against malicious hosts. The framework outperformed other frameworks / models 
as it provides dynamic solutions without burdening a system with unnecessary security 
gadgets and hence paying for it in system cost and performance.
Key terms: Mobile agent security; Malicious hosts; Threats classification; Security 
framework requirements; Mobile agent security framework; Countermeasure classification; 
Communication networks; Computer security.
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CHAPTER 1
PROPOSAL
Introduction
The client-server paradigm introduced the concept of remote procedure calls as the basis 
for distributed computing (Comer & Stevens, 1999). In traditional approaches such as 
these, distributed information access brought the data to the point of computation. This 
however, required crucial conditions such as a continuous link between the client and the 
server when requesting information.  
The next step from the client-server technology saw the introduction of mobile agents. The 
concept of a mobile agent brings the computation to the data and the mobility and autonomy 
attributes make permanent connections unnecessary. The notion of a mobile agent arose 
from that of a software agent. 
Software agent can be defined as software components that communicate by exchanging 
messages in an agent communication language (Genesereth & Ketchpel, 1994). The 
concept of software agents is based on objects as recognized in the object-oriented 
environment and they can adopt several different forms such as stationary agents, intelligent 
agents and mobile agents. 
According to an IBM white paper (1998) intelligent agents are software entities that carry 
out some set of operations on behalf of a user or another program with some degree of 
independence or autonomy and in doing so, employ some knowledge or representation of 
the user's goals or desires
A mobile agent can be defined as an autonomous program that moves between networks to 
take advantage of the services supplied by stationary agents (Karnik, 2000). The stationary 
agent resides on a specific host with the inability to move about but with the ability to offer 
services or perform tasks on behalf of its owner. A mobile agent, on the other hand carries 
along its complete implementation and interacts with a host system as well as other mobile 
and stationary agents. Mobile agents have a distinct computational advantage by moving 
computation close to the resources they need to access, hence reducing network 
communication, bandwidth and latency. 
Mobile agents are deployed for various purposes.  Some of the most common purposes 
include information searching, filtering and retrieving applications, low level network 
maintenance, testing, fault diagnosis and the dynamic upgrading of existing services, 
concluding certain e-commerce deals or negotiating with other mobile or stationary agents 
(Karnik, 2000; Tripathi et al., 2001).
An agent is generally regarded as mobile when its execution can be interrupted (usually 
briefly), before it migrates to a new host and is then resumed after the transportation to the 
new runtime environment. Mobile agents do not transport themselves, but depend on the 
mobile agent system to move their binary images between execution layers over a variety of 
media (Ylitalo, 2000).
Mobile agents open several new possibilities for conducting business in a network and 
especially the Internet environment, but they also introduce a new dimension of security 
issues. In fact, full-scale adoption of mobile agent technology in untrustworthy network 
environments, such as the Internet, has been hampered and delayed by several security 
complexities (Montanari, 2001). Jansen (2000) categorises threats in the mobile agent 
environment into four distinct classes, namely threats imposed by the mobile agent to the 
host, threats imposed by a mobile agent host to a mobile agent, threats imposed by a mobile 
agent to another mobile agent and threats imposed from other entities to mobile agents.
A malicious hosting node can launch several types of security attacks on the mobile agent 
and divert its intended execution towards a malicious goal or alter its data or other 
information in order to benefit from the agent’s mission (Sander & Tschudin, 1998). On the 
other hand, agents can also have malicious intentions against hosts or against other agents.  
For example, a virus or a trojan horse can masquerade as a mobile agent and then attack 
the hosting node’s resources.  An agent can also interfere with, or hijack other agents so that
they cannot carry out their tasks or become corrupted (Zeltser, 2000).  Thirdly, network 
entities outside the hosting node can launch attacks against a mobile agent in transit, or 
against the mobile agent system and steal its secrets (such as an encryption key) or corrupt 
its integrity (Jansen, 1999).
Ylitalo (2000) categorised threats imposed by the mobile agent on the host as damage, 
denial of service, breach of privacy, harassment and social engineering. Typical examples of 
agents with these kinds of behaviours are found in computer viruses. Reliable security 
measures to counter these threats have been (and still are) extensively researched and 
proposed and include, for example, solutions like software-based fault isolation (Whabe 
et al., 1993) and state appraisal (Farmer et al., 1996). In general, research on host 
protection is based on security techniques in the arena of Computer Security. The focus of 
our research is on the malicious host problem, where the agent is vulnerable to an attack of a
malicious hosting node.  
Problem Statement
A complete security solution for mobile agent systems would typically insist that the 
execution environment itself be secured and also that the executing code (mobile agent itself) 
be deployed in the execution environment and be designed and implemented according to 
specific security requirements. As mentioned in 1.1, security measures for protecting hosts 
against malicious agents are well researched and we consider it to fall outside the scope of 
this thesis.
The mobility attribute of a mobile agent, which implies that these agents are executed in an 
open environment, introduces new security threats to mobile agent applications. 
Countermeasures for these threats are in the initial phases of research.  In fact, the type of 
threats that are imposed by a malicious host on a mobile agent cannot simply be resolved by 
Computer Security solutions. This is due to the fact that the mobile agent carries along its 
code, data, attributes and state and as a result presents a different challenge to current 
security solutions.
To overcome the drawbacks associated with mobile agent technology, it is essential that 
mobile agent systems must have an integrated security framework, which offers different 
security techniques to provide an overall secure system. Current security solutions from the 
perspective of a malicious host are largely based on the security provided by the underlying 
operating system and/or the programming language. The research question that is addressed 
in this study deals with how a security framework can be constructed to resolve the 
malicious host problem without introducing high costs or restraining the mobile agent’s 
mobility, autonomy or performance.
1.3 Solution Approach
The purpose of this study is to propose a mobile agent security framework that could 
provide a basis for the secure implementation of mobile agents. A combination of research 
techniques is used in this undertaking namely, literature reviews, constructing arguments and 
propositions, prototyping, experimentation and testing, as well as contextual evaluation. 
In the context of this research a technical survey will be conducted on the existing literature 
on mobile agent systems and mobile agent security with specific reference to the malicious 
host problem. Through this survey, essential information will then be extracted to identify the 
most salient characteristics in existing security frameworks and mobile agent systems and 
also isolate the drawbacks, which up to this point still leave a mobile agent vulnerable for 
malicious host attacks. 
From the studied information, classifications will be proposed to categorise different classes 
of threats and the possible countermeasures will be evaluated. Further arguments and 
propositions will then be constructed to propose the security framework from the 
perspective of protecting the mobile agent as an entity when executing on a node in a mobile 
agent system. A prototype that has been constructed, as a proof-of-concept of the 
proposed framework, will then be described. The undertaking also involves evaluation of a 
suitable implementation infrastructure, prototype design, test case construction and 
evaluation, which will also be discussed.
 
A prototype will be constructed that serves as a vehicle for experimentation, during which 
the practical implementation of the framework will be tested and evaluated. Thereby, 
different current security solutions will be combined to find the best emulsion for different 
scenarios. These will then be evaluated within the context of the depicted scenario.
1.4 Research Context
As suggested earlier, the security threats associated with mobile agent technology hamper its 
wide acceptance to such an extent that there has been a notable decline in mobile agent 
publications in the late nineties.  However, literature shows that in the past two or three 
years, there has been a considerable rise in the number of research publications involving 
mobile agent technology. The renewed interest is largely due to the recent materialisation of 
the semantic web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001, Kagal et al., 2003), as well as the continued 
exponential growth of Internet applications and the establishment of open standards for 
these applications. Yet, many of the specific problems associated with mobile agent 
technologies have not been resolved and now it is almost a matter of urgency to address the 
remaining problems.
The current demand for secure mobile agent applications can be seen in the increase of e-
commerce transactions and Internet information retrieval requirements over the past few 
years.  It is within this context of relevance that our research resides.  
1.5 Scope of Study
The following issues do not fall within the scope of this research undertaking:
The study does not consider malicious agent or malicious entity security problems.
The purpose of the study is not to suggest new countermeasures to the malicious 
host problem, but rather to propose a complete security framework where various 
countermeasures reside. Therefore, the study uses available countermeasure 
techniques for its implementation and experimentation, instead of proving the 
feasibility of new or un-implemented countermeasures. 
1.6 Synopsis
Chapter 2 provides state-of-the art information on mobile agent systems. The types of 
threats imposed by malicious hosts on mobile agents are investigated and categorised. 
Chapter 3 covers the different countermeasures that have been proposed by researchers 
throughout the field, as well as the analysis thereof in relation to the identified threats 
discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 provides information on the existing implemented and 
proposed mobile agent models, frameworks and architectures. Current mobile agent 
systems and developed applications are also detailed in this chapter. In Chapter 5, the 
criteria for an integrated security framework is investigated by considering current agent 
standards as well as the general challenges to security solutions for mobile agent 
technologies.  The various requirements for a secure mobile agent framework are 
considered in Chapter 6, which also particularizes the design of the proposed security 
framework. A prototype and implementation details of, as well as experimentation efforts on 
the framework are described Chapter 7. In conclusion, Chapter 8 presents an analysis of 
implementation results and lessons learnt. Furthermore, recommendations are also made 
regarding avenues for future work based on this analysis.
Addendums are added to the thesis in order to provide additional information with regards 
to the implementation specifics of the framework. The detailed security policy created for 
the implementation and testing of the framework (as implemented on every remote host to 
be visited by the agent) is presented in Addendum A. Addendum B provides a listing of a 
mobile agent created for information retrieval purposes, while the source code for a mobile 
agent that not only retrieves information on specified hosts but also conducts certain degrees 
of computation, is provided in Addendum C. The creation of audit information to detect 
possible malicious modifications is achieved by including a history of the hosts visited by the 
mobile agent (Addendum D) as well as the authentication of results retrieved at the different 
hosts (Addendum E).
CHAPTER 2
MOBILE AGENT PARADIGM
2.1 Introduction
The mobile agent paradigm stems from two distinct approaches, namely the distributed 
systems environment and the distributed artificial intelligence environment. Due to these 
environments being a recent research area, several different descriptions and architectures 
exist to describe this paradigm. The purpose of this chapter is twofold, namely to describe 
the essence of a mobile agent as well as a mobile agent system and secondly, to introduce 
the specific security threats relating to this paradigm, as this forms the basis of our research.
2.2 Background
In order to provide a description of mobile agents, it is important to review their history. As 
mentioned, mobile agent research has been influenced by at least two important directions of 
study, namely distributed artificial intelligence and distributed systems. Each of these 
has its own interest in mobile agent research and therefore brings a unique understanding and
corresponding influence in the field. On the one hand agent-based systems is a niche area of 
interest in artificial intelligence (D'Inverno & Luck, 2001), while on the other hand the efforts 
of Picco (1998) and Papaioannou (2000) show that the mobile agent system paradigm 
developed independently from distributed artificial intelligent agent research as a result of 
shortcomings in the client-server paradigm. This was due to demands placed by 
technologies such as Remote Procedure Call (RPC). 
Fugetta et al. (1998) summarise this position and proposes the mobile agent as a refinement 
of distributed applications in that it utilises network connections uniquely. 
They furthermore identify the mobile code as an executing unit that is composed of 
execution state, code segment and data space. Three types of mobile code systems are 
identified: remote evaluation, code on demand and mobile agent system. Of these three 
the mobile agent system is described as unique due to its capability to transport code and 
data space to a different location on a network. 
2.3 Advantages and Uses
The mobile agent paradigm introduces several advantages. Some of the most salient include: 
- The mobile agent is not bound to the system where it begins execution. A mobile agent 
has the unique ability to transport itself from one system in a network to another. The 
ability to travel, allows a mobile agent to move to a system that contains an object with 
which the agent wants to interact and then to take advantage of being in the same host 
or network as the object (Lange, 1998).
- Both bandwidth limitations as well as the support for disconnected operation capabilities 
are eminent problems experienced in the wireless and mobile environments. By moving 
the computation to the host and as a result decreasing the amount of packets on the 
network, mobile agents can assist in alleviating these problems (Suri et al., 2000).
- Mobile agents provide the ability to conduct intelligent information retrieval, such as 
retrieving appropriate information from a number of hosts as well as performing some 
computations (Aerts et al., 2002).
- Mobile agents overcome network latency in that real-time systems need to respond to 
changes in their environment. Controlling such systems through a large network involves 
significant latencies for which mobile agents can offer a solution (Lange, 1998).
These advantages open up several applications that will benefit from the use of mobile agent 
systems. Typical applications range from information searching, filtering and retrieval to 
electronic commerce on the Web where they act as personal assistants for their owners. 
Mobile agents can also be used in network management maintenance, testing, fault 
diagnosis, and for dynamically upgrading the capabilities of existing services (Tripathi et al., 
1999). Other uses include workflow management, air traffic control, information retrieval 
management and education (Grimley & Monroe, 1999).
2.4 Software Agents
Mobile agents form a special subset of software agents. Software agents and their specific 
attributes therefore deserve a brief review. There are many definitions in literature to define a 
software agent (for example see Genesereth & Ketchpel (1994); Smith et al. (1994); 
Franklin & Graesser (1997)) For the purpose of this research we consider the definition of 
the Object Management Group (OMG). 
According the Object Management Group (2000) a software agent is defined as an 
autonomous software entity that can interact with its environment. Some of the properties 
that agents may possess in various combinations are as follows:
Autonomy: It can act without direct external intervention and is able to initiate 
activities.
Interactivity: Agents can communicate with the environment as well as other 
agents.
Adaptivity: A software agent can respond to other software agents and/or its 
environment. 
Sociability: A software agent can act sociably by being companionable or friendly.
Mobility: Contains the ability to transport itself from one environment to another.
Proactively: It is goal oriented and does not simply react to the environment.
Intelligence: According to Wooldridge (2002) intelligence implies the inclusion of at 
least three distinct properties, namely reactivity, pro-activeness and social-ability. 
Rationality: It is able to choose an action based on its internal goals. 
Coordinative-ness: Able to complete a task in a certain environment together with 
other agents.
Cooperativeness: Able to coordinate with other agents to reach a common goal.
Some other properties (that are not included in the scope of this research) include 
unpredictability, accountability, ruggedness, competitiveness, etc. For more information on 
these properties see Etziani & Weld (1995).
According to these properties, different types of software agents can be specified such as 
Autonomous agents, Interactive agents, Adaptive agents, Mobile agents, Coordinative 
agents, Intelligent agents and Wrapper agents. See Object Management Group (2000) and 
Bradshaw (1997) for detailed information on the different types of software agents. Two of 
these types namely stationary agents and mobile agents need to be described in more 
detail for the purpose of this research.
2.4.1 Stationary Agent
A stationary agent executes only on the system where it begins execution. If it needs 
information that is not on that system, or needs to interact with an agent on a different 
system, it typically uses a communication mechanism such as remote procedure calls (Lange,
1998).
The purpose of a stationary agent is to provide support and services to other agents such as 
mobile agents and assist them in keeping their objectives. Stationary agents remain resident 
at a single platform, while mobile agents are capable of suspending activity on one platform 
and move to another, where they resume execution (Jansen, 2000).
2.5 Mobile Agent Context
Being a type of software agent and essential to the existence of mobile agent systems, the 
description and features of a mobile agent are set out below.
2.5.1 Description
A mobile agent can be defined as a program that represents a user in a network and that is 
capable of migrating autonomously from node to node, performing computations or tasks on 
behalf of that user (Tripathi et al, 1999).
2.5.2 Components
A mobile agent as defined consists of a number of required components, which are identified
as the following:
- Code: the program that defines the behaviour or required tasks of the agent (Fugetta 
et al., 1998).
- State: This is data relating to the technical execution of the mobile agent such as 
stack and program pointer, which enable the mobile agent to resume its activities 
after migrating to another host (Fugetta et al., 1998). 
- Data: This data relates to the results of the mobile agent's purpose or tasks. The 
mobile agent migrates the network, executing instructions as it goes along. These 
instructions in certain cases may produce results, which are carried with the mobile 
agent. Data can be divided into two groups, namely initial data that the mobile 
agent takes along for reaching its goal and data as generated or received on the 
different nodes (which can be used in further computations or saved until arrival at 
initiator or home node) (Lange, 1998).
- Itinerary: The path that defines the agent's journey between the different hosts is 
called the itinerary of the agent. This can be determined during creation by the 
mobile agent's creator or it can be determined at run-time according to specific input 
variables as received during computation (Jansen, 2001). 
- Unique Identifier: A unique identity is dependant on an algorithm that will during the 
creation of the mobile agent; give it a unique identification for address or navigation 
purposes. This identification will be carried with the mobile agent in the form of data 
(Jansen, 2001).
2.5.3 Features
The following features form part of a mobile agent and is regarded as essential to its 
definition and objectives:
- Mobility: Mobility allows an agent to move between different mobile agent 
platforms (Jansen, 2000). Two types of mobility are defined, namely strong mobility 
and weak mobility. After being dispatched, the mobile agents become independent 
from the creating process and can operate asynchronously and autonomously 
(Lange, 1998).
- Autonomy: Mobile agents have control over the actions they initiate (Sundsted, 
1998). They also adapt dynamically and have the ability to monitor their execution 
environment and react autonomously to changes (Lange, 1998).
- Security: A mobile agent has to protect its code, state and data from malicious 
entities such as hosts and other mobile agents (Jansen, 2000).
- Reactivity: A mobile agent reacts on environmental changes, such as determining a 
new host to migrate to, if for example, the predefined next host specified on the 
itinerary does not exist or is unavailable (Hoffmann et al., 2002).
- Pro-activeness: Mobile agents do not just react on changes of the environment, but 
are able to act before changes in the environment occur (Hoffmann et al., 2002).
- Persistence: A mobile agent persists in obtaining its objectives without interference 
such as denial of services from the environment (Hoffmann et al., 2002).
- Goal oriented: A mobile agent is designed with certain objectives in mind. A 
common example is where a mobile agent is designed to retrieve the cheapest airline 
fares between specified destinations (Sundsted, 1998).
- Communicativeness: Mobile agents need to communicate with a number of entities 
in order to reach their design goals. These entities may for example include the 
mobile agent platform, different hosts and stationary agents (Sundsted, 1998).
2.5.4 Mobile Agent Lifecycle
The lifecycle of a mobile agent consists of a number of phases that are depicted in Figure 
2.1 as well as in the description below: 
- Creation: The mobile agent is created and contains its objectives, goals, code and 
initial data.
- Initiate: The mobile agent is initiated at the home mobile agent platform. For the 
purpose of this research, the home mobile agent platform is called the local host. 
The local host is seen as the first address on the mobile agent's itinerary as well as 
the last address, being that the mobile agent always returns home in order to convey 
its results.
- Repeat for a number of n-2 mobile agent platforms on the itinerary:
Ø Request for migration: The mobile agent issues a request to its host to be 
packed and sent to the next specified host. A host in this instance may refer 
to the local host or a remote host, which is a platform where the mobile 
agent is executed in order to pursue its design goals. 
Ø Migration: The mobile agent is sent from the current host to the next host 
specified in its itinerary. 
Ø Unpacked and acceptance: The mobile agent is presented in a form suitable 
for execution on the remote host. This also includes a number of processes 
to which the mobile agent is subjected before acceptance on the remote 
host, such as authentication and authorisation procedures.
Ø Execution: As soon as the mobile agent arrives on the next remote host it 
starts execution according to its design goals. During this phase the mobile 
agent makes use of resources provided on the remote host in order to aid in 
its goals, such as the retrieving of data and the computation of results. The 
execution of the mobile agent also includes making use of the services 
provided by the remote host such as communication mechanisms.
- Return to local host: The mobile agent requests migration to the local host, where it 
conveys the results of its journey. It is not mandatory that the mobile agent returns to 
its local host, but can be self-exterminating after its specific task or tasks have been 
completed.
Figure 2.1: The mobile agent lifecycle
2.6 Mobile Agent System 
The most important entity in the mobile agent paradigm is the mobile agent itself. However, it
needs a mobile agent system as a basis of its existence. A mobile agent system is seen as a 
distributed system consisting of several components that are outlined below.
2.6.1 Mobile Agent System Components
A mobile agent system consists of a number of elements in order to be identified as such a 
system. 
Host 
The host is the physical machine connected to other hosts through a network. The host is 
responsible for providing resources such as processing power and information through a 
protected mobile agent execution environment to the visiting mobile agent (Karnik, 1998).
 
Mobile agent platform
An agent platform acts as the interface between the mobile agents and the services 
provided by the host (Tripathi et al., 1999). It also provides the computational environment 
in whichan agent operates. The agent platform is responsible for hosting and executing any 
mobile agent that arrives over the network and for providing primitive operations to agent 
programmers such as migration, communication and the accessing of host resources. A 
mobile agent platform can also be specialised to provide application-specific services and 
keeps track of status information regarding the mobile agents, such as active/inactive status, 
error conditions and resource consumption (Karnik, 1998). 
Besides furnishing the engine on which an agent executes its code, other services offered by 
a mobile agent platform include the capability for an agent to clone itself, to spawn or create 
new agents, to terminate any spawned agents, to locate other agents at the platform or a 
platform elsewhere, to send messages to other agents, and to relocate the agent to another 
platform (Jansen, 1999). One or more hosts may comprise an agent platform and an agent 
platform may support multiple computational environments or meeting places, where agents 
can interact (Jansen & Karygiannis, 1999).
For the purpose of this research we use the term host to refer to both the host itself as well 
as the mobile agent platform.
2.6.2 Mobile Agent Platform Features / Tasks
An agent platform is responsible for the following:
Migration
The primary identifying characteristic of a mobile agent is its ability to autonomously migrate 
from host to host. Migration involves the transfer of different components of a mobile agent 
between different hosts. The support for agent mobility is thus a fundamental requirement of 
the agent's infrastructure. If a mobile agent requests to migrate, then the host must deactivate 
the mobile agent, capture its state and transmit it to the next host as specified by the itinerary 
of the mobile agent. The destination host is responsible for restoring the state of the mobile 
agent, as well as reactivating it (Karnik, 1998). 
Migration can either result from a hard coded itinerary designed by a programmer, or from 
the reactiveness property of the mobile agent in response to its environment. Braun et al. 
(2000) describe migration in terms of a mobility model. A mobility model defines 
abstractions as well as the behaviour of the host when mobile agents migrate to a new host. 
The mobility model views migration capabilities from three different perspectives, namely 
how the programmer implements migration; which migration strategy the mobile agent 
chooses; and the influence of the transmission strategy on the underlying network.
Programmers generally address mobility in two ways: weak mobility in which the agent's 
state is represented in program-defined data structures, allowing migration only at specific 
points in the agent code; and strong mobility which captures the agent's state at the 
underlying thread or process and allows migration at any point in the agent's execution 
(Tripathi et al., 2001). With weak mobility the agent restarts on the new host from the 
beginning of its data, while strong mobility allows the agent to continue execution from the 
point in its instructions when it was transferred (Horvat et al., 2000). If the thread of control 
needs to be retained in an agent system supporting weak mobility, additional programming is 
required to save the execution state manually. In a system with strong mobility, migration is 
completely transparent to the migrated program, reducing programming effort as well as the 
size of the transported code (Picco, 2001). 
The mobile agent is able to choose a strategy for migration, such as pull-code where the 
code is downloaded by the executing host from a specified source and push-code where the
code is sent in advance to the executing host. In the pull-code strategy, the code of the 
mobile agent is not sent together with the mobile agent's data, but is loaded dynamically by 
the new host after migration. The class files can be loaded individually or as a package once 
a specific class file is requested. In the push-code strategy, the code can be sent to all hosts 
as specified on the itinerary (if the itinerary is known), or just to the next remote host (Braun 
et al., 2000).  
The transmission strategy defines the way the mobile agent is physically transmitted to the 
destination host. It states how the data and code is transmitted on a protocol level, such as 
TCP/IP or UDP (Braun et al., 2000).
Communication
Sustaining the idea of a mobile agent system, communication primitives are (or should be) 
embedded in each mobile agent. These primitives are necessary to enable inter-agent and 
agent-to-host communication. Different mechanisms can be used in order to establish a 
communication service, such as message passing or method invocation (Karnik, 1998). 
According to Ford & Karmouch (1997), the mobile agent must also be able to consult with 
its owner in the case of the mobile agent requesting additional information, before migrating 
to a next host or making a decision. Stationary agents on the local host should also be able 
to communicate with remote agents.
Agent monitoring and control 
The owner of a mobile agent (thus the local host) must be able to monitor the agent's status 
while executing on a remote host. The local host must also be able to perform remote 
control tasks such as terminating the agent, or recalling it to transfer back to the local host 
(Karnik, 1998). 
Resource management
Agents on a remote host will request resources available on the remote host such as 
memory, CPU time and information contained in databases. The remote host therefore has 
to manage these requests by for example checking authorisations and quotas as contained in 
the security policy of the host as well as the agent (Fünfrocken & Mattern, 1999).
Execution support
Certain classes and libraries are not necessarily built into agent code in order to enhance a 
lightweight agent for transportability. When executed at a remote host, the agent may 
therefore request access to classes or libraries on the remote host, or require class transfers 
from a designated code-base server that are not available on the remote host (Gray et al., 
2002; Milojicic et al., 1998). Access to these classes and libraries are not essential during 
execution, but are also required for remote creation of new mobile agents (Fünfrocken & 
Mattern, 1999). Execution support is therefore an important requirement for the mobile 
agent. 
Naming and name resolution
Tripathi et al. (2001) describe the necessity for a global naming scheme and name service to
locate resources, specify agent servers for migration and to establish inter-agent 
communication, while Milojicic et al. (1998) argue the need for suitable agent names to 
identify, control and locate mobile agents. Traditional name services such as DNS or NIS 
are not designed to keep track of mobile agents that move very dynamically. One example 
of a scheme is where the mobile agent programmer enables the mobile agent to leave a 
proxy object on the local host and connects regularly to the proxy to notify it of its new host 
address (Fünfrocken & Mattern, 1999).
Security manager
The remote host is responsible for maintaining security policies to protect the host against a 
malicious or uncontrolled agent. The remote host is also responsible for run-time activities, 
such as transport-level security, communications and audit trails. These activities are 
normally managed by a security manager component, which forms part of the remote host. 
A method to enforce security in mobile agent systems is by employing security policies for 
the different entities such as the mobile agent and the host. The security manager is 
responsible for enforcing these security policies and can, at its discretion, increase the level 
of security requested by an agent. It cannot decrease the level of services requested by an 
agent but must inform the agent that the requested service level cannot be provided (OMG 
Document, 2000). 
2.7 Security Issues
Two main categories of threats can be identified in mobile agent systems, namely threats 
against the host and attacks against the mobile agent. The categories are defined as follows:
2.7.1 Host Threats
The mobile agent platform is responsible for the acceptance and execution of mobile agents. 
Jansen (2000) defines two categories of threats against the remote host. They are possible 
threats caused by a malicious mobile agent during execution and threats from other entities 
such as another remote host attacking the host. 
Attacks stemming from malicious mobile agents can be divided into attacks where the 
mobile agent can firstly gain unauthorised access to the host (and information on the host) 
and secondly where this gained access can be used to conduct malicious behaviour. 
Examples of attacks that a malicious mobile agent can perform on a remote host include the 
unauthorised modification of resources, the unauthorised use of system resources located on 
the host and the leaking of sensitive data.  A malicious mobile agent can for example be a 
virus that causes damage to the remote host, or it can launch denial of service attacks against
hosts and prevent other agents from executing (Karnik, 1998).
Attacks from other entities such as other remote host involve denial of service attacks as 
well as attacking the platform through masquerading (Jansen, 2000).
A large number of solutions to protect the remote host against attacks from a mobile agent 
have been proposed and some have been implemented. The reason for this being that 
traditionally, conventional prevention techniques used in trusted systems and communications
security can be used to provide adequate protection for the remote host (Jansen, 2000). 
Methods for countering attacks on a host include software-based isolation (Whabe et al., 
1993), code signing (Karjoth et al., 1997), path histories (Chess et al., 1995) and state 
appraisal (Farmer et al., 1996). 
2.7.2 Mobile Agent Threats
Threats against mobile agents involve the protection from the remote host, other mobile 
agents and entities outside the mobile agent system, such as attacks on the transport 
mechanisms. These type of attacks are difficult to guard against because of the fact that 
traditional protection mechanisms were developed to address threats stemming from attacks 
on the execution environment by the application and not the other way around (Jansen, 
2000). 
In providing a secure framework for mobile agents, the category of threats stemming from 
attacks imposed by a malicious host onto a mobile agent is of main concern in this research. 
These threats are discussed and classified in the next section.
2.8 Threats in Mobile Agent Security
As a first step in designing a secure mobile agent framework, we organise the possible 
threats by a malicious host on a mobile agent in different criteria according to the method of 
attack.
The criteria by which a mobile agent has to be protected against a malicious host, is based 
on the five fundamental concerns or requirements of users gaining access of computer 
network services, namely integrity, availability, confidentiality, authentication and non-
repudiation (ISO (7498-2), 1988).  By using these fundamental security requirements, the 
criteria that has to be incorporated in the design of a mobile agent system, is defined as 
integrity, availability, confidentiality, and authentication. Each of these is described in detail 
below.
2.8.1 Integrity
The integrity of a mobile agent must be protected from tampering by a malicious host. This 
includes the protection from tampering of the mobile agent’s code, state and data. In order 
to protect the integrity of the mobile agent, the security design has to incorporate the 
following sub-criteria:
Integrity interference: The mobile agent has to be protected from the executing host 
interfering with the mobile agent’s execution mission. In this scenario the host does not alter 
any information, but interferes with the execution of the mobile agent. Examples include 
transmitting the mobile agent incorrectly, not executing the mobile agent completely, 
transmitting the agent to a host that is not specified in the itinerary, or executing the agent 
arbitrarily.
Information modification: This sub-criteria includes several possible actions, namely 
altering, corrupting, manipulating, deleting, misinterpreting or incorrect execution of the 
agent’s code, data, control flow or status. Another example of information modification 
occurs when the executing host interferes with the interaction between different agents and 
alters the communication between them for its own benefit.  
2.8.2 Availability
When a mobile agent arrives at a host, it must be given privileges and access to resources 
that are necessary for its design goals. If an authorised mobile agent is prevented from 
accessing objects or resources to which it should have legitimate access, availability 
refusal occurs. Acts of availability refusal are mostly deliberate actions performed by the 
executing nodes, in order to obstruct the agent. Three sub-criteria are defined, namely 
denial-of-service, delay-of-service and transmission refusal.
Denial-of-service: Under normal networking conditions, this kind of attack occurs when a 
network system crashes because it has been flooded with network traffic. In the case of 
mobile agents, denial-of-service simply means that the requested resources needed by the 
agent to accomplish its mission are denied.  However, it is also possible for a malicious host 
to bombard the agent with so much irrelevant information, that the agent finds it impossible 
to complete its goals. Attacks relating to non-repudiation, where the agent platform denies 
that it has received an agent, is also included here.
Delay-of-service: This type of attack occurs when the host lets the mobile agent wait for 
the service and only provides the service or access to the required resources after a certain 
amount of time. This delay can have a negative effect on the actual purpose of the mobile 
agent.
Transmission-refusal: When a host with malicious intentions disregards the itinerary of the 
mobile agent and refuses to transmit the agent to the next host specified in its itinerary, 
transmission-refusal occurs.
2.8.3 Confidentiality
When the assets of the mobile agent are illegally accessed or disposed by its host, the 
privacy of the mobile agent is not respected and comes under attack. Three subclasses of 
confidentiality attacks are described, namely eavesdropping, theft, and reverse 
engineering. 
Eavesdropping is an invasion of privacy that mostly occurs when the host spies on the 
agent and gathers information about the mobile agent or about the intercommunication 
between agents.  The access of the remote host to the mobile agent's code, state and data 
present an opportunity for the host to monitor the agent for other purposes than protecting 
itself and its own resources. Although the host may not attempt to alter the agent, it can use 
this information for its own benefits. 
Theft and eavesdropping are closely related.  In this subclass, the malicious host not only 
spies on the agent, but also removes information from the agent.  The malicious host may 
also “steal” the agent itself and use it for its own purposes, or simply kill it. 
Reverse engineering occurs when the malicious host captures the mobile agent and analyse 
its data and state in order to manipulate future or existing agents. Different to a theft attack, 
a reverse engineering attack enables the host to construct its own similar agents, or update 
the profile of information to which the agent gets access.
2.8.4 Authentication
In the case of the malicious host problem, the agent must be able to correctly identify and 
authenticate its executing host. Hiding its own identity or refusal to present its own 
credentials, the host may jeopardise the intended goal of the mobile agent. There are two 
subclasses of authentication attacks, namely masquerading and cloning.
Masquerading: If a remote host masks itself as one of the destinations on the mobile 
agent’s itinerary when, in fact, it is not, masquerading occurs. A remote host can also 
masquerade itself as a trusted third party and by doing so accept mobile agents in order to 
extract sensitive information from them. The masquerading remote host can harm both 
visiting mobile agents as well as the host whose identity it has used (Jansen & Karygiannis, 
1999). 
Cloning: Each agent carries its own credentials in order to gain authorised access to the 
services of its executing hosts.  If a host creates a clone of the mobile agent, it will cause 
unique agent authentication problems.
2.9 Mobile Agent Threats Model
For the previous discussion of threats against the mobile agent, we can safely argue that a 
mobile agent needs to be protected from its execution environment. In Tables 2.1 to 2.4 we 
show the impact of each threat on the different aspects of a mobile agent. The purpose of 
these arrangements is to understand the specific effects of suggested countermeasures, 
which are discussed in the next chapter. 
As stated earlier in the chapter, the mobile agent consists of code, state and data. In 
protecting the mobile agent against possible attacks from a malicious host, it is also 
necessary to include the control flow (as specified in the code) as a separate component. 
The data of the mobile agent is divided into the identification of the agent, the itinerary of 
the agent, initial data (added at creation) to be used in the attainment of its goals on 
subsequent hosts, aggregated data acquired at previous hosts not to be used subsequently, 
aggregated essential data acquired at previous hosts on the itinerary to be used at 
subsequent hosts in attaining its goal, and required data as acquired (or to be acquired) at 
the current host. 
For the purpose of defining a threat model, the different categories and specific threats 
within the categories are seen as enclosed threats. Attacks initiated by a malicious host can 
be a combination of different categories of threats. For example a remote host masquerading
as a legitimate receiver of the mobile agent can, after receiving the agent perform a number 
of integrity or confidentiality violations, such as the altering or copying of sensitive 
information. 
2.9.1 Integrity Threats
Table 2.1 provides the impact of integrity threats on the different components of the mobile 
agent. The incorrect transmission as well as the modification of the mobile agent poses 
threats to all components of the mobile agent, while the transmission of the agent to a host 
not specified on the itinerary interferes with the defined route of the mobile agent. Integrity 
interference in relation to the incorrect or arbitrarily execution of the agents, only poses 
threats to the state and control flow of the agent. 
Table 2.1: Integrity Threats
Integrity Interference
Integrity modification
Transmitting mobile agent incorrectly Transmitting agent to 
host not on itinerary (must make sure the host honours itinerary) Not executing the 
mobile agent completely Executing mobile agent arbitrarily Deleting, corrupting, 
manipulating, altering, misinterpreting, incorrect execution.
Code Threat No effect No effect No effect
Threat
State Threat No effect Threat Threat
Threat
Control Flow Threat No effect Threat Threat
Threat
Data ID Threat No effect No effect
No effect Threat ItineraryThreatThreatNo effectNo effectThreatInitial data 
ThreatNo effectNo effectNo effectThreatAggregated data ThreatNo effectNo effectNo 
effectThreatAggregated essential dataThreatNo effectNo effectNo effectThreatRequired 
dataThreatNo effectThreatThreatThreat
A threat implies that the specific part of the mobile agent is threatened by the particular 
offence listed in the column, while no effect (grey cells) implies that the type of offence listed 
in the column will not affect the particular part of the mobile agent. For example, if an agent 
is wrongfully transmitted to a host that is not on the itinerary (offence listed in 3rd column), 
such an incorrect transmission will have no direct impact on the code of the agent (the agent 
itself is not damaged), but this contempt threatens the intended itinerary of the mobile agent. 
Consider the 4th column offence, namely incomplete execution of the mobile agent, as a 
second example. Once again this offence does not endanger the existence (thus code) of the 
agent, but it threatens its state, control flow and required data, as incomplete execution might
generate a false state and misleading data. 
2.9.2 Availability Threats
Denial and delay-of-service threats have an influence on the code, state and required data of 
the mobile agent. Refusing to transmit the mobile agent, threatens all components of the 
mobile agent. The impact is outlined in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Availability Threats
Availability
Denial of Service Delay of service
Transmission refusal
Execution resources (memory & CPU denied) Data denied / 
Bombarded with irrelevant information Execution resources (memory & CPU 
delayed) Data is delayed Transmission refusal
Code Threat No effect Threat No effect
Threat
State Threat No effect Threat No effect
Threat
Control Flow No effect No effect No effect No effect
Threat
Data ID No effect No effect No effect No 
effect Threat Itinerar No effectNo effectNo effectNo effectThreatInitial data No effectNo 
effectNo effectNo effectThreatAggregated dat No effectNo effectNo effectNo 
effectThreatAggregated essential dat No effectNo effectNo effectNo effectThreatRequired dat No 
effectThreatNo effectThreatThreat
2.9.3 Confidentiality Threats
Confidentiality threats are a concern to all components of the mobile agent except the data 
to be acquired at the current host (malicious host). See Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Confidentiality Threats
Confidentiality
Eavesdropping Theft Reverse 
Engineer
Code Threat Threat Threat
State Threat Threat Threat
Control Flow Threat Threat Threat
Data ID Threat Threat Threat
Itinerary Threat Threat Threat
Initial data Threat Threat Threat
Aggregated data Threat Threat Threat
Aggregated essential data Threat Threat
Threat
Required data No effect No effect No effect
2.9.4 Authentication Threats
Authentication threats as depicted in Table 2.4, indicate that masquerading threats only 
affects the data to be required, while the cloning of the mobile agent threatens the 
identification of the mobile agent.
Table 2.4: Authentication Threats
Authentication
Masquerading Cloning
Code No effect No effect
State No effect No effect
Control Flow No effect No effect
Data ID No effect Threat
Itinerary No effect No effect
Initial data No effect No effect
Aggregated data No effect No effect
Aggregated essential data No effect No effect
Required data Threat No effect
2.10 Conclusion
This chapter described the mobile agent paradigm as well as all the elements that form part 
thereof. Security is seen as one of the major factors that prohibits the implementation and 
widespread use of mobile agent systems. The first step in designing a secure framework for 
mobile agents in mobile agent systems is the categorising of all possible threats, which has 
been done in Section 2.8. This leads to the creation of a threat model depicting the attacks 
on the different components of the mobile agent. Chapter 3 seeks to categorise possible 
countermeasures for the different categories of threats.
CHAPTER 3
COUNTERMEASURES
3.1 Introduction
Different countermeasures have been proposed and a small number implemented in mobile 
agent applications. We have also found that there are few measures implemented to specific 
categories of threats (as we have proposed in Chapter 2), and as a result many of the 
implemented measures fail to address specific needs of different types of applications. The 
purpose of this chapter is twofold, namely to discuss the countermeasure structure of mobile 
agents and to combine these measures into a number of countermeasure classes to enhance 
their applicability.
3.2 Countermeasure Structure
Countermeasures directed toward the protection of the remote host are a direct evolution of 
traditional mechanisms employed by trusted hosts, while countermeasures directed towards 
the protection of the mobile agent are radically different from traditional lines. This is due to 
the fact that traditional mechanisms were not devised to address threats stemming from 
attacks on the application by the execution environment, which is exactly the situation faced 
by a mobile agent executing on a remote host that it may not completely trust (Jansen, 
2000).
Sander & Tschudin (1998) broadly divide the malicious host problem into two categories, 
namely tampering detection and tampering prevention.
Countermeasures in the tampering detection category aim to detect mobile agent tampering 
after the tampering has occurred. It furthermore includes tracing the identity of the malicious 
host as well as proving the malicious act. 
The tampering detection category includes countermeasures that prevent mobile agent 
tampering before the tampering can occur. Prevention mechanisms attempt to make it 
impossible (or very difficult) to access or modify the mobile agent in a meaningful way 
(Vigna, 1998).  Kotzanikolaou et al. (2000) further categorise prevention mechanisms as 
either passive or active. Passive prevention mechanisms protect the mobile agent by 
employing organisational or architectural solutions, such as letting the mobile agents only be 
employed in a trusted domain. An example is the creation of a network of trusted hosts in 
which the mobile agents are to be deployed (Sander & Tschudin, 1998). Passive prevention 
approaches either rely strongly on the trustworthiness of the mobile agent platform, or 
concede the core features of the mobile agent such as autonomy and migration. 
Active prevention mechanisms provide the mobile agent with adequate protection without 
compromising the features and advantages of the mobile agent paradigm. These types of 
countermeasures can either be hardware based, such as the incorporation of special 
trusted hardware components (see Smith & Austel, 1998; Wilhelm et al., 1998) or 
software based, such as the obfuscation of code (Hohl, 1997, 1998) and the use of 
encrypted functions (Sander & Tschudin, 1998).
3.3 Countermeasure Classes
Countermeasures that have been implemented, or proposed to reduce the vulnerability of 
the mobile agent against malicious hosts, can be categorized into a number of classes 
according to the protection technique being used. We propose four different classes, namely 
trust-based computing, countermeasures based on recording and tracking, 
countermeasures based on cryptographic techniques, and countermeasures based on 
obfuscation and time techniques. 
3.3.1 Class 1: Trust-based computing
The creation of a trusted environment in which a mobile agent roams freely and fearlessly 
without being threatened by a potential malicious host can possibly alleviate most of the 
categories of threats that have been discussed. According to Ordille (1996), the central 
security concern is how to establish trust between entities and how to limit the risk for the 
different entities. Once the level of trust is established, the risk for the entities (in this case the 
mobile agent and the remote host) can also be established.
The trust that a mobile agent has in a particular host can be blind, based on reputation, 
based on control and punishment, or based on policy enforcement where an agent has 
prior (contractual) relationship with the host (Yee, 1997). Each of the different classes of 
trust has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example trust based on reputation is 
easy to implement because no special mechanisms are required, while trust based on 
control and punishment can have cost implications for the individual if punishment is seek 
amongst judicial lines, especially if the malicious entity is located in another country with a 
different or unknown law-system (Wilhelm et al., 1998).
In order to implement countermeasures based on a notion of trust, a security policy must be 
created and used by the remote host. Wilhelm et al. (1998) define such a policy as a set of 
rules that constrains the behaviour of a host for all conceivable situations. They then define 
trust in a host as the belief that it will adhere to its published security policy. 
Ordille (1996) categorises the travelling of mobile agents into three types, namely one-hop 
agents, two-hop boomerang agents and multi-hop agents, where a hop defines a trip 
from one host to another. A one-hop agent only travels from its local host to a remote host; 
a two-hop boomerang agent travels from its local host to a remote host and back to its 
local host, while multi-hop agents travel to multiple remote hosts. According to this 
classification, different levels of trust are established according to a pre-defined policy.  For 
example, establishing trust for one-hop agents is simpler than for multi-hop agents, in that 
only one remote host is visited and the agent does not travel any further. The level of trust in 
these types of agents is determined by a risk policy; if the mission of the agent is only to 
carry data to the destination, then the agent owner only has to trust the remote host to 
accept the agent and its data.
Swarup & Fábrega (1999) describe aspects of trust in open distributed systems. They argue
that computational models and mechanisms be produced that can enable trust between 
entities. Trust between agents can be established in a variety of ways such as blind trust, 
deterrence-based trust, knowledge-based trust, identification-based trust and social trust. 
Trust benefits include enabling cooperation between agents, the lowering of access barriers 
for the protection of resources and entities, as well as the creation of trusted communities. 
Swarup (1997) states that the critical problem in mobile agent security is the assessment of 
trust in mobile agents and hosts. Three trust appraisals are identified, namely 
authentication to deduce which principal made a specific request, code appraisal to 
ensure that is safe to execute a mobile agent and state appraisal to ensure that a mobile 
agent has not become malicious due to alterations in its state. 
Countermeasures that make use of the notion of trust that have been researched for the 
mobile agent paradigm include the following:
Tamper resistant hardware (prevention)
 Installing tamper resistant hardware is a method well suited to implement the notion of 
trust in agent-to-host relationships. This method uses the concept of a secure coprocessor 
model, where physically secure (tamper-detecting /-responding) hardware is added to 
conventional computing systems. These are computational devices that are trusted to 
execute their software correctly, despite physical attack. The distribution of trusted 
hardware components throughout a hostile environment enables secure distributed 
applications (Smith & Austel, 1998).
  
Wilhelm et al. (1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000) created the Cryptographically Protected 
Objects (CryPO) Protocol, which makes use of a Tamper-Proof Environment (TPE) in 
order to provide a secure execution environment for the execution of mobile agents on 
untrusted hosts. The TPE is a complete microcomputer and its main task is to run a virtual 
machine where the mobile agent platform (Agent Executor) can be installed. An underlying 
operating system controls the access to resources on the host where the TPE resides. A 
private key is contained in a cryptographic library that forms part of the TPE and is 
accessible only to this environment. The components contained in the TPE are protected 
which make it impossible to access or manipulate mobile agents executing in this 
environment. A Tamper-Proof Environment Manufacturer (TM) produces the TPE, and it 
guarantees the information contained in the TPE to be tamperproof. 
The CryPO protocol consists of an initialisation and a usage phase. The initialisation 
phase is only executed once and consists of the TM publishing its certification key and 
sending it to the Agent Executor located on a remote host. The Agent Executor registers its 
TPE with one or several brokers. The usage phase of the protocol can only be executed 
once the initialisation phase is completed. In the usage phase the owner of the mobile agent 
contacts the broker for information regarding the Agent Executor it wants to interact with. 
This is done by the verification of the published certificate of the TPE. Once satisfied, the 
owner encrypts the mobile agent with the public key of the TPE and sends the encrypted 
agent to the Agent Executor. The Agent Executor doesn't possess the decryption key and 
has to forward the mobile agent to the TPE where it will be decrypted and executed. Once 
finished with its task on the specified TPE, it can request migration back to its owner or to 
the next remote host as specified on its itinerary. Mobile agents migrating from the TPE are 
encrypted and the TPE provides the certificate of the designated receiver of the mobile 
agent. 
Although all computations on the mobile agent are protected and executed within the TPE, 
the Agent Executor is still responsible for sending the mobile agent to the next remote host. 
This can lead to the possibility of the mobile agent not being sent to the correct remote host 
as specified in the itinerary of the mobile agent (Wilhelm et al., 1998). A possible solution to 
this problem is the introduction of an itinerant safe policy, whereby the mobile agent is 
serialised within the TPE (Wilhelm et al., 1998). Other limitations to this protocol include 
the violation of the TPE if adequate time and resources are available. In the case where the 
private key of the TPE is compromised, the attacker will have complete control over all 
mobile agents sent to the TPE. Solutions to these limitations include periodic inspections of 
the TPE by an independent appraisal organisation (Wilhelm et al, 1998). A main feature of 
a mobile agent is autonomy (as specified in Chapter 2), and the CryPO protocol, which 
creates a trusted network, violates this feature in terms of regulating the environment in 
which a mobile agent can be deployed. Ma & Yen (2002) emphasise this disadvantage and 
also state that the use of special hardware reduces the usefulness of a mobile agent system 
as a middleware component. The costs implied by installing TPE’s and thus creating a 
trusted network is also a deterrent for service providers (Borselius, 2002). 
Another type of tamper-resistant hardware is proposed by Fünfrocken & Mattern (1999), 
which makes use of a Java Card as a trusted computing base. The card is able to run Java 
code and is added to the remote host running the agent platform, as a specialised hardware 
component. A Java Card owns a private key, which implies that the mobile agent can be 
encrypted with the corresponding public key and only the Java Card can decrypt and 
execute the code. An encrypted mobile agent moves its code from the agent platform to the 
Java Card and subsequently can be executed in a highly secure environment. 
Kilian-Kehr & Posegga (2002) proposed the use of a smart card platform for the execution 
of mobile code. The smart card implements an interpreter for mobile code and the execution 
platform implements key management facilities.
According to Schneier (2000), it is not really possible to manufacture a device that is 
absolutely tamperproof.  He suggests that instead of focussing on how tamper resistant a 
specific device is, the focus must shift to how much tamper resistance is needed in terms of 
the cost to “break” a tamper resistant device.
Trusted execution environment (prevention)
According to Sander & Tschudin (1998) a trusted execution environment can be 
achieved by setting up a trusted set of network nodes by using encryption and authentication 
techniques. This is done by encrypting the mobile agent as it is sent between remote hosts 
and by authenticating the host before the mobile agent is transported to it. Finally, the mobile 
agent has to be authenticated before it enters the host.  However, this method goes against 
the notion of a mobile agent to a certain extent.  If a mobile agent has a predefined itinerary, 
the advantage of the vast amount of resources available on the Internet, may be lost or 
severely obstructed. 
Another drawback is that a method needs to be specified in order to create a trusted 
execution environment, by just authenticating the hosts it will still be possible for a 
malicious host to masquerade as a trusted legitimate one. The encryption of the agent only 
protects the mobile agent during transportation and not during execution on the remote host. 
The creation of a trusted execution environment can prevent some attacks against mobile 
agents and can be useful in a small environment (such as an Intranet), but is not viable in an 
open environment.
Trusted third party (prevention)
A trusted third party is a separate entity in the mobile agent system environment employed 
for secure and safe computations by mobile agents and hosts. Feigenbaum & Lee (1997) 
define the services performed at the trusted third party, as examination of the mobile agent 
and also the writing of an auxiliary program to monitor the destination host. This program 
determines whether the remote host can be regarded as a safe execution environment for the 
visiting mobile agent. The trusted third party digitally signs the mobile agent as well as the 
auxiliary program upon which the destination host can decide to accept or reject the mobile 
agent.
A trusted third party may also act as a Certification Authority for the generation of private 
and public key pairs. Furthermore, a mobile agent on route can also divert after migration 
from a host to the trusted entity in order to perform secure computations (see for example 
the FILIGRANE project (Jalali, 2000)). Advantages of using a trusted third party are that it 
can alleviate large increases in network traffic when making use of cryptographic algorithms 
in order to encrypt mobile agents between remote hosts (Piessens et al., 2000). In the case 
where the mobile agent is forced to visit the trusted third party after executing at a remote 
host, is limits the autonomy of the mobile agent.
3.3.2 Class 2: Countermeasures based on recording and tracking techniques
Countermeasures based on recording make use of the itinerary information of a mobile 
agent, either by manipulating the migration history or by keeping it hidden. 
Countermeasures that make use of tracking techniques make use of for example agents or 
servers that cooperate in order to reach the goal of the mobile agent. 
Path histories (detection)
A path history is a countermeasure that is strongly used in the malicious agent problem 
where it is needed to maintain record of the agent’s travels that can be substantiated. 
According to path histories, a record of all prior hosts visited by a mobile agent is 
maintained. 
The computation of a path history requires that each host add a signed entry to the itinerary 
carried by the mobile agent. Ordille (1996) defines two methods to establish the level of a 
host's trust in a mobile agent. The first technique requires each host to add its identification 
to the itinerary of the mobile agent and forwards a copy of the added information to the next 
remote host specified on the itinerary. The next remote host can then determine whether it 
trusts the previous hosts that the mobile agent visited, either by simply reviewing the list of 
identities provided or by individually authenticating the signatures of each entry in the path 
history. In the second technique the added identification of the current host is signed before 
added to the itinerary and sent to the next specified host. 
Although this method is used for the detection of malicious agents, the possibility exists that it
can be implemented to detect malicious hosts as well. The generated record (of hosts 
visited) can be used by the mobile agent owner (once the agent has returned to the local 
host), to detect at which host possible tampering occurred. By keeping histories of the hosts 
visited, a current host can also detect if the mobile agent has been manipulated before 
accepting the agent for execution. 
While the technique does not prevent a host from behaving maliciously, it serves as a strong 
deterrent, since the host’s signed path entry is non-repudiatable. Disadvantages of path 
histories, is that it becomes more costly (in terms of size and thus the validation process) as 
the path history increases and the success of the scheme is dependent on whether the 
current host is able to determine the level of trust of the previous hosts visited by the agent 
(Jansen, 2000). 
Detection objects (detection)
Detection objects as a countermeasure to detect modifications by a malicious host is based 
on prevention of storage jamming techniques. Storage jamming is the disruption of 
information systems by the unauthorised modification of data (McDermott & Goldschlag, 
1996). One of the techniques introduced to combat storage jamming is the use of detection 
objects, which can also be used in the mobile agent environment.
Detection objects such as dummy data items or attributes accompany the mobile agent and 
are used to determine whether the host in question can be trusted. If the detection objects 
have not been modified, then reasonable confidence exists that legitimate data has not been 
corrupted also. According to McDermott & Goldschlag (1996), detection objects must 
satisfy two properties, namely hosts must not be able to distinguish between detection 
objects and real data, and a high probability that an unexpected detection object state 
indicates malicious modification. 
One of the primary disadvantages to this technique is that it is very application specific as the 
detection objects must be believable enough to fool host systems and at the same time must 
not affect the result of the query returned by the mobile agent. Another disadvantage is the 
added computational cost as it is necessary to update the detection object often (Meadows, 
1997). 
Itinerary recording with replication and voting (detection)
Minsky et al. (1996) and Schneider (1997) proposed itinerary recording with 
replication and voting as a countermeasure by which multiple copies of a mobile agent are 
used to perform the computations as needed to reach the goal of the mobile agent. The idea 
behind the method is that although a malicious host may corrupt a few copies of the mobile 
agent, enough replicas to successfully complete the computation will still exist. For each 
stage of the computation, the host ensures that the mobile agent has not been tampered with. 
The technique of replication and voting commences with a mobile agent being created at 
the local host. Upon migration the agent is replicated into a pre-determined number (n) of 
mobile agents that is sent to n different remote hosts. The replication of the mobile agent can 
be an exact copy, or the computations can be divided into different agents, with each agent 
responsible for computing a certain section of the ultimate goal. Upon arrival at a remote 
host, a voting system is used in order to determine the validity of the n mobile agents that are 
received by checking if the credentials of the agents are valid. Remote hosts that are 
involved in a particular stage of a computation are expected to know the set of acceptable 
hosts for the previous stage. The host propagates onto the next stage only a subset of the 
replica mobile agents it considers valid, based on the inputs it receives. 
This technique can be used to ensure a critical message is delivered and is appropriate for 
tasks that can be safely duplicated as it guarantees the computation integrity by identifying 
trusted hosts. In duplicating agents, additional resources are consumed and the network 
traffic increases. As one of the advantages of mobile agents (as stated in Chapter 2), is that 
it can be used with success in order to alleviate bandwidth problems, using the technique of 
replication and voting, as a security measure will work against this advantage. It is also 
unrealistic to presume that two or more hosts exist that can execute a specific mobile agent 
in the same manner without being from the same provider. Jansen & Karygiannis (1999) 
also mentioned additional drawbacks such as the cost of setting up the authenticated channel 
and the inability for the peer to determine which of two platforms is responsible if the agent 
is killed.
Mutual itinerary recording (detection)
According to mutual itinerary recording, the itinerary of the mobile agent is recorded and 
tracked by another cooperating agent, while a mobile agent moves between hosts. The 
cooperating agent serves as a backup agent and is executed in a trusted environment. There 
also exists a secure communication channel between the mobile agent and its cooperating 
agent. The mobile agent will convey the information about the last host visited, the current 
host and the next host on its itinerary to the cooperating mobile agent through the 
authenticated channel. The cooperating agent maintains a record of the mobile agent’s 
itinerary and takes appropriate action when inconsistencies are noted (Roth, 1998).
According to Roth (1998), the protocol assumes three categories of hosts (namely white 
hosts, grey hosts and red hosts) that are categorised according to their level of trust. A 
white host is completely trusted; hosts that are not completely trusted and which may 
potentially perform some malicious acts are categorised as grey. Red hosts may collaborate 
with at least one other host in order to launch an attack on a mobile agent. 
Critical operations in the mobile agent are performed in the cooperating agent and secret 
data is distributed between the mobile agent and the cooperating agent. The cooperating 
agent records the actual route of the mobile agent. This is achieved by the mobile agent 
sending the address of the previous host as well as the address of the next host through the 
authenticated channel, to its cooperating agent (this is done on every remote host). The 
cooperating agent verifies the addresses as sent by the mobile agent and if a malicious host 
transfers the mobile agent to an incorrect host, it will be able to detect this and take 
appropriate actions.
Because the path records are maintained at the agent level, this technique can be 
incorporated into any appropriate application. Some drawbacks include the cost of setting 
up the authenticated channel and the inability of the peer to determine which of the two 
platforms is responsible if the agent is killed  (Roth, 1998). This technique only detects 
modifications on the route of the agent and not on the agent itself. It also goes against the 
notion of a mobile agent as being autonomous; the same effect will be achieved by letting the 
agent migrate to a trusted third party after visiting a remote host.
Reference states (detection)
Reference states as a countermeasure are a variation of the itinerary recording with 
replication and voting technique (Minsky et al., 1996; Schneider, 1997). Hohl (2000) 
suggests the idea of using reference states, which are mobile agent states produced by non-
attacking or reference hosts in order to detect interference attacks. This countermeasure 
initially made use of a referenced trusted host to execute the mobile agent in parallel, 
however this was nothing more than a client-server set-up and the author presented an 
improved protocol (Hohl, 1999). In this protocol every host on the itinerary of the mobile 
agent receives the initial state, final state and input data from the previous host. The current 
host is then responsible for re-executing the mobile agent to check for indifferences. 
In this protocol the local host computes and signs the initial state of the mobile agent, which 
is then transferred together with the mobile agent’s code and initial state to the next host as 
specified in the itinerary. The receiving host checks the signature, if this cannot be verified 
then the local host is informed. In the case that the signature is valid, the mobile agent is 
executed, whereupon the host signs the resulting state. Upon migration the signatures 
together with the states, input and code is marshalled and sent to the next host. This protocol
is repeated at every host on the itinerary. Every host re-computes the mobile agent with the 
input provided from the previous host and compares the results received. If the results differ 
then the previous node acted maliciously and can be acted on. This protocol has been 
implemented in the Mole mobile agent system (Baumann et al., 1998).
Reference states can detect attacks such as writing or modification in the state of the mobile 
agent.  This mechanism is however not able to detect confidentiality attacks.
Advantages of this protocol include the presentation of the complete state of the mobile 
agent, which can be used in order to prove modifications done on a specific host. A 
disadvantage is the increase in costs by the extra overhead required for the computations 
(Hohl, 1999).
Phone home (prevention)
Grimley & Monroe (1999) propose that before leaving each host, a mobile agent transfers 
the data that it has required at the specific host to its owner. 
The transfer of data to the local host can involve the transfer of any data it has acquired, 
thereby preventing its loss or its disclosure to future hosts, or it can act as a method to let a 
user know that the agent is still functioning.
Phoning home can prevent data acquired at remote hosts from malicious modifications by 
future hosts, but does not prevent tampering. Tampering can be detected if the state of the 
mobile agent after execution at a remote host is also sent to the owner of the agent. This 
countermeasure defies the autonomy property of a mobile agent, in that it needs to have 
direct contact with its owner.
Using a mobile agent system (prevention)
Yee (1997) proposed using a distributed mobile agent system, where a specific task is split
into several mobile agents, based on the method of recording and voting as proposed by 
Schneider (1997). In a mobile agent system, the collaborative effort of all the agents 
accomplishes the task instead of a single agent assigned with the user’s wishes. 
By using a distributed mobile agent system, two mobile agents can for example be sent to 
the same list of remote hosts, but in a different order. The mobile agents in this case will have
the same goal and would visit the same providers. This can alleviate problems such as a 
malicious host modifying, for example, the lowest price of goods as contained in the agent. It 
is however not in all cases viable to send replicas of agents to the same hosts and it does not 
allow for changes in the itinerary of the agent.
State appraisal (detection)
The goal of the state appraisal countermeasure is to ensure that an agent’s state has not been
tampered with. Although this countermeasure has been proposed as a possible solution to 
the malicious agent problem, it can be applied to the malicious host problem. The state 
appraisal function of a mobile agent uses authentication and authorization techniques to 
calculate a set of privileges as a function of the agent’s state. Such a function can then be 
used to predict and thus detect certain state alterations (Farmer et al., 1996). Although not 
all state alterations can be detected, it can protect the mobile agent against state 
modifications. 
In the protocol Farmer et al. (1996), distinguish between a program and the mobile agent 
that will be responsible for executing the program. The program contains the source code 
and is signed by the author, while the mobile agent contains the data and state also signed by 
its owner. The state appraisal function for the program is computed which will calculate the 
maximum safe permissions to be granted to the agent as a function of its state. A message 
digest of the result of the compiled program as well as the state appraisal function is 
created and the owner signs this with its private key. Upon preparing the program for 
sending a second state appraisal function is attached which contains the permissions the 
sender wants an agent running the program to have. 
Before sending the agent the owner attaches its name and computes a message digest for the
program, the message digest of the program, the state appraisal function of the sender and 
the owner's name. This message is signed with the owner's private key. Upon migration of 
the agent between platforms the current platform constructs a message containing the agent, 
the current state of the mobile agent, the current interpreter, the principal on whose behalf 
the interpreter is executing and the principal on whose behalf the next interpreter should 
execute the agent (from its current state).  
A remote host receiving the agent uses the state appraisal functions to verify that 
predecessor hosts have not changed the state of the mobile agent. State appraisal, as a 
countermeasure, has not been proven in practice and thus the possible implications on for 
example, processing costs have not been determined. The success of this technique also 
relies on the extent to which harmful alterations to an agent’s state can be predicted and on 
the extent to which the state appraisal functions can be prepared before using the agent 
(Jansen, 2000). If it is possible to provide a mobile agent with state appraisal functions, it 
will allow manipulations of the agent’s state to be detected during its execution (Wilhelm et 
al., 1999). Westhoff (2001) also mentions that by using this approach a malicious act can 
be detected, but not the identity of the attacker.
Proof-carrying code (detection)
Proof-carrying code is a technique proposed by Necula & Lee (1998) as a 
countermeasure for the malicious agent problem, but can also prove useful to protect the 
mobile agent against code modifications by malicious hosts. The author of the mobile agent 
creates a formal safety proof that proves adherence of the mobile agent to the safety rules. 
The receiving host uses a proof validator to check if the proof is valid and safe to execute. 
Any modifications to the code of agents constructed with proof-carrying code will result in 
the rejection of the agent by the host. 
Proof-carrying code is checking the built-in properties of the code and does not make use 
of cryptography or trusted third parties. The proofs are verified statically before the code is 
executed. Necula & Lee (1998) define the steps of proof-carrying code as (1) the 
specification of the safety policy for the interaction with the mobile agent, (2) the host 
receives the mobile agent and extracts a safety proof from it, (3) the safety proof is sent to 
the proof producer who is responsible for the proving of the agent’s code and returning the 
proof to the host (the host can also acts as the proof producer) and (4) the validity of the 
proof is checked by the host by making use of a proof checker. If the proof is valid the 
agent can execute, if not, it will be rejected.
Proof-carrying code programs are tamperproof in the sense that any modification to the 
code will result in the proof not being valid. This can be used in the malicious agent problem 
to prevent unauthorised modifications of the mobile agent’s code. Disadvantages of the 
technique include that the proofs are extensible in size and will have a large impact on 
computing transfer costs. Borselius (2002) adds that the difficulty in generating such formal 
proofs in an automated and efficient way, is a major drawback.
3.3.3 Class 3: Countermeasures based on cryptographic techniques
Techniques under this type of countermeasures utilise encryption/decryption algorithms, 
private and public keys, digital signatures, digital timestamps, and hash functions to 
address different threat aspects. 
Anonymous itinerary (prevention)
Westhoff et al. (1999) proposed anonymous itinerary as a prevention method used to 
protect the route of the mobile agent. This method entails the encryption of the pre-defined 
itinerary of the mobile agent and in doing this, hides the agent’s route from all other entities 
(including all remote hosts specified in the itinerary). 
The protocol starts with the author of the mobile agent specifying the initial itinerary of the 
mobile agent as a concatenated list of Internet addresses. The local host (home) address is 
stored (in plaintext) separately from the rest of the itinerary. The reason for this is to provide 
a means for the remote hosts (if needed) to abort the agent. After defining the addresses of 
the remote hosts to be visited, the itinerary is then encrypted by making use of a public-key 
infrastructure. Concatenation or encapsulation techniques are also used in order for a 
specific host to only be able to decrypt data related to it. The local host signs the data of the 
mobile agent intended for a specific host. Before migration to the next host, the current host 
is deleted from the itinerary.  Westhoff et al. (1999) present four different combinations of 
encryption and signature schemes that can be used for implementing the encryption and 
signature parts of the countermeasure. These combinations are:
Atomic encryptions and Signatures: The itinerary of the mobile agent is signed in an 
atomic way by using a public-key encryption method. By doing this the current host can 
verify the itinerary for modifications as well as decrypt the address of the next platform 
to be visited. All the other destinations specified in the itinerary are hidden. A trip-
marker that uniquely identifies the mobile agent's journey (such as the time of creation) 
is added to the itinerary in order to prevent replay attacks.
Atomic Encryptions and Nested Signatures: All the addresses as well as the 
signatures in the itinerary are encrypted, which implies higher computational complexity. 
The signature contains the address of the current host, the previous and next hosts, the 
trip-marker as well as the encrypted texts (of all addresses) to be used by later hosts.
Nested Encryptions and Atomic Signatures: The remote host receives cipher text 
from the previous hosts, when decrypted reveals the next host, the signature from the 
local host and the encrypted address of the previous host. In this approach the signature 
does not contain the address of the previous host.
Nested Encryptions and Signatures: The current host decrypts the address of the next 
host. A signature and the encrypted itinerary is sent to the next host that contains the 
current host address, the address of the next host, the trip-marker and the complete 
remainder of the itinerary.
The above combinations can be used with varying results for different applications. For 
example atomic encryptions and signatures operates at a lower cost, making it ideal for 
short routes and less sensitive services, while nested encryptions and signatures detect an 
attack as early as possible.
Although this method is based on a pre-defined itinerary, it is possible to extend the 
algorithm in order to include new remote hosts during execution. The mobile agent has the 
ability to change its pre-defined itinerary and in doing so it has to include a signed 
confirmation of the changes.
Anonymous itinerary is a countermeasure that can be used effectively for applications that 
deem necessary to keep the itinerary of the mobile agent hidden. This can alleviate security 
problems based on competition by different hosts (where a host will sent an agent to a 
destination not on the itinerary or change for example prices according to the businesses 
listed in the itinerary). A possible disadvantage is the computational costs that are involved. 
Execution tracing (detection)
Execution tracing is a technique for detecting unauthorised modifications of an agent 
through the recording of the agent's behaviour during its execution on each host. Vigna 
(1998) suggests a procedure that compels the executing host to produce a trace. A trace 
TP of the execution of a mobile agent p consists of a sequence of pairs <n,s> where n is a 
unique identifier of a statement and s is a signature. 
Statements in the code of the mobile agent are classified as either black or white. A 
statement is black if it modifies the state using information received from the external 
execution environment (for example read(x) is classified as a black statement). A statement 
is classified as white if the mobile agent's execution state is modified on the basis of the 
value of the agent's internal variables only (for example x:=y+z is classified as a white 
statement). In the case of a black statement the signature contains the new values of the 
internal variables as a result of the statement execution. In the case of a white statement the 
signature is empty.
The protocol makes use of public/private key encryption and one-way hash functions to 
produce cryptographically secure messages. Upon requesting migration to the first host 
(Host A) on the itinerary, a signed message (containing the mobile agent’s code and the 
initial state in encrypted form as well as the mobile agent token) is sent from the local host 
to the remote host. The mobile agent token contains the ID of the agent, a timestamp, a 
hash value of the code and the identity of the trusted third party to be used. The local host 
using its secret key signs this mobile agent token. 
Host A receives the message and checks the signature on the message as well as the agent 
token. It examines the information contained in the message and on this basis makes a 
decision whether to refuse or accept the mobile agent. In both cases the host responds by 
sending a signed message containing a rejection or acceptance notice to the local host. If it 
contains an acceptance, the key used for encrypting the mobile agent is sent to Host A, 
protected with the public key of the host. Upon receiving the key, Host A can decrypt the 
agent and execute it.
If the mobile agent requests migration to the next remote host (Host B), the mobile agent is 
wrapped and Host A sends two consecutive signed messages to Host B. The first message, 
contains the names of the sender and receiver, the agent token, a hash value of the trace 
produced by the agent execution on Host A, a hash value of the current state on Host A and 
a timestamp. The second message, consists of the code of the mobile agent and the current 
state encrypted by a random key chosen by Host A, as well as a hash of the previous 
message. Host B checks the signatures and hash values and verifies that the local host sent 
the mobile agent at the indicated time. Host B sends a signed message containing an 
acceptance or rejection notice.
This protocol is repeated for every address listed in the itinerary of the mobile agent. The 
final host on the itinerary retrieves from the agent token, the name of the local host and 
contacts it to request for delivery of the agent.
In order to detect possible modifications on the mobile agent's code and state, the local host 
can check the execution sessions logged in the trace after the agent terminates, by requesting 
the traces from the corresponding hosts.  This check requires the owner of the mobile agent 
to compute a hash of the received trace and compare it with the data to its disposal.  This 
comparison enables the owner to identify possible security breaches.  
This method can detect all possible manipulations of the mobile agent (code, state & 
execution flow) after suspicion has been aroused and only after the agent has terminated. It 
also relies on the hosts to be honest about their input information to the agent. 
The approach has a number of drawbacks, the most obvious being the size and number of 
traces to be retained and the fact that the detection process is triggered occasionally, by 
suspicious results or other factors. Other more subtle problems identified include the lack of 
accommodating multi-threaded agents and dynamic optimisation techniques (Jansen & 
Karygiannis, 1999). Westhoff (2001) states another disadvantage, namely that in case of an 
attack, the identity of the attacker cannot be revealed. It furthermore places an extra burden 
on the hosts who have to dedicate large amounts of resources to the storage of enforcement 
information (Wilhelm et al., 1999).
Computing with encrypted functions (prevention)
Sander & Tschudin (1998) suggest the use of encrypted functions, which prohibits the 
executing host from learning anything substantial about the agent. This approach is based on 
the tamper-resistant hardware technique (Wilhelm et al., 1998), but with the difference 
that it only relies on software.
According to this technique, a mobile agent is composed of several decomposable functions.
Each function, which should remain secret, is encrypted and sent on its way to perform a 
particular task.  For example, if fi is such a function, then the function gi = E(fi) is the 
encrypted version of fi, which is created by the sender. The sender also creates a program 
Pi,(gi) which implements the function gi. Function Pi(gi) is sent to the host where it is 
deciphered and executed by a program, P, to determine P(gi)(x). The host will thus be able 
to see clear text instructions about a small part of the mobile agent, but will not be able to 
understand the goal of gi. Because the mobile agent owner knows the decryption algorithm, 
he/she is able to decipher and hence determine the value of fi (x).  This way, the host 
executes a set of instructions that do not portray the real meaning of the agent.
Computing with encrypted functions permanently prevents attacks on the entire agent and 
doesn't make use of a trusted functionality. This technique, while very powerful, 
does not prevent denial of service, replay, experimental extraction and other forms of attack 
against the mobile agent (Jansen, 2000). According to Wilhelm et al. (1999) it is however in 
its current form not possible to implement. 
Environmental key generation (prevention)
Riordan & Schneier  (1998) describe a model in which the malicious host problem is 
countered with the introduction of clueless agents. Clueless agents carry a cipher text 
message, as well as a method for searching through a host environment for specific 
information.  If this information is found, predetermined environmental conditions become 
true and allow the generation of a key that can decipher the mobile agent’s cipher text 
message.  The cipher text message can be private data or part of the mobile agent’s code. 
The environmental conditions are hidden through a one-way hash function or a public key 
encryption of the hidden message. This ensures that a malicious host cannot uncover the 
message or the response action, by directly reading the mobile agent's code.
Clueless agents scan the environment for their activation keys on a fixed data channel such 
as web pages, mail messages and file systems. The environmental key generation 
protocol has three phases, namely the host sends an encryption key to the initiator of the 
agent, the initiator gives the mobile agent the encrypted message, part of the data needed to 
decrypt the message as well as the location of the rest of the data needed for decryption and 
finally, the mobile agent retrieves the data needed to derive the decryption key from the host 
and decrypts the message.
Time based constructions allow key generation based on time. Three different time-based 
constructions are used, namely forward-time hash functions, forward-time public keys 
and backward-time hash functions. Forward-time constructions permit key generation 
only after a given time, while backward-time constructions permit key generation only 
before it. Another form of environmental key generation is general server constructions 
that make use of one-way functions and a symmetric encryption algorithm. 
This countermeasure can be used effectively to protect parts of the mobile agent against 
integrity and confidentiality attacks. One weakness of this approach is that a platform that 
completely controls the agent could simply modify the agent to print out the executable code 
upon receipt of the trigger, instead of executing it. Another drawback is that a host typically 
limits the capability of an agent to execute code created dynamically, since it is considered 
an unsafe operation (Jansen & Karygiannis, 1999). 
Partial result encapsulation (prevention)
Partial result encapsulation makes use of a public key to encrypt the result of the mobile 
agent’s action at each executing host platform. The encapsulated data bits are incrementally 
accumulated until an intermediate point(s) is reached or until the mobile agent returns to its 
point of origin, where the private key is used to decrypt the layers of data. By employing 
encryption and digital signatures, encapsulation of the results of an agent’s visit to each host 
can, respectively, provide confidentiality and integrity (Chess et al., 1995; Jansen, 2000; 
Yee 1997).
In general, there are three alternative ways to encapsulate partial results (Jansen & 
Karygiannis, 1999):
· Provide the agent with a means for encapsulating the information,
· rely on the encapsulation capabilities of the agent platform, or
· rely on a trusted third party to timestamp a digital fingerprint of the results.
The following countermeasures are all sub-forms of partial result encapsulation, namely 
partial result authentication codes, sliding encryption, and partial results along the 
way.
Partial result authentication codes 
Yee (1997) presents a variation to the partial result encapsulation.  This technique 
requires the agent and its originator to maintain or incrementally generate a list of secret keys 
used in the partial result authentication codes computation. Once a key is applied to 
encapsulate the information collected, the agent destroys it before moving onto the next 
platform, guaranteeing forward integrity. If one of the hosts visited by the mobile agent is 
malicious, then the previous set of results obtained by the mobile agent will remain valid. 
Only the owner of the mobile agent can verify the result, because no other copies of the 
secret key remain. 
This technique has a number of limitations. The most serious occurs when a malicious 
platform retains copies of the original keys or key generating functions of an agent. If the 
agent revisits the platform or visits another host conspiring with it, a previous partial result 
entry or series of entries could be modified without the possibility of detection. Since 
partial result authentication codes is oriented towards integrity and not confidentiality, the 
accumulated set of partial results can also be viewed by any host visited, although this is 
easily resolved by applying sliding key or other forms of encryption (Jansen & Karygiannis, 
1999).
Sliding encryption
Often the amount of information gathered by an agent is rather small, in comparison to the 
size of the encryption key involved and the resulting cipher text. A special form of encryption
is implemented, namely sliding encryption that encrypts the mobile agent piecewise, which 
in turn yields small pieces of cipher text (Young & Yung, 1997). 
The agent carries a public key and encrypts the information as it is accumulated at each host 
visited. When the agent returns home the information is decrypted using the private key 
maintained at the local host. While the purpose of sliding encryption is confidentiality, an 
additional integrity measure could be applied as well, before encryption occurs (Jansen & 
Karygiannis, 1999).
Sliding encryption aims at saving space rather than time, which can be crucial for an 
application where the mobile agent collects small amounts of data on a large number of 
different hosts (Loureiro et al., 2000). 
Partial results along the way
Another method is to require each host to encapsulate partial results along the way, rather 
than relying on the agent to encapsulate the information. The distinction is not only one of 
where the encapsulation mechanisms are retained, either with the agent or a platform, but 
also one of responsibility and associated liabilities (Jansen, 2000).
Karjoth et al. (1998) devised a platform-oriented technique for encapsulating partial results, 
which reformulated and improved on the partial result authentication technique. The 
method first constructs a chain of encapsulated results (as computed on every remote host) 
that binds all the results obtained at the different hosts together. Each host digitally signs its 
entry using its private key and uses a secure hash function to link the results and identities 
within an entry. 
This technique provides forward integrity and confidentiality by encrypting each piece of 
accumulated information with the public key of the originator of the agent. 
Yee (1997) mentioned that forward integrity could also be achieved using a trusted third 
party that performs digital time stamping. A digital timestamp allows an entity to verify that 
the contents of a file or document existed at a particular point in time. A problem associated 
with this method is the general availability of a trusted time-stamping infrastructure (Jansen & 
Karygiannis, 1999). 
Digital signatures (detection)
Sander & Tschudin (1998) introduced the concept of an un-detachable digital signature 
that allows a mobile agent to produce a digital signature inside a malicious host without the 
host being able to deduce the agent's secret or to reuse the signature routine. 
Digital signatures can also be used to provide integrity by signing the data acquired or 
computed at a host, which is not to be used at subsequent hosts. A disadvantage of this 
approach is that the size of the mobile agent grows linearly as it gathers results (Loureiro et 
al., 2000).
3.3.4 Class 4: Countermeasures based on obfuscation and time techniques
The basis of countermeasures based on obfuscation and time techniques is to add 
restrictions on the lifetime of the mobile agent as well as scrambling the code in order to 
make it difficult or impossible to understand.
Code obfuscation (prevention)
Hohl (1997, 1998) suggested a mechanism called Blackbox Security. The strategy behind 
this technique involves the scrambling of the code in such a way that it is impossible to gain a 
complete understanding of the code’s function (i.e., specification and data). It is also 
impossible to modify the resulting code without detection. Hohl (1997, 1998) proposed 
code-obfuscation as a combination of two mechanisms. The first mechanism dynamically 
generates a new and less understandable version of the mobile agent code, while the second 
mechanism restricts the lifetime of the mobile agent's code and data.
Before migration the local host scrambles the code of the mobile agent, mixes the data 
elements of the mobile agent and adds expiry dates to the data elements by making use of 
digital signatures. The local host then signs the code of the mobile agent together with 
another expiry date. Once migrated, a malicious host can still manipulate the code (although 
it will take a certain extra amount of time). On sending the manipulated mobile agent to the 
next host on the itinerary, the receiving host will reject the mobile agent due to the fact that 
the validity dates have expired. Three different techniques are commonly defined for code 
obfuscation, namely variable re-composition, structure dissolving and conversion of 
compile time control flow elements into run-time data dependent jumps. In variable 
re-composition, the set of program variables are scrambled, new variables are created that 
contain some data from the original variables and are adapted in the program code. 
Structure dissolving consists of the program structure being eliminated by the replacement 
of procedure calls by procedure code, the substitution of blocks by goto statements or the 
dissolvement of small variable scopes into global ones. In the conversion of compile-
time control flow elements into run-time data dependent jumps, the control flow 
elements such as if-and-while statements are converted into a form that is dependent on the 
content of variables. 
Code obfuscation techniques prevent attacks temporarily on the agent’s code and it 
doesn’t make use of a trusted functionality. Since an agent can become invalid before 
completing its computation, obfuscated code is suitable for applications that do not convey 
information intended for long-lived concealment. Furthermore, no techniques are currently 
known for establishing the lower bounds on the complexity for an attacker to reverse 
engineer an agent’s code (Jansen & Karygiannis, 1999).
This approach will cost both execution time, space and communication bandwidth and will 
require some time-critical restrictions, but gives the agent the possibility to do some security 
sensitive work without the danger of an immediate explosion of sensitive data by the host 
(Hohl, 1997).
Westhoff (2001) also states that this approach requires a large number of interactions with a 
trusted host at every destination specified on the itinerary.
Code transformations (prevention)
An et al. (2002) proposed the method of code transformations whereby a compiler-
based approach is used to conduct code transformations for the purpose of obstructing 
static analysis. Prevention of tampering of the state of the mobile agent is done by 
transforming the data-flow and control-flow information as well as the relationship between
them. 
The transformation of the control-flow is performed in two steps. Firstly the high-level 
control structures are converted into if-then-go statements. Secondly the goto statement is 
modified in such a way that the target address is determined dynamically by the switch 
variable computed in each block of code. 
The data-flow transformation can be conducted by either of two methods namely dynamic 
computation of branch targets and alias through pointer manipulation. Branch targets 
are the latest definition of the switch variable. In dynamic computation of branch targets an 
array is defined whereby the value of the switch variable is computed. 
Time sensitive agents (prevention)
Time sensitive agents make use of the fact that it takes time for a malicious host to evaluate 
an executing agent. If the amount of time needed to execute a mobile agent on a host is 
limited, then the chance that it will be tampered with is minimized. It is necessary to 
determine the maximum amount of time needed by a mobile agent to execute safely on an 
untrusted host. Once this maximum time has elapsed, the agent can be programmed for 
example to shut down or to move to the next host specified on the itinerary (Grimley & 
Monroe, 1999).
At the moment, the implementation of one specific countermeasure is seldom enough to 
provide acceptable security against a malicious host, but it is essential to select and combine 
solutions according to the needs of the user and the sensitivity of the mobile agent. Time 
sensitive agents can be used to prevent malicious host attacks by combining them with for 
example code obfuscation techniques.
3.4 Analysis of Threats and Countermeasures
In order to provide a framework for the protection of mobile agents against malicious hosts, 
it is necessary to analyse the different countermeasures according to the categories of threats 
as discussed in Chapter 2. Each of the countermeasures is evaluated according to the 
protection that they provide for each part of the mobile agent. The analysis is discussed in 
the following sections according to the information provided in the tables.
3.4.1 Integrity Interference
The four different integrity interference threats namely, transmitting the mobile agent 
incorrectly, transmitting the mobile agent to a host not on the itinerary, not executing 
the mobile agent completely and executing the mobile agent arbitrarily as well as the 
countermeasures that can be used to prevent/detect these attacks are outlined in Table 3.1 
and Table 3.2. The tables follow the same outline as in Chapter 2, whereby the grey cells 
indicate that the type of offence listed in the column does not affect the particular part of the 
agent and thus no countermeasure/s are needed. Tamper resistant hardware (Wilhelm et 
al., 1998) together with the creation of a trusted environment (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) 
is the only two countermeasures that provide the most preventative protection against 
possible integrity interference attacks. Tamper resistant hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998) 
can only provide protection against attacks on the migration process if the serialisation and 
de-serialisation process of the mobile agent is done inside the boundaries of the trusted 
hardware. Detection methods, such as itinerary recording with replication and voting 
(Minsky et al., 1996) as well as execution tracing (Vigna, 1998) also provide protection 
against integrity interference attacks. One of the problem-areas is to make sure that the 
current host provides the mobile agent with the correct information as it requested.
Table 3.1: Integrity Interference
Integrity Interference
Transmitting mobile agent incorrectly Countermeasures Transmitting 
agent to host not on itinerary Countermeasures
Code Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Execution tracing Reference states No effect
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Reference states State appraisal Execution tracing No 
effect
Control Flow Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Reference states Execution tracing No effect
Data ID Threat Tamper resistant hardware 
Trusted execution environment  Itinerary recording with replication & voting Execution tracing No 
effect
Itinerary Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Execution tracing Threat Tamper 
resistant hardware Trusted execution environment Path histories Itinerary recording with replication & 
voting Mutual itinerary recording Anonymous itinerary
Initial data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Digital signature Execution tracing No effect
Aggregated data Threat Tamper resistant hardware 
Trusted execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Partial result encapsulation 
Digital signature Phone home No effect
Aggregated essential data Threat Tamper resistant hardware 
Trusted execution environment  Itinerary recording with replication & voting Partial result encapsulation
Digital signature No effect
Required data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting No effect
Table 3.2: Integrity Interference (Cont.)
Integrity Interference
Not executing the mobile agent completely Countermeasures Executing 
mobile agent arbitrarily Countermeasures
Code No effect No effect
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Reference states State appraisal Execution tracing
Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Reference states Execution tracing
Control Flow Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Itinerary recording with replication & voting Execution tracing Threat Tamper 
resistant hardware Trusted execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting 
Execution tracing
Data ID No effect No effect
Itinerary No effect No effect
Initial data No effect No effect
Aggregated data No effect No effect
Aggregated essential data No effect No effect
Required data Threat Trusted execution environment Reference states
Threat Trusted execution environment Reference states
3.4.2 Integrity modification
Table 3.3 provide the threats and countermeasures relating to integrity modification. As 
indicated in the table, a number of countermeasures provide protection against the deletion, 
corruption, manipulation, alteration, misinterpretation and incorrect execution of the 
mobile agent. Tamper resistant hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998), code transformations 
(An et al., 2002), code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998), computing with encrypted 
functions (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) and providing a trusted execution environment 
(Sander & Tschudin, 1998) provide preventative protection against all integrity modification 
attacks. Detection methods that can be used include execution tracing (Vigna, 1998), 
proof-carrying code (Necula & Lee, 1998), itinerary recording with replication and 
voting (Minsky et al., 1996), detection objects (McDermott & Goldschlag, 1996) and 
path histories (Ordille, 1996).  As indicated in the table possible countermeasures exist for 
the whole agent against integrity modification attacks.
Table 3.3: Integrity Modification
Integrity modification
Deleting, corrupting, manipulating, altering, misinterpreting, 
incorrect execution. Countermeasures
Code Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Path histories Detection objects Itinerary recording with replication & voting 
Proof carrying code Execution tracing Computing with encrypted functions Code obfuscation Code 
transformations Time sensitive agents Environmental key generation
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Reference states State appraisal 
Execution tracing Computing with encrypted functions Code transformations Time sensitive agents
Control Flow Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Path histories Detection objects Itinerary recording with replication & voting 
Execution tracing Computing with encrypted functions Code obfuscation Code transformations Time 
sensitive agents
Data ID Threat Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted execution environment Path histories Itinerary recording with replication & voting 
Time sensitive agents Environmental key generation
Itinerary Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Path histories Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary 
recording Anonymous itinerary Time sensitive agents Environmental key generation
Initial data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Digital signature Environmental key 
generation
Aggregated data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Trusted third party Itinerary recording with replication & voting Phoning home 
Partial result encapsulation Digital signature Time sensitive agents Environmental key generation
Aggregated essential data Threat Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Partial result 
encapsulation Digital signature Time sensitive agents Environmental key generation
Required data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Reference states Partial result 
encapsulation Digital signature
3.4.3 Availability
Availability threats consist of denial of service, delay of service and transmission refusal. 
The countermeasures to combat the availability threats are given in Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. 
Providing protection against denial of service attacks can be obtained by the use of tamper 
resistant hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998), the creation of a trusted execution 
environment (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) and by using time sensitive agents (Grimley & 
Monroe, 1999). It must be noted that time sensitive agents (Grimley & Monroe, 1999) 
are to be used in collaboration with other countermeasure techniques such as code 
obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998) in order to make it more viable. Table 3.4 again outlines 
the lack of countermeasures for attacks that denies the mobile agent information as 
requested.
Table 3.4: Availability (Denial of service)
Availability
Denial of Service
Execution resources (memory & CPU denied)
Countermeasures Data denied / Bombarded with irrelevant information
Countermeasures
Code Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Time sensitive agents No effect
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Time sensitive agents No effect
Control Flow No effect No effect
Data ID No effect No effect
Itinerary No effect No effect
Initial data No effect No effect
Aggregated data No effect No effect
Aggregated essential data No effect No effect
Required data No effect Threat
Trusted execution environment
Table 3.5 provides the countermeasures of the delay-of-service attacks. Tamper resistant 
hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998), providing a trusted execution environment (Sander & 
Tschudin, 1998) and time sensitive agents (Grimley & Monroe, 1999) are the only 
countermeasures that can possibly protect the mobile agent against delay-of-service attacks. 
Delaying the provision of data as requested by the mobile agent once again proves to be 
difficult to protect against.
Table 3.5: Availability (Delay-of-service)
Availability
Delay of service
Execution resources (memory & CPU delayed)
Countermeasure Data is delayed Countermeasures
Code Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Time sensitive agents No effect
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Time sensitive agents No effect
Control Flow No effect No effect
Data ID No effect No effect
Itinerary No effect No effect
Initial data No effect No effect
Aggregated data No effect No effect
Aggregated essential data No effect No effect
Required data No effect Threat
Trusted execution environment Time sensitive agents
In Table 3.6 the list of countermeasures providing protection against the host refusing to 
transmit the agent are given. Prevention techniques include tamper resistant hardware 
(Wilhelm et al., 1998), trusted execution environment (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) and 
time sensitive agents (Grimley & Monroe, 1999). Mutual itinerary recording (Roth, 
1998) and itinerary recording with replication and voting (Minsky et al., 1996) are two 
detection methods that can be used.
Table 3.6: Availability (Transmission Refusal)
Availability
Transmission refusal
Transmission refusal Countermeasures
Code Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary recording Time 
sensitive agents
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary recording Time 
sensitive agents
Control Flow Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary recording Time 
sensitive agents
Data ID Threat Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary 
recording Time sensitive agents
Itinerary Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary recording Time 
sensitive agents
Initial data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary recording Time 
sensitive agents
Aggregated data Threat Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary 
recording Time sensitive agents
Aggregated essential data Threat Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary 
recording Time sensitive agents
Required data Threat Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted execution environment Itinerary recording with replication & voting Mutual itinerary 
recording
3.4.4 Confidentiality
Countermeasures for confidentiality attacks are provided in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. 
Tamper resistant hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998), trusted execution environment 
(Sander & Tschudin, 1998), code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998), code transformation 
(An et al., 2002), and environmental key generation (Riordan & Schneier, 1998) are 
prevention mechanisms that prove viable against eavesdropping attacks. This is because 
they either make use of a trusted environment or the different components of the mobile 
agent are encrypted. Theft of the mobile agent is difficult to protect against and can only be 
protected in a trusted network or when making use of techniques where the agent is 
duplicated, such as using a mobile agent system (Yee, 1997).
Table 3.7: Confidentiality
Confidentiality
Eavesdropping Countermeasures Theft
Countermeasures
Code Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Code obfuscation Code transformations Environmental key generation Threat
Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment Using a mobile agent 
system
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Code transformations Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Using a mobile agent system
Control Flow Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Code obfuscation Code transformations Environmental key generation Threat
Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment Using a mobile agent 
system
Data ID Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Environmental key generation Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Using a mobile agent system
Itinerary Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Environmental key generation Anonymous itinerary Threat Tamper 
resistant hardware Trusted execution environment Using a mobile agent system
Initial data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment 
Environmental key generation Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Using a mobile agent system
Aggregated data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Trusted third party Environmental key generation Threat
Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution environment Using a mobile agent system
Aggregated essential data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Environmental key generation Threat Tamper 
resistant hardware Trusted execution environment Using a mobile agent system
Required data No effect No effect
Reverse engineering of the mobile agent can only be protected when making use of tamper 
resistant hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998), a trusted execution environment (Sander & 
Tschudin, 1998), time sensitive agents (Grimley & Monroe, 1999) and methods that 
incorporate encryption techniques (such as environmental key generation (Riordan & 
Schneier, 1998)).
Table 3.8: Confidentiality (cont.)
Confidentiality
Reverse Engineer Countermeasures
Code Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Time sensitive agents Code obfuscation Code transformation Environmental key 
generation
State Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Time sensitive agents
Control Flow Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Time sensitive agents Environmental key generation
Data ID Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Time sensitive agents
Itinerary Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Time sensitive agents Anonymous itinerary
Initial data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Time sensitive agents Environmental key generation
Aggregated data Threat Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
execution environment Trusted third party Time sensitive agents Partial result encapsulation
Aggregated essential data Threat Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted execution environment Time sensitive agents
Required data No effect
3.4.5 Authentication
Authentication attacks (namely masquerading and cloning) can only be prevented when 
deploying the mobile agent in a trusted execution environment (Sander & Tschudin, 
1998) (see Table 3.9).
Table 3.9: Authentication
Authentication
Masquerading Countermeasures Cloning
Countermeasures
Code No effect No effect
State No effect No effect
Control Flow No effect No effect
Data ID No effect Threat Trusted 
execution environment
Itinerary No effect No effect
Initial data No effect No effect
Aggregated data No effect No effect
Aggregated essential data No effect No effect
Required data Threat Trusted execution environment 
Digital signatures No effect
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed look at the possible countermeasures for protecting a 
malicious agent against attacks by a malicious host. The countermeasures were divided into 
four different classes, namely trust-based computing, recording and tracking, 
cryptographic techniques and obfuscation and time. Section 3.4 analysed the different 
countermeasures by creating matrixes of threats against countermeasures. This analysis is 
essential in providing a framework for the protection of a mobile agent and is referenced 
again in later chapters. Chapter 4 provides information and discussions on current mobile 
agent systems as well as applications that incorporate security techniques.
CHAPTER 4
MOBILE AGENT MODELS, FRAMEWORKS, ARCHITECTURES, SYSTEMS 
AND APPLICATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Working towards a framework for the protection of mobile agents against malicious hosts, it 
is essential to study proposed mobile agent models, frameworks and architectures as well as 
current mobile agent systems and mobile agent applications. A large number of such systems 
are available in literature but only a few incorporate security methods into their designs. 
Insights into the different proposals, systems and applications that have integrated security 
techniques into their designs, are offered in this chapter as well as detail of the designs. The 
analysis of the frameworks, systems and applications will guide us towards establishing a set 
of criteria for a mobile agent security framework and ultimately the requirements for such a 
framework 
The study of the designs of the systems listed in this chapter consists of a description of each 
system followed by a short summary detailing the types of countermeasures incorporated 
into the designs as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the designs. Each section 
ends with a short integrated discussion on the analysis of the different systems.
4.2 Mobile Agent Models and Frameworks
For the purpose of this research, we have studied more than thirty mobile agent models, 
frameworks and architectures as described in literature. The literature that was studied do 
not necessarily agree on (or distinguish between) terminology such as frameworks, 
models, architectures and systems.  For example, some describe their work as a 
“framework”, whilst others use the term “model” to structure similar research efforts.  It is 
outside the scope of this research to get absorbed in the definitions of these terms. Our aim 
is rather to recapitulate the essence of the different research efforts that were investigated 
and therefore, we merely use the same terminology offered by the authors. These proposals 
and implementations introduce interactions between different countermeasures as well as 
measures not discussed as part of the previous chapters. In the following paragraphs, we 
describe the most prominent of these systems in terms of the basic functionality of the 
security implementation of each, which include the type of countermeasures used.  We 
conclude the discussion on each system by an evaluative remark on the most salient points 
as well as the drawbacks regarding the security implementation of each system. 
The proposed mobile agent models and frameworks are divided into those that make use of 
some kind of trusted environment and those that can operate in an open environment 
(where no trusted environment is created or specified).
4.2.1 Trusted environment
The mobile agent models and frameworks in this section make use of the concept of creating
a trusted environment. This is achieved by either using trusted hardware, a trusted third party
or by authenticating the hosts.
Police office model (POM)
Guan et al. (2000) presented a mobile agent security model by setting up special hosts 
called police offices within defined regions. These police offices are based on the concept of 
police stations in the real world. The idea of POM is to prevent a large number of attacks 
that can be performed by malicious hosts against mobile agents. This is achieved by the 
separation of critical components (of the agent) and only allowing non-critical components to
be executed at the remote hosts. 
Regions are defined that consist of a number of special hosts connected to each other. 
Regions may not overlap and hosts within a region have high-speed connections relative to 
low speed connections to hosts outside the region. A police office is a special host inside a 
predefined region, with certain characteristics, namely, it is a trusted host, it is responsible 
for controlling all hosts in the region and it is accessible through any host specified in the 
region. All mobile agents are divided into distinct parts, namely a master part that is security 
critical and a slave part that is security-free. The slave part can only migrate between the 
host and the police office. 
Once a mobile agent needs to migrate to a specific host (Host1) in a region, it first migrates 
to the police office of the specific region where-in Host1 is located. The master part of the 
mobile agent remains at the police office and sends the slave part to Host1 where it will 
perform security-free actions. After completion the slave part returns to the police office 
with the results obtained. Computations with the returned results are performed by the 
master part at the police office and on completion the mobile agent can migrate to the next 
host on its itinerary.
The countermeasures used in this model are based on the creation of a trusted execution 
environment by using the notion of a trusted entity for secure computations of the agents. 
Although the autonomy and mobility aspects of the mobile agent are restricted within this 
model, the model can be implemented successfully in applications that are reliant on a 
trusted environment for the secure execution of mobile agents. One of the advantages of the 
model is that the security critical data (such as keys for encryption / decryption) are only 
migrated between trusted entities and is thus protected from malicious acts by foreign hosts. 
Computational cost implications for the remote hosts are minimal due to the agent only 
retrieving information at the different hosts and the computations completed at the trusted 
entity.
Although POM offers a number of inspiring security benefits to tackle the malicious host 
problem, there are some notable weaknesses. For example, the partitioning of the mobile 
agent in a master and slave part can be difficult depending on the type of application to be 
implemented. The creation of regions can also pose problems because they are required not 
to overlap and for every region a trusted entity needs to be established. The model does not 
supply the relation between the number of hosts and the trusted entity within a domain. This 
can lead to a bottleneck at the trusted entity, if a large number of hosts are defined within a 
region. The size of the itinerary of the agent will be extensive due to the inclusion of the 
trusted entities as well as the hosts within a domain to be visited. The model also defines the 
police office as a separate entity, which causes problems such as establishing the responsible 
entity for the creation and maintenance of the police offices (both in terms of hardware and 
software). The communication sessions within the model also increases substantially due to 
the mobile agent being split and it not being migrated as a whole to the list of remote hosts.
Security enhanced mobile agents
Varadharajan (2000) proposed a security model whereby the notion of a security 
enhanced mobile agent is introduced. The security enhanced agent carries a passport that 
contains its security credentials and related security code. 
Each host in this model contains a trusted security management component (SMC), which
maintains security policy information as well as public and private keys. Hosts that obey the 
same security policies are also grouped together to form a domain. Each domain has a 
security authority, namely the security management authority (SMA) that is responsible to 
interact with the SMC's in the domain in order to establish and maintain security policies. It 
is also responsible to interact with SMAs in other domains. Each SMC and SMA in the 
system has public-private key pairs and they are trusted entities. 
The security enhanced mobile agent has a structure consisting of an identifier, privilege 
token, data store, agent code and security tags. The identifier field consists of a unique 
identifier assigned at creation, a creator-principal certificate that refers to the creator of the 
mobile agent, a creator-SMC certificate (signed by the SMA), a timestamp when the mobile 
agent was created and the intended lifetime of the mobile agent. The privilege token 
contains privileges to be used in conjunction with the policy at the host in order to determine 
whether a request by a mobile agent is to be allowed or disallowed. Each privilege in the 
token consists of an identifier, a timestamp and a lifetime. The data store contains the 
execution state and itinerary of the mobile agent, while the agent code is divided into two 
types of code, namely application code as specified by the creator of the mobile agent and 
security code. Security code is a default set of methods automatically added when the 
security enhanced mobile agent is created. Two security tags are identified, namely one 
created by the owner that contains the hash value of the original security enhanced mobile 
agent and one which is generated by the sending host and contains the hash value of the first 
certificate and the data store.
When creating a mobile agent, a unique identifier is generated and the creator-principal 
certificate as well as the creator-SMC certificate is added. The privileges of the mobile 
agent are defined, the default security code is added and the security tags are generated. 
The migration request from one host to the next host as specified in the itinerary contains the 
identity of the sending host, its SMC certificate, the target host, the operation being 
requested and the valid time period.
The static part of the mobile agent (code and creator granted privileges) is signed using the 
private key of the creator. The dynamic part is signed using the private key of the sending 
host. The receiving host can verify the authenticity of the sending platform as well as check 
the integrity of the application code. If all checks are successful, the mobile agent is executed
and a copy of the results is stored in data store. The SMC of the executing host produces a 
signed hash digest of the results along with a timestamp using its private key. 
The countermeasures incorporated into the design of Security enhanced mobile agents 
consist of policies, encryption, digital signatures and time techniques in order to protect the 
agent against malicious modifications. These countermeasures combined provide protection 
for the mobile agent’s code and data against integrity modification and confidentiality 
attacks. The creation of keys for encryption and decryption purposes is managed within a 
security manager contained in every remote host. The creation of a secure software 
component within every host as well as the creation of a trusted security management 
authority can prove this model viable in a small closed environment.
This model creates a trusted environment by authenticating the hosts as well as the agents 
before migration. Aggregated data is also signed at every host in order to protect the results 
obtained. The use of a time stamp within the concept of a trusted environment seems to 
provide additional protection against attacks such as reverse engineering and delay of 
execution.
The disadvantages of this model are the autonomy and mobility restrictions placed on the 
agent, due to the agent only being released in a trusted domain. The establishments of 
trusted entities as well as specifying the domains place additional restrictions on the mobile 
agent.
Flexible IPR for software agent reliance (FILIGRANE)
The purpose of the FILIGRANE project is to develop a security framework for mobile 
code commerce. Jalali et al. (2000) proposed the project, which makes use of the standard 
Java Cryptography Architecture and Java Cryptography Extension as the underlying 
security infrastructure. 
The model consists of a number of entities, namely a certification authority, a smart card 
issuer, the producer of the mobile code, the provider who sells services or information, the 
end user who is registered to download software, a rights clearing house which is 
responsible for the definition of rights between entities, a fee collecting agency, a quality 
label service and an E-notary which acts as a trusted repository for all entities. 
A mobile agent is protected in FILIGRANE by means of a signature (more than one entity 
can sign the agent as a whole or individual files that form part of the agent), encryption (the 
agent is encrypted to firstly avoid reverse engineering and secondly to control the execution 
and reading there-of), rules (used for describing the contracts between different entities and 
are checked by the host to detect breaching), watermarks (are embedded in the agent for 
the purpose of identification of code, integrity checks and avoidance of reverse engineering), 
obfuscation (modifications of the code in order to make the process of reverse engineering 
difficult), tagging (the identification of the mobile agent). All the mentioned protection 
mechanisms are combined inside a package called a code envelope. 
The FILIGRANE framework uses smart cards as secure physical tokens for storage and 
usage rights. The operations on the mobile agent are controlled by a security engine, which 
are embedded in the hosts in order to control mobile agent packaging and execution. The 
security engine consists of a number of configurable name services. A session manager 
registered and manages these services.
The FILIGRANE framework makes use of a number of techniques in order to create a 
trusted environment for a specific mobile agent application. These techniques include the use 
of smart cards, creation of policies, encryption of the agent, watermarking and code 
obfuscation. The FILIGRANE project introduced a new security concept within the mobile 
agent environment, namely watermarking that can be used in the protection of the agents. 
Watermarking is the practice of imperceptibly, altering a cover to embed a message about 
that cover.  The integration of watermarking, code obfuscation and encryption techniques, is 
a new direction taken in mobile agent security technology and can protect an agent against 
integrity modifications and confidentiality attacks (especially eavesdropping and reverse 
engineering). The cryptography aspects are done via an extension to the Java language, 
which relates to no additional costs if the mobile agent system is based on the mentioned 
language.
A drawback to this framework is the use of trusted hardware in the form of smart cards. 
This is however, an application specific security framework for the trading of mobile code 
on the Internet. Additional requirements for the implementation of this framework include the 
trusted entity within a domain as well as the security engine embedded at every remote host.
M&M Mobile agent framework
Marques et al. (2001) have developed a component framework for the deployment of 
mobile agents by making use of components that allow applications to become able to send 
and receive mobile agents. In M&M there are no mobile agent platforms and the security 
aspects must be integrated with security mechanisms already in place in the applications. The
reason being that the mobile agents migrates between applications and not hosts.
Marques et al. (2001) distinguish between different application domains that run on different 
environments. Two types of environments are considered, namely closed environments 
where all nodes belong to the same authority (for example network management and 
software upgrading) and open environments where the nodes may belong to different 
authorities (for example electronic commerce and information gathering). The M&M mobile 
agent framework operates in an agent-accountable environment, which is a mix between a 
closed and open environment. An agent accountable environment is defined as a set of 
cooperating organisations that deploy a mobile agent infrastructure for supporting their 
operations. These organisations form a trusted environment.  
The security model consists of three modules, namely the mobility component (that 
provides the basic infrastructure for the migration and management of the mobile agents), the 
security component (responsible for handling tasks such as public and private key 
management, user and host authentication and authorisation) and the security manager (this 
component must be instantiated to allow for permission-based mechanisms to be 
employed).
The security features of the framework are authentication and authorisation, 
confidentiality and privacy, accountability, installable services and remote 
management as well as cryptographic primitives. Each of the principals in the M&M 
framework has a private and public key pair stored on a local key store. Upon creation of a 
mobile agent, the owner has to provide a password used for uniquely connecting the mobile 
agent to the owner. An object containing the identity information of the mobile agent (such 
as itinerary, name, hash of code, creation and expiry time) is created and signed with the 
private key of the owner to prevent tampering. The owner can only create mobile agents in 
the nodes where it is registered. Key distribution is locally done from a key-store and a 
LDAP server stores all keys for a whole system. When the mobile agent migrates to a host, 
its identity is firstly sent whereupon the security component will validate and either accept 
or reject the mobile agent. 
SSL sockets are used to protect the mobile agent while migrating and the data and 
execution state is kept private. In terms of accountability, log reports are kept where each 
log entry consists of a security level, an origin and a timestamp. Cryptographic primitives 
such as partial result authentication codes are used for the implementation of secure 
information gathering protocols. 
The M&M framework integrates countermeasures such as digital signatures, encryption, 
passwords, policies, partial result authentication codes and log reports for protecting the 
agent. The M&M framework can be useful in applications that require a trusted domain for 
implementation. A main feature of the M&M framework is that it distinguishes between 
types of environments (open, close or agent-accountable). A security manager is also built-
in at every host for handling authentication and key management related tasks.
M&M does not require an execution environment on each host, but transfers agents 
between applications. This has additional requirements for the host as well as the agent in 
terms of software needed for development. 
Distributed transactions
Vogler et al. (1997) present an architecture for a mobile agent system that guarantees 
protection of the hosts as well as protection of the mobile agents. This architecture makes 
use of a trusted third party that contains information about all instances of the closed system. 
The trusted third party is also responsible for key generation, as well as the logging of data 
about the mobile agents and hosts (such as the identities of the mobile agent and the host, as 
well as time intervals). For acceptance in this architecture, it is assumed that every principal 
possesses a certified public key pair and is registered at the trusted third party. 
The initiator of the mobile agent registers the agent at the trusted third party, which generates 
a unique mobile agent identification. This communication is protected by public key 
encryption. The next host on the itinerary is determined with the aid of a special trader for 
agents. Once a contract between the target host and agent is negotiated, a copy of the 
mobile agent is sent to the host by making use of two different mechanisms namely 
distributed transaction processing and encryption. 
The protocol steps for the transfer of the mobile agent starts off with the originator host 
initiating a distributed transaction involving the target host and the trusted third party. A 
session key is requested by the originator host for the secure transfer of the mobile agent. 
The session key is generated and sent to the originator and target host by the trusted third 
party. The copy of the mobile agent is encrypted with the session key and transferred to the 
target host, whereupon it acknowledges and decrypts the mobile agent. 
This architecture guarantees that no other entity besides the trusted hosts have access to the 
mobile agent. If one of the trusted hosts attacks the agent, the logging facilities can be used 
to detect the breach and trace it back to the host. 
The countermeasures employed by the Distributed transactions architecture are a trusted 
third party for key distribution and logging as well as the encryption of agents between 
entities. A closed environment of trusted hosts is created by requiring the remote hosts to 
register at a trusted third party within a certain domain. The creation and distribution of a 
session key for the encryption of the agent can be used effectively, with the only 
disadvantage being the additional communication sessions between the hosts and the trusted 
third party. The trusted third party is also required to keep logs of the execution of the agent 
for detection purposes.
Mansion
Mansion provides a logical model for designing distributed multi-agent applications. Van't 
Noordende et al. (2002) present the security architecture of Mansion, which provides 
protection for hosts as well as mobile agents.
The Mansion framework consists of a logical model that is used to structure an application 
and a physical model that consists of a network of hosts on which the logical model is 
mapped. An application is modelled as a closed world containing a set of hyper-linked 
rooms, which determines how they are connected. Entities in a room (such as mobile 
agents) are injected into a world through a daemon, which does some security and 
consistency checks. Global services that are accessible to agents in all rooms are contained 
in an attic. A basement in each world keeps track of the information needed to make the 
world function, such as location tracking. Zones are used to express the distribution and 
security properties of the hosts and are protected by public-key cryptography.
The owner of the mobile agent provides only a list of trusted hosts on its itinerary in order to 
make sure that it does not migrate to a host in an untrusted zone. If information located on 
an untrusted host is needed, a helper agent is created with minimal functionality to retrieve 
the data and return to its parent (the mobile agent). An agent container is used to store the 
agent's data and code. Upon migration to a next host the contents of the mobile agent is 
signed with the private key of the host. An audit trail of visited hosts is kept in order to 
determine illegal changes to the mobile agent.
The Mansion architecture protects the mobile agent against malicious modifications by 
making use of a trusted network of hosts. The countermeasures employed include the use of 
a trusted entity for distributing the agent into a specified domain, digital signatures, 
encryption of the agent as well as keeping path histories of the hosts visited. As Mansion 
only lets the agent be deployed amongst a pre-defined set of hosts, it will be suitable for 
applications that require a trusted domain for deployment.
The creation of slave agents for retrieving data means that the mobile agent is not executed 
at the remote host but on a trusted entity. This implies additional communication sessions for 
retrieving data. 
Planet
Kato et al. (1996) designed a distributed computing system, called Planet for a worldwide 
network. The Planet system model uses five basic abstractions namely, an object (an entity 
that encapsulates data as well as programs to manipulate the data), activity (a 
computational entity that encapsulates the current state of computation), place 
(computational resources), repository (worldwide object store) and protection domain 
(control object accesses).
Two techniques are used in the protection domain mechanism, namely the use of virtual-
memory management hardware units and providing each protection domain with a distinct 
virtual address space.  A host sends an object to another host in a secure way by following
a number of steps. The server object requests an authenticator object in order to register 
its service in the service directory. The authenticator object registers the service and 
generates a wrapper and un-wrapper pair. The wrap operation encrypts an object and 
attaches a unique object name to the object. It also unloads the secure object from the 
protection domain, while the unwrap operation loads and decrypts the object. The 
authenticator object passes the un-wrapper to the server object that waits until an object 
arrives that can be unwrapped    (by making use of the provided un-wrapper). The client 
object makes a request for authentication of itself as well as a request for service from the 
authenticator’s object service directory. The authenticator object passes the wrapper to the 
client object, upon which the client object creates an object and uses the provided wrapper 
to encrypt the object. This secure object is sent to the server object that uses the un-
wrapper to unwrap the object.
Planet makes use of cryptographic protocols as well as protection domains and specific 
hardware components to protect agents. An advantage is that the required hardware 
component is not specialised, and is already available on virtually all modern computers. The 
creation of a trusted domain is achieved by the use of a trusted entity, authentication of the 
hosts as well as the encryption of the agent between hosts. This model is based on a 
distributed architecture and can be used in an environment that requires a trusted domain for 
distributed applications
The authentications and world-wide object store required by this model involves additional 
hardware/software to be created within the system. 
Proxy-agents and trusted domains 
Mitroviæ & Arribalgaza (2002) proposed an architecture for secure mobile agent systems 
by using trusted domains and proxy agents. The architecture introduces the concept of 
security proxy agents as facilitators of security services for both mobile agents and mobile 
agent systems. The security proxy agents contain a set of security and cryptographic 
mechanisms that can be used. 
There is a proxy factory present in every mobile agent system that is responsible for the 
creation of security proxy agents as well as the association of these with mobile agents. One 
or more security proxy agents guard the entrance to the mobile agent systems. The 
proposed architecture relies on trusted domains, where every domain has one or more 
mobile agent systems that deal with security. The authentication of mobile agents and mobile 
agent systems as well as the application of trust policies is done by one domain. By checking 
the signature of the mobile agent or modules within the mobile agent systems, it is possible to 
detect alteration of the mobile agent's code. 
Upon migration from one domain to another, the mobile agent will move to the domain 
controller where the proxy factory service is located. A security proxy agent is created and 
assigned to the mobile agent, equipped with the credential of the mobile agent. Both the 
mobile agent and the security proxy agent move to the domain controller of the destination 
host, where the security proxy agent checks both for alterations. If no alteration is detected 
then the security proxy agent of the mobile agent and the destination domain controller 
negotiates possible cooperation. Once cooperation is agreed-on, the mobile agent is 
decrypted and can move freely within the domain. The security proxy agent will reside on 
the domain controller, waiting for the mobile agent to finish its journey within the domain. 
Upon completion the mobile agent is again encrypted and the journey is continued to the 
next domain. 
The Proxy agents and trusted domains architecture implements the use of a trusted entity 
for the creation of the proxy agents, the creation of security domains, as well as the use of 
policies and authentication techniques. This architecture can typically be deployed in an 
environment that allows for the creation of multiple domains with a secure entity present in 
every domain as well as applications that need a trusted environment for implementation.
Additional communication sessions is however a downside to this architecture, due to the 
cooperation agreement between the hosts and the proxies. The autonomy of the mobile 
agent is limited due to the creation of trusted domains. Additional cost implications can also 
have an affect if the trusted entities do not exist within the specified domains.
Electronic supermarkets
Wu (2000) proposed the use of electronic supermarkets in order to solve or minimise the 
security problems experienced in mobile agent systems. An electronic supermarket is a 
database owned by a trusted authority that is responsible for the management thereof. In 
order to secure visiting mobile agents, trusted hardware is implemented on all electronic 
supermarkets. Upon entering an electronic supermarket, the identity of the mobile agent is 
checked and recorded to a databank. This will alleviate problems encountered in the case 
where a mobile agent is cloned.  
Electronic supermarkets create a trusted set of hosts by requiring the implementation of 
tamper resistant hardware devices on every host. Domains are specified and a trusted entity 
is required within every domain. The purpose of the trusted entity is to allow for the 
registration of mobile agents before entering the domain. This feature will assist in protection 
of the host and can assist in detecting if a malicious host has made an exact copy of the 
agent. Electronic supermarkets is an application specific model that can be used for 
applications that require the agent to conduct e-commerce related functions. 
The use of trusted hardware within the model protects the agent from a malicious host but 
does however have additional cost implications for the remote hosts. 
Domain name exchange (DNX) 
Schütz et al. (2000) presented different security techniques designed for the Domain 
Name eXcgange (DNX) platform. Cryptographic tools are used for the safe routing of 
mobile agents between hosts and a secure Java-based platform guarantees the safe 
execution of the mobile agents. 
Every host in the mobile agent network is structured with three main parts, namely an agent 
space for the execution of the mobile agents, a services space that provides the interface 
between the mobile agent and the mobile agent platform, and the security space which 
controls the incoming and outgoing mobile agents. The security space consists of a sender 
agent, which is a stationary agent responsible for encrypting and signing the outgoing agents 
and a receiver agent responsible for decrypting and verifying the incoming agents. 
The JavaSeal agent platform (Vitek et al., 1998) is used to ensure the secure execution of 
agents, controlled communications between agent environments and enforcing the security 
policy of the agents.
The DNX platform integrates encryption techniques as well as the notion of a secure 
platform for the safe execution of agents. The notion of a protection domain is achieved by 
using JavaSeal (Vitek et al., 1998), which is a micro-kernel mobile agent system 
developed using Java. Applications that are required to execute within a trusted environment 
and that are based on the Java language can be implemented by using the DNX model. It 
provides secure transmission of agents between hosts and the authentication of agents and 
hosts.
The disadvantages are the restrictions placed on the autonomy of the mobile agent as well as 
the required space necessary on the remote hosts.
Supervisor-worker framework
Fischmeister (2000) described a framework whereby confidential data is left at a secure 
place and slave agents are sent to untrusted hosts carrying a limited amount of information. 
The framework makes use of supervisors, who are responsible for dividing tasks into sub-
tasks, controlling the workers, and generating reports after merging the outputs as received 
from the worker agents. The workers implement all methods needed for accepting and 
fulfilling tasks and sending reports to the supervisor. Upon initialisation, the user creates the 
supervisor and delegates a task. The supervisor splits the task into different subtasks and 
moves to a host in the area where the workers will perform their subtasks. The supervisor 
then creates the workers and delegates the subtasks, upon which the workers move to the 
destined hosts and relay the results back to the supervisor. The supervisor merges the results
and conveys it back to the user.
The creation of a trusted execution environment for the execution of agents within the 
Supervisor-worker framework is achieved by creating secure domains. Every domain is 
equipped with a trusted third party for accepting incoming agents within the domain as well 
as the creation of slave agents in order to retrieve results from hosts within the domain. This 
trusted entity is also responsible for the computation of the agent once all the required 
information is retrieved. The Supervisor-worker framework will be adequate within 
applications that require a trusted environment, where the creation of trusted hosts is 
replaced by the computation referred to a trusted third party.
The supervisor has to reside on a trusted host in the vicinity of the workers, which is a major 
disadvantage of this framework. The strategies for dividing the task into subtasks, as well as 
the protection of the slave agents, are also unclear.
4.2.2 Open environment
A small number of frameworks and models are available in literature that combine security 
techniques without the creation of a trusted environment. The proposed frameworks and 
models for an open environment are discussed in this section.
Secure and automatic wrapper for mobile agents (SAWMA)
Luo (2001) proposed a detection approach for the protection of mobile agents by making 
use of three layered techniques, namely secret spreading, obfuscation, and Java 
watermarking. Before migration to a host the mobile agent uses a wrapper to converts the 
clear text of the mobile agent code cryptographically. By making use of these techniques the 
code of the mobile agent will be more difficult to be attacked by a malicious host. 
The sharing of secrets is done by attaching time limits to the lifetime of the agent as well as 
making use of distributed agents, in order to share the secrets amongst more than one agent. 
Methods to evoke secret sharing can be for example recursive encryptions and the split 
of variables. The author developed a technique called class evolution that enables the 
encryption to change throughout the execution cycle. This technique also includes a method 
whereby mobile agents don't execute in clear text form on the remote host. 
Code watermarking attempts to detect any manipulation of the mobile agent's code. 
Watermarks embedded in Java code are dynamic; meaning the detection of the watermark 
requires the execution of the code. The execution status of the mobile agent is observed by 
its owner and detection of modification is done by the verification of the watermark. 
Combining watermarking, code obfuscation and time techniques forms the basis of 
SAWMA. As also proposed in the FILIGRANE project (Jalali et al., 2000), the 
combination of these three techniques is worth looking into for the purpose of protecting the 
mobile agent. Additional countermeasures within the SAWMA model include the encryption 
of the agents as well as time limits. Secret data carried by the agent is protected by means of 
creating a certain number of mobile agents, each containing a sub-set of the secret data. By 
using this method the data that is declared as secret is spread amongst a number of agents 
and is not contained in a single agent. This framework can be used for implementation within 
an open environment where a trusted set of hosts is not required and where the mobile agent 
can be split into a number of distributed agents.
The drawback is the creation of the distributed agents for the purpose of secret sharing. The 
migration paths for these agents is also unclear (in terms of whether they will visit the same 
hosts), as well as the increase in communication sessions due to the increase of mobile 
agents within the system. The actual creation of the distributed agents for secret sharing 
requires additional computational costs from the owner or creator of the agent.
Agent factory
Brazier et al. (2002) presented an approach whereby a blueprint of the mobile agent's 
functionality is migrated instead of the code, data and state. The mobile agent is designed to 
have a compositional structure and the resulting specification of the mobile agent is the 
blueprint. An agent factory is responsible for the generation of the mobile agent from the 
received blueprint for a specific platform. An agent platform requires libraries of re-usable 
mobile agent components as well as ways to describe the functionality of the mobile agent 
components. 
The blueprint contains descriptions of the interfaces of the components within an agent 
factory as well as additional information regarding the relation between these components on 
two levels of detail. These two levels are a conceptual description, which is the blueprint of 
the components, as well as interactions and interfaces between them. A detailed 
description includes the code and definitions.
The blueprint of a mobile agent does not change during the existence of the agent and by 
adding an integrity check (such as a digital signature) to a blueprint it is possible to detect 
whether the blueprint has been changed. The advantage of making use of agent factories is 
that mobile agents are able to migrate between non-identical platforms. 
The agent factory makes use of a separate entity required for the creation of the agent from 
a conceptual description. Within the framework the conceptual description is migrated and 
not the agent itself. The only protection provided is digital signatures added to the blueprint. 
This framework provides useful mechanisms for mobile agent applications within an open 
environment, due to a specific language-related execution environment not being required on 
remote hosts.
The question arises whether the problem of protecting a mobile agent is shifted to the 
protection of the blueprint. Another disadvantage is the existence of the agent factory 
responsible for the creation of the detailed description from the specifications contained in 
the conceptual description.
Security framework for a mobile agent system
Bryce (2000) describes a distributed security infrastructure for mobile agents, in which the 
mobile agents themselves are used to enforce security properties. The security properties 
are believability, meaning that mechanisms are provided for authentication and 
survivability, meaning the agent can be programmed to survive attacks by malicious hosts.
The framework makes use of encryption as well as replication and voting techniques. The 
mobile agent carries signed credentials that verify its properties and its security policy is 
designed to adapt to a possible changing environment.  An agent defines a set of access 
groups that represents a set of access rights. Keys for encryption and decryption purposes 
are carried within a predefined class of the agent.
The countermeasures used within the Security framework for a mobile agent system is 
based on the creation of cooperating agents. The replication and voting techniques used in 
the framework, can detect manipulations of the agent and the encryption of the agent (or 
parts there-of) provides safety against confidentiality and integrity attacks. Applications that 
consist of a small number of mobile agents can be implemented.
Disadvantages of this scheme is the protection of the key carried by the mobile agent for 
decryption purposes as well as the additional communication sessions created by the 
cooperating agents. The overhead costs of the system also increase with the use of 
replication and voting techniques.
Mobile code security framework
Tan & Moreau (2002) described a method by which execution traces are enhanced through 
a trusted third party called a verification server. The construction of a mobile agent is 
simplified by making use of mobile agent templates. 
The execution tracing protocol as proposed by Vigna (1998) is changed in this framework 
through the introduction of a verification server that is responsible for verifying the traces, 
instead of the local host. The framework consists of a certification authority, responsible 
for the issuing of certificates to other entities in the framework as well as the management of 
keys and a verification server, which is a trusted third party responsible for the verification 
of execution traces submitted by hosts on behalf of the agent owner. Two types of 
certificates are used, namely capability certificates and execution certificates. Capability 
certificates associate the identity of the host with its capability of correctly executing the 
mobile agent template. A mobile agent template identifier replaces the public key present in 
a normal certificate. The private key of the verification server signs these certificates. 
Execution certificates identify the success of the validation process and are generated by the 
verification server for a host. An execution certificate contains a hash of the agent’s code 
and state, a timestamp, identity of the verification server, identity of the host and the results 
of the trace. A record of all invalid execution traces that were detected is kept in a 
capability certificate revocation list. The verification server submits an entry containing 
the identity of the server, identity of the host platform, fault detected in the trace and a 
timestamp.
Before migrating to a new host, the following occurs: The mobile agent contains a list of 
template identifiers that represents the templates it is composed from. This as well as the 
code of the mobile agent is signed by the agent owner platform. The identifiers are sent to 
the new host platform, which checks if it possesses capability certificates containing some or 
all identifiers specified. The capability certificates are sent back to the mobile agent for 
review in order to decide to migrate or not.
After migration to the new host platform, the mobile agent is executed and an execution 
trace is created by the platform. The created trace is submitted to the verification server 
where it is validated and an execution certificate is prepared and sent back to the host 
platform (once the trace is validated). The host platform keeps a copy of the execution 
certificate and the original is sent with the mobile agent to the next host platform. If the trace 
is not validated no certificate is issued and an entry is written to the capability certificate 
revocation list.
The Mobile code security framework is advancing on the current execution traces 
technique through the use of a trusted certification authority. This trusted entity is not only 
responsible for key management but also the verification of the traces and the subsequent 
issuing of certificates upon validation. This framework can effectively be implemented in 
environments where such certification authorities exist.
Possible network congestion at the verification server can be a problem if the number of 
hosts and mobile agents compared to the number of verification servers are high. Execution 
tracing as a countermeasure also causes extensive extra overhead in terms of computational 
resources as well as additional communication sessions.
Self-protecting mobile agents
D’Anna et al. (2003) state in a final report, the development of a distributed mobile agent 
system, whereby the mobile agent is converted into a set of tamper-resistant agentlets.
Every mobile agent is partitioned into a set of communicating programs called agentlets that 
executes on independent hosts. Critical information contained in the mobile agent is spread 
across the agentlets that limits their vulnerability. The code and data of each agentlet is 
obfuscated by using a number of techniques. A time limit is also added so that a successful 
attack on an agentlet cannot be accomplished before the agent expires. Agentlets are self-
monitoring by using challenge/response techniques. Compromised agentlets are 
automatically excluded, lost agentlets are replaced and the identities of malicious nodes are 
reported.
Self-protecting mobile agents employs the use of distributed agents as well as code 
obfuscation and time techniques for protecting the agent. A mobile agent is split into a 
number of cooperating agents for the purpose of spreading the secret parts of the mobile 
agent amongst a number of different agents. The agents are protected by the use of code 
obfuscation and time techniques, which combined, provide adequate protection for the agent
against hosts employing reverse engineering techniques. Self-protecting agents can be used 
in an environment that relates to the use of cooperating agents.
The disadvantages of this framework are the actual creation of the different agents as well as 
the additional communication sessions required due to the use of additional agents. The 
additional agents can also influence the computational costs of the remote hosts if they are 
required to be executed on the same set of remote hosts. 
Plain text algorithm
An et al. (2002) proposed a method whereby the code of the mobile agent is sent in plain 
text and the data and state is encrypted. The protocol relies on the assumption that every 
host must be able to handle public key encryption and decryption.
Upon migration, the current host on the itinerary sends the identification of the mobile agent's 
owner, the mobile agent's code as well as a hash of the mobile agent's code encrypted with 
the secret key of the current host, to the next host. The receiving host checks if the hash 
code of the mobile agent's code is equal to the encrypted hash code as sent by the previous 
host. If it is equal the mobile agent is executed, if not the mobile agent is sent back to its 
local host. 
The Plain text algorithm method provides protection against integrity and authentication 
attacks, but not against confidentiality attacks.
An et al. (2002) also distinguish between agents employed in a trusted or untrusted 
environment and applications are defined as either critical or non-critical (according to the 
security levels that are required by the agent).
The countermeasures employed by the Plain text algorithm are based on encryption / 
decryption techniques. A new way of protecting the agent is proposed by only encrypting 
the state and the data of the agent and migrating the code in plain text format. A hash of the 
mobile agent’s code is created and validated by the next host. This proposed method would 
be viable in an application that requires the retrieval of information or similar applications 
where the data and state can be migrated in an encrypted form.
The classification of mobile agent applications depends on the type of environment (trusted 
or untrusted) and type of application (critical and non-critical) and is criteria that needs to be 
incorporated into the design of a mobile agent security framework.
Protocol for detecting a mobile agent clone
Baek (1999) proposed a protocol that can prevent the cloning of a mobile agent. Through 
the use of this protocol, it is also possible to detect whether a clone of a mobile agent exists 
as well as identify the malicious host that was responsible for the cloning. 
Cloning is seen as an exact replica of a current mobile agent, including the same unique 
identifier. The protocol makes use of a trusted party namely a coordinator, which upon 
receiving messages from hosts, determines the existence of a mobile agent clone by 
executing a clone detection algorithm. The creation, execution, migration and deletion of a 
mobile agent can only be done by a host if the coordinator grants permission. This gives 
control of the life cycle of the mobile agent over to the coordinator, and is also used as a 
method to detect possible cloning. The coordinator is in a position to predict the next step in 
the life cycle of the mobile agent, and any request not within this prediction indicates that a 
clone is in operation. 
The problem of duplicating mobile agents is a threat that can only be prevented by making 
use of a trusted execution environment. The protocol presented by Baek (1999) provides a 
new method by which the threat of cloning can be prevented. The additional requirements of 
the proposed protocol are the establishment of a trusted third party for the purpose of clone 
detection. This proposal needs to be integrated with other countermeasure techniques in that 
it only provides a method for detecting the creation of exact replicas by malicious hosts.
The disadvantages of the proposal lie in the additional communication sessions required 
between the hosts and the trusted entity responsible for the clone detection. 
 
Three-tier protection model
Sameh & Fakhry (2002) presented a solution to security in mobile agent systems by using a 
combination of code obfuscation, encryption and time techniques. 
The code obfuscation part is achieved through the involvement of three major parts namely, 
the insertion of dummy code (the aim of this part is to make the mobile agent code more 
complex for any attacker to understand), the alteration of the values of numeric 
variables (every numeric value such as integer and float is changed by multiplying the value 
with a random seed kept at the home host. This random seed value is used to regenerate the 
original numerical value of the mobile agent (by making use of an inverse operation) and the 
alteration of the values of string variables (every index in the string is changed by 
multiplying its numerical value by the generated random seed and kept at the home host).
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is used to encrypt the secret data of the 
mobile agent. This protection model was tested by making use of the Concordia mobile 
agent system (Kiniry & Zimmerman, 1997). 
The countermeasures implemented within the Three-tier protection model consist of code 
obfuscation, encryption and time techniques. The integration of these methods is to be used 
in applications that need to prevent the reverse engineering of the mobile agent. 
The disadvantages include the additional computational costs needed by the creator of the 
agent in order to implement code obfuscation techniques. The use of code obfuscators for 
this purpose can also mean additional financial costs for the creator of the agent. 
4.2.3 Evaluative summary of mobile agent frameworks, architectures and models
The analysis of the different proposed mobile agent frameworks; architectures and models 
provided a step forward in determining the requirements of a mobile agent security 
framework. Other mobile agent protocols in the open environment, which are not 
specifically discussed in this thesis, include the Multi-Agent Cryptographic Protocols 
(Tate & Xu, 2003) and the One-Round Secure Computation and Secure Autonomous 
Mobile Agents (Cachin et al., 2000) This section summarises the investigation into the 
proposed systems and highlights the findings.
Security levels
One of the main issues that became noticeable through the discussion of the various models 
and frameworks, is the apparent inability of these systems to distinguish between different 
levels of security, depending on the type of environment where the mobile agents are 
deployed. The main criteria obtained from the analysis is that a mobile agent security 
framework needs to provide for different security levels. For example, M&M (Marques et 
al., 2001) introduced the concept of distinguishing between different types of environments 
in which the agent is to be deployed. This proves to be a valuable input, due to the 
countermeasures used within a framework being dependent on the environment in which the 
agent operates in. The Plain text algorithm (An et al., 2002) also classifies the mobile 
agent applications according to the type of environment (trusted or untrusted) as well as the 
type of application (critical and non-critical). The different proposed systems were also 
distinguished in terms of those operating in a closed environment (such as POM (Guan et 
al., 2000) and FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000)) and those that can be implemented in an 
open environment (for example Self protecting mobile agents (D’Anna et al., 2003) and 
Mobile code security framework (Tan & Moreau, 2002)).
It is thus essential that our security framework provide for different levels of security 
according to the environment in which the agent is to be deployed as well as the type of 
mobile agent system application.
Autonomy
Another aspect that is essential to mobile agent applications is the autonomy of the mobile 
agent. A large number of the discussed mobile agent models and frameworks are based on 
the creation of a trusted execution environment. Although trusted environments restrict the 
mobility and autonomy aspects of the mobile agent, it seems that (depending on the type of 
application), there may be a demand for these types of environments and hence in some 
cases it is necessary to establish trusted environments for the deployment of mobile agents. 
The autonomy and mobility aspects of a mobile agent are also restricted in systems that 
implement techniques where the agent is split into a number of cooperating agents. Systems 
such as POM (Guan et al., 2000), Mansion (Van't Noordende et al., 2002) and 
Supervisor-worker framework (Fischmeister, 2000) only allow the computation of the 
agent on a trusted entity with slave agents created in order to retrieve data from remote 
hosts needed by the mobile agent. SAWMA (Luo, 2001) requires the secret part of the 
agent to be split into a number of distributed agents in order to protect the secret part of the 
agent within an open environment, while Security framework for mobile agent systems 
(Bryce, 2000) and Self protecting mobile agent (D’Anna et al., 2003) requires the agent 
to be split into a number of cooperating agents for secret spreading.
The creation of cooperating agents has a number of disadvantages (such as additional 
communication sessions and additional overhead) and should only be used in applications 
that require a distributed design.
Trusted third party 
A large number of the proposed systems employ the use of a trusted entity (especially the 
systems that are based on the notion of a trusted execution environment). The objectives of 
such an entity range from key management to providing a place for secure computation of 
the agent. Systems that use a trusted third party for secure computations are POM (Guan et 
al., 2000), Mansion (Van't Noordende et al., 2002), Planet (Kato et al., 1996) and 
Supervisor-worker framework (Fischmeister, 2000). 
The use of a trusted third party for the establishment of trusted domains by software 
methods (which include key management and distribution duties), are used by systems such 
as Security enhanced mobile agents (Varadharajan, 2000) and Distributed transactions 
(Vogler et al., 1997). 
Systems that utilise a trusted third party to perform other duties include, Distributed 
transactions (Vogler et al., 1997) that require the trusted entity to create logs of the 
execution of the agent for detection purposes; Proxy agents and trusted domains 
(Mitroviæ & Arribalgaza, 2002) for the creation of proxy agents as well as the distribution 
of the proxies to the hosts; Electronic supermarkets (Wu, 2000) for registering agents 
within a domain; Agent factory (Brazier et al., 2002) requires the existence of an agent 
factory that is responsible for the creation of the mobile agent from a conceptual description; 
Mobile code security framework (Tan & Moreau, 2002) for validating cryptographic 
traces and Protocol for detecting a mobile agent clone (Baek, 1999) requires a trusted 
third party to detect if a malicious host created a clone of the mobile agent.
The use of a trusted entity for either the creation of a trusted environment, for securing some 
computational results within an open environment, or for key management / certification 
features seems essential within a security framework.
Countermeasures
A number of different countermeasures form part of the proposed systems. The 
authentication of the different remote hosts as well as the mobile agent is done mainly by the 
use of digital signatures (for example, Security enhanced mobile agents (Varadharajan, 
2000), Mansion (Van't Noordende et al., 2002), Planet (Kato et al., 1996) and Mobile 
code security framework (Tan & Moreau, 2002)).
Keys for encryption and authentication purposes include the creation of public / private key 
pairs by models such as FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000), M&M (Marques et al., 2001) 
and SAWMA (Luo, 2001)), as well as the use of session keys by for example Distributed 
transactions (Vogler et al., 1997). 
The protection of the mobile agent against reverse engineering attacks as well as the 
modification of the code of the agent, involves the use of individual or the integration of 
techniques such as watermarking, code obfuscation and time techniques (for example, 
FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000), SAWMA (Luo, 2001), Self protecting mobile agent 
(D’Anna et al., 2003) and Three-Tier protection model (Sameh & Fakhry (2002)).
The protection of computational results as well as data retrieved by the agent is performed 
by partial results authentication code (Yee, 1997) techniques in systems such as 
Security enhanced mobile agents (Varadharajan, 2000) and M&M (Marques et al., 
2001). 
Proposals such as Mansion (Van't Noordende et al., 2002) generate an audit trail of hosts 
visited in order to detect if the itinerary of the mobile agent was followed, while the Security 
framework for mobile agent systems (Bryce, 2000) make use of replication and voting 
techniques (Minsky et al, 1996; Schneider, 1997) for protecting the mobile agent.
It is essential that our proposed security framework not only provide for the use of individual 
countermeasures, but also the integration of specific countermeasures. For example, the 
use of code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998) and time techniques (Grimley & Monroe, 
1999) will provide additional protection for code manipulations if combined.
Policies
Policies provide a manner to define the security requirements of the agent. Although the 
mobile agent is dependant on the remote host for its execution, the definition of security 
policies together with the implementation of certain countermeasures can aid in providing 
protection for the agent. Models that integrate security policies in their designs are POM 
(Guan et al., 2000), FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000), M&M (Marques et al., 2001), 
Proxy agents and trusted domains (Mitroviæ & Arribalgaza, 2002) and Security 
framework for mobile agent systems (Bryce, 2000).
Additional requirements
Additional security implementations are required in some models (of which some can have 
additional cost implications when implemented), for example the creation of a trusted entity, 
as well as trusted hardware components (such as FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000) and 
Electronic supermarkets (Wu, 2000)). Planet (Kato et al., 1996) also requires additional 
secure hardware.
Software requirements for remote hosts include the creation of a security manager present at 
the foreign hosts (for example Security enhanced mobile agents (Varadharajan, 2000), 
FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000) and M&M (Marques et al., 2001)). 
Agent factory (Brazier et al., 2002) also requires the creation of a mobile agent according 
to a provided conceptual design. Systems that make use of encryption techniques as well as 
authentication techniques will require certain additional encryption software.
The communication sessions required for the implementation of some of the models are a 
concern, especially with the use of trusted entities for computations as well as cooperating 
agents. For instance POM (Guan et al., 2000) lets the agent only migrate to a trusted entity 
and slave agents are sent to the hosts in the domain for obtaining the information. Additional 
communication sessions are also needed for the creation and distribution of public / private 
keys by means of a trusted entity as well as the creation and distribution of session keys. 
In determining the requirements of a mobile agent security framework, the additional 
requirements in terms of computational overhead, communication sessions and financial 
implications, need to be taken in consideration.
4.3 Mobile Agent Systems
In Section 4.2 we considered frameworks, architectures and models proposed by other 
researchers that have security methods incorporated into their designs. In this section we 
consider a number of mobile agent systems and tools, both research-based and commercial, 
which have been developed for the purpose of assisting in the creation and deployment of 
mobile agent system applications. Some of these were developed for applications in a 
closed environment and thus no security mechanisms were included in the design and 
implementation, while others included some security techniques. Examples of systems 
developed that do not incorporate agent security into their designs are Mole (Baumann et 
al., 1998), Tracy (Braun et al., 2000), AMASE (Pascotto, S.a.), Grasshopper (Breugst 
et al., 1999) and Voyager (ObjectSpace, 1997). 
This section focuses on providing detailed descriptions of mobile agent systems that include 
mobile agent security features. The main objective of these mobile agent systems is to aid in 
the development of applications within the mobile agent environment, and is not integrated 
frameworks as the systems analysed in Section 4.2. The analysis of these systems thus 
differs from the previous section by providing an integrated discussion on the detailed 
systems in Section 4.3.1.
Agent Development Kit (ADK)
The Agent Development Kit (ADK) is a mobile component-based development platform 
that allows Java Developers to easily build, deploy and manage secure, large-scale 
distributed solutions that operate regardless of location, environment or protocol. ADK is a 
commercial package developed by Tryllian, but is freely available for research purposes.
The security features of ADK is built on the Java security model, and is accomplished by 
digitally signing the agent’s class files with a private key as well as including a certificate. The 
certificate itself consists of a public key and personal data. The public key is used for 
encryption purposes. If agents need to send the host computer their certificate, they will do 
so using the host's public key. Personal data is included in order to make it possible to trace 
the owner of an agent's certificate. If the agent's owner gives their certificate to an 
unauthorised third party, it will be possible to trace it back to them.
With the signature, a host can check that nobody has tampered with the agent. It can also 
find out who created the agent and who trusts the developer of the agent. Assigning 
permissions to certificates allows the host to determine what an agent is allowed to do when 
it enters the host. 
When an agent requests to enter the host, the agent is inspected to see who created it and to 
check if nobody has changed the contents somehow. It does this by inspecting the certificate 
included in the agent. This certificate contains the builder of the agent, his public key and an 
agent checksum. The checksum can only be created with the private key, which is only 
known to the builder. 
Agent Tcl
Agent Tcl is a simple, flexible and secure mobile agent system based on the Tcl scripting 
language developed for research purposes at Dartmouth College. The architecture builds on 
systems such as Telescript (Tardo & Valente, 1996), Ara (Peine, 1998) and TIAS (Harker, 
1995) and consists of a server, which is responsible for keeping track of agents, migration, 
communication and non-volatile storage.
A mobile agent is requested to register at a server of which the process is digitally signed 
using the owner's private key, encrypted using the server's public key and sent to the server. 
Upon migration the mobile agent is signed with the private key of the current server and 
encrypted with the public key of the destination's server (Gray, 1996). 
Agent Tcl only provides authentication and encryption facilities, with no additional 
protection for the remote hosts.
Aglets
Aglets is an open source mobile agent system developed by IBM Japan and is currently 
only being upgraded by the open source community. Aglets as described by (Karjoth et al., 
1997) are Java objects that can move from one host on the Internet to another. The aglet 
security model supports the flexible definition of various security policies, which are defined 
in terms of a set of rules. These policies specify conditions such as the authentication 
required for all entities and the communication security between aglets and between hosts. 
The main focus of the aglets security model is the protection of the host against malicious 
agents and the protection of aglets from other aglets. Protection of aglets against 
modifications by other aglets is achieved by making use of proxy agents.
Ajanta
Ajanta is a mobile agent programming system being developed at the University of 
Minnesota. It allows agents written in Java to securely migrate between hosts on the 
Internet. The Ajanta project is aimed at building an infrastructure for mobile agent execution 
that integrates security and robustness features as an integral part of the design.
The Ajanta architecture includes a generic mobile agent server, which provides a secure 
mobile agent execution platform. The entities in the Ajanta mobile agent system are a 
principal on whose behalf actions are performed, the creator of the mobile agent, the 
human owner and the guardian. A guardian object is assigned to each mobile agent by the 
application in order to deal with exception conditions. 
A mobile agent in Ajanta carries credentials which is a tamperproof certificate containing 
its name, the name of its owner, the name of its creator and the name of its guardian. A 
code base server provides the code for the classes required by the mobile agent. The code 
base server is normally the creator of the mobile agent and the mobile agent also carries the 
URL of this server. The credentials object also contains the hash-value of the read-only data 
contained in the mobile agent, which together with the credentials is signed by the creator. 
In order to protect the mobile agent from tampering by other agents on a specific host, the 
mobile agent is isolated in a protected domain. Two Java mechanisms for creating protected 
domains are used, namely thread grouping and class loading. The Agent Transfer Protocol 
for the migration of mobile agents between hosts employs standard cryptographic 
mechanisms such as hashing and digital signatures. 
Ajanta implements three methods for the detection of tampering by malicious hosts. Firstly, 
part of the mobile agent's state can be declared as read-only and is cryptographically 
protected. A read-only container object contains a vector of objects along with the owner's 
digital signature for these objects. The owner computes the digital signature by firstly using a 
one-way hash function (SHA) to digest the vector of objects to a 128-bit value and then 
encrypting this by making use of the private key supplied by the constructor. 
The second method is the keeping of append-only logs in the case of data obtained and not 
to be used subsequently. Data is digitally signed by the current host and inserted into the 
append-only log. 
The third method protects items in the mobile agent so that they are only accessible to 
certain hosts. The targeted state contains a vector of objects that are individually encrypted 
using the public key of the host for which it is targeted. The corresponding identities of the 
hosts are inserted into a separate vector. These two vectors are then hashed together and 
signed by the owner of the mobile agent. 
In order to prevent the copying and masquerading of mobile agents, a copy of the itinerary is
inserted into the read-only container as well as making use of a name service, which is 
implemented as a group of autonomous registries. A name registry entry contains the 
location information for the resource it represents (Karnik & Tripathi, 2000). 
Asynchronous Message Transfer Agent System (AMETAS)
The Asynchronous Message Transfer Agent System (AMETAS), was developed by Zapf 
et al. (1998) and is implemented in Java. Mobile agents and hosts are required to apply 
security rules as stated in the different security policies. The security services of the agent 
platform, the programming language as well as the infrastructure are responsible for the 
enforcements of the security policies. The mobile agent code (after compilation) is digitally 
signed by its owner, which allows for subsequent mobile agent platforms to validate the 
integrity of the mobile agent code. The owner of the mobile agent may specify the hosts who 
are allowed or denied to execute the mobile agent. These rights are added to the mobile 
agent and digitally signed. 
A Certification Authority forms part of the security framework for the storing and issuing of 
public-private key pairs. Before migration between hosts, the two hosts authenticate each 
other. The hosts use their public keys to identify themselves and prove the ownership of the 
corresponding private key by encrypting some random data. The mobile agent is sent 
between the two hosts in encrypted form. Both agent platforms also have to confirm the 
sending or receiving of the mobile agent data.
Anchor toolkit
The Anchor toolkit was developed by Mudumbai et al. (1999) at the Imaging and 
Computing Sciences Division, University of California as a mobile agent system intended for 
research purposes.
 According to Mudumbai et al. (1999), the Anchor toolkit handles the transmission and 
secure management of mobile agents in a heterogeneous distributed computing environment. 
The mobile agent system model is based on Aglets (Karjoth et al., 1997), whereby mobile 
agents are created within a context. Mobile agents are grouped together in a context and 
they can only be accessed through a proxy. A proxy handles all communication and actions 
directed towards the mobile agent. The IAIK-SSLtoolkit together with Java Cryptographic 
Extensions are used to encrypt mobile agents migrating between hosts. X.509 certificates 
are used for mutual authentication between hosts. Hosts are also responsible for signing the 
mobile agent's persistent state before migration.  
Agents for remote action (ARA)
Agents for Remote Action (ARA) is a platform for the portable and secure execution of 
mobile agents, currently under development at the Unversity of Kaiserslautern.
Peine (1998) provides a detailed description of the security architecture of the ARA mobile 
agent platform. The programming model consists of the three components, namely places 
which is the entity that the mobile agent migrates to in order to use services provided, 
service which is only accessible to mobile agents at a place and the mobile agents. The 
entities in the system are the mobile agent users (the person initiating the mobile agent), 
mobile agent manufacturers and the host machines. 
Associated with each mobile agent is its passport that contains relevant identification 
information such as the identity of the mobile agent, time of creation and appropriate 
certificates. Upon creation of the agent, the mobile agent is signed and the mobile agent 
initiates a host trace that is responsible for keeping a list of all hosts visited. The host trace is 
incrementally signed by the receiving host systems on every hop. The mobile agent is divided 
into two parts, namely changing and unchanging. The unchanging part consists of the 
mobile agent code and its passport that is signed upon creation of the mobile agent. The 
changing part is not signed and thus not protected from malicious host actions.
Hosts are grouped into regions that are managed on a lower level without providing any of 
this knowledge to the mobile agent. At migration encryption of the mobile agent can be 
omitted if the destination host resides in the same region as the current host.  
Almost zero infrastructure mobile agent system (aZIMAs)
The almost Zero Infrastructure Mobile Agent system (aZIMAs), is developed by Nalla 
et al. (2002). aZIMAs is a simple mobile agent system based on HTTP for the deployment 
of Java-based mobile agents. A mobile agent is protected from other agents by the system 
creating a separate namespace for each executing agent. Security provisions are the 
declaration of parts of the mobile agent as read-only and the assumption that mobile agents 
are only executed on trusted hosts. 
Bee-gent
Bee-gent is a software development framework developed at the Systems and Software 
Research Laboratories at Toshiba Corporation, that allow developers to build flexible open 
distributed systems that make optimal use of existing applications (Toshiba, 2001). The 
Bee-gent framework consists of two types of agents, namely agent wrappers that are used 
to convert existing applications to mobile agent systems and mediation agents that handle 
inter-application coordination. The mediation agents support digital fingerprint authentication 
as well as secret key encryption. The mediation agents move from the site of an application 
to another where they interact with the agent wrappers. The agent wrappers themselves 
manage the states of the applications they are wrapped around, invoking them when 
necessary. Thus inter-application coordination is handled through the agent wrappers 
generating and receiving requests, which are transported around by the mediation agents. 
The mediation agents do more than just transport the messages; they are able to respond to 
the nature of the request to determine the best course of action. 
Concordia
Concordia is a Java-based mobile agent system designed specifically to support enterprise 
computing and mobile platforms and was developed by the Mitsubishi Electric Information 
Technology Center.
Concordia is implemented in Java and the framework consists of multiple components, each
of which is responsible for handling a specific task. These components are the Concordia 
Server, Administration Manager, Security Manager, Persistence Manager, Event 
Manager, Directory Manager, and the Queue Manager. The Security Manager handles 
all security related issues within the system and also supports strong authentication through 
certificates. Mobile agents are protected while migrating through SSLv3. The mobile agent's 
state is encrypted while in persistent storage in order to prevent unauthorised access and 
modification (Kiniry & Zimmerman, 1997). 
D'Agents
D'Agents is a mobile agent system that is capable of initiating and executing mobile agents 
written in Tcl, Java and Scheme. It is developed at Dartmouth College as an advancement 
of the agent Tcl project. The core system of the D'Agents architecture consists of four 
levels, namely an interface to the transport mechanisms, a server running on every host, the 
execution environment (which are just interpreters for the different languages) and the 
mobile agents. The tasks of the server is to provide communication facilities, receiving and 
authenticating mobile agents as well as restarting the mobile agent in the appropriate 
execution environment. 
Each host has a public-private key pair and PGP is used for digital signatures and 
encryption. When a mobile agent migrates from its home host to a new destination, the state 
is digitally signed with the private key of the owner and optionally encrypted with the public 
key of the destination host. The receiving host verifies the signature and decrypts the agent. 
Currently D'Agents only provide protection during migration as well as protection for the 
host against malicious agents (Gray et al., 1998).
Jumping Beans
Jumping Beans®, Inc. provides solutions to mobile corporate wireless systems using 
Jumping Beans, mobile agent system.
Jumping Beans implement a client-server architecture, whereby an agent always returns to 
a secure central host first before moving to any other platform. Jumping Beans has four 
layers of security, namely traditional distributed security, multi-jump security, trusted 
source as well as monitoring and intervention. Jumping Beans employs all of the 
standard security techniques used in traditional distributed computing systems, such as digital 
signatures, encryption, passwords and audit logs. The system administrator assigns a level of 
trust to each host, and ensures the code executed by an application comes from a known 
trusted source, even if an untrusted host launched the application. The system administrator 
can also track the activity in the entire Jumping Beans system to help detect unwanted 
activity. In addition, the system administrator can control applications to help prevent or stop
unwanted activity. 
S-agent
Makino et al. (2000) proposes a secure mobile agent system that provides an architecture 
for the protection of attacks against mobile agents as well as protection against hosts. The 
design is based on the Java security model and all entities in the system must contain RSA 
(Rivest et al., 1978) key pairs. 
To detect modifications of the mobile agent by a malicious host, three functions are 
implemented, namely an agent ticket, state signing and logging. An agent ticket is created 
as part of the mobile agent and consists of the date of creation, a sequence number, name of 
the source host and the hash value of the agent Class object. All hosts on the itinerary of the 
mobile agent must digitally sign the ticket sequentially.
Upon migration the current host must sign the current state of the mobile agent. The 
serialised form of the mobile agent and the destination address of the next host on the 
itinerary are stored in the source host for a period of time. 
Secure mobile agents (SeMoA)
Secure Mobile Agents (SeMoA) is developed by using Java and focuses on all aspects of 
mobile agent security (Roth & Jalali, 2001). The security architecture of SeMoA consists of 
a number of layers through which a visiting mobile agent has to pass before being accepted 
for execution onto the host. 
The different layers are the transport layer security protocol, security filter and sandbox. 
The purpose of the transport layer security protocol is to provide mutual authentication of 
the hosts, as well as encryption and integrity protection. The implementation used is SSL 
and migration requests are accepted or denied according to a specified security policy. 
Different security filters exist for accepting or rejecting incoming and outgoing mobile agents. 
SeMoA make use of two complementary filters to handle digital signatures and the 
encryption of mobile agents. The signatures of incoming mobile agents are verified and the 
mobile agent is decrypted. Outgoing mobile agents are signed and encrypted. A sandbox is 
created for the incoming mobile agent to protect the host against mobile agent attacks. A 
dedicated class-loader loads the classes for use by the mobile agent. All loaded classes are 
verified against a set of trusted hash functions signed by the mobile agent's owner to prevent 
the loading of unauthorised classes. Mobile agents are also separated from other mobile 
agents and each has its own view of the environment. 
In SeMoA the mobile agents are transported between hosts as Java Archives, with signature 
files added to the contents of the ZIP archive. The JAR format is extended to provide 
support for the selective encryption for multiple recipients. Two digital signatures are 
attached to mobile agents, which is the static part signed by its owner as well as each host 
signing the complete mobile agent. By doing this the host commit to state changes that 
occurred while it executed the mobile agent. 
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1) digest algorithm is applied to the mobile agent's owner 
signature. This leads to globally unique names and anonymity for the mobile agent.
Secure and open mobile agent (SOMA)
Corradi et al. (1999) describes the Secure and Open Mobile Agent (SOMA) which offers 
a number of tools and mechanisms aimed at protecting mobile agents as well as hosts against
malicious behaviour. The SOMA framework supports flexible security policies in order to 
administrate interactions of mobile agents and mobile agent platforms. Several different 
principals are modelled namely the mobile agent, the place that represents the execution 
site, the agent creator, the agent owner, the place creator and the place owner. Every 
principal owns specific, tamperproof credentials which are needed for authentication and 
authorisation. X.509 certificates are used to bind the unique identities of agent / place 
owners and creators to a cryptographic public key pair in a secure way. 
Agent owners are associated with specific roles and each agent carries a set of exclusive 
credentials as part of their state. These credentials act as proof that the agents behaved 
correctly. 
The SOMA security infrastructure is composed of a number of building blocks, such as a 
policy server used for management of domain policies, a domain server which maintains 
references to resources, a role server for managing roles, a certification authority, a 
directory service responsible for distributing certificates, an authentication server and an 
authorisation server for granting access to resources.
The mobile agent is encrypted and digitally signed before migration between hosts. The 
destination host verifies the authenticity of the previous site’s credentials and accepts or 
denies the mobile agent. SOMA implemented two solutions aimed at the detection of 
modification attacks on the state of the mobile agent, namely trusted third party and 
multiple hops. 
The trusted third party acts as a trusting environment where the mobile agents can conduct 
secure computations. After the mobile agent has visited a possible malicious site, it migrates 
to the trusted third party in order to check for any inconsistencies. The trusted environment 
is responsible for maintaining the proof of all mobile agent computations at different sites.
In the multiple hops approach mobile agents can autonomously migrate through the network 
without having to interact with trusted third parties. Each host must provide a short proof of 
the mobile agent's computation, which is stored as part of the mobile agent's state. Each 
proof attached is cryptographically linked with the ones computed at previous mobile agent 
platforms. This prevents the modification of one proof from influencing all the previous 
proofs. On arriving at the home platform, the cryptographic proofs are verified in order to 
detect any integrity violation.
Tromsø and cornell moving agents (TACOMA)
Johansen et al. (1995) proposed the Tromsø And COrnell Moving Agents (Tacoma) 
project that focuses on operating system support for mobile agents. A briefcase that 
contains collections of named folders is associated with each mobile agent for the carrying 
of data. Broker agents are used to maintain databases of service providers. The broker 
agents are contacted by a mobile agent to identify hosts offering a specific service. They are 
also used to enforce the policies of a protected mobile agent by arranging meetings with 
other agents. Upon migration to a new host, a rear guard agent is created and stored on the
current host. This agent is responsible for the launching of a new mobile agent in the case of 
an agent that is killed, as well as terminating itself once a mobile agent is safely executed and 
has migrated from the new host. TACOMA is implemented on Tcl, where every host is 
required to run a Tcl interpreter as part of the mobile agent platform.
Web agent-based service providing platform (WASP)
Fünfrocken & Mattern (1999), developed the Web Agent-based Service Providing 
platform which provides support for resource management, mobility, agent execution, 
communication and security. These tasks or services are achieved by making use of 
distributed Java concepts. Mobile agent platforms are integrated into World Wide Web 
servers by making use of server extension modules. The WASP platform provides basic 
security mechanisms for protection of the host against malicious mobile agents. 
In order to protect the mobile agent, WASP makes use of a trusted environment. 
Fünfrocken & Mattern (1999) are currently experimenting with a smart-card that contains a 
Java byte-code interpreter (Java Card). The purpose of the Java Card is to provide 
authorisation for mobile agents acting on behalf of their initiators as well as using the Java 
Card as a trusted computing base for the execution of mobile agents. The Java card contains
a private key that will provide a mobile agent the opportunity to be encrypted.  The mobile 
agent can only be decrypted and executed by the Java card. 
4.3.1 Evaluative summary of mobile agent systems
The mobile agent systems analysed in 4.3 provide security mechanisms for the development 
of secure mobile agent applications by incorporating a number of different techniques. 
Realised from the analysis is the large number of systems that make use of the Java security 
model as the primary security model. Examples of such systems are ADK (ADK), Aglets 
(Karjoth et al., 1997), and Concordia (Kiniry & Zimmerman, 1997).
Encryption and authentication
A large number of the evaluated systems feature authentication techniques based on the 
creation of digital signatures. The creation of the digital signatures ranges from the signing of 
the class file of the agent (ADK (ADK)) to the signing of the agent itself (Agent Tcl (Gray, 
1996), Concordia (Kiniry & Zimmerman, 1997) and AMETAS (Zapf et al., 1998)).
Encryption techniques are included in almost all the evaluated systems that provide 
protection of the agent while in transit. Examples are Ajanta (Karnik & Tripathi, 2000), 
Anchor (Mudumbai et al., 1999), Jumping Beans (Jumping Beans®) and SOMA (Corradi 
et al., 1999). 
The provision of authentication and encryption techniques for the agent as well as the host 
seems essential to a security framework.
Trusted third party
A few mobile agent systems provide for the use of a trusted third party for secure 
computations within the design. SOMA (Corradi et al., 1999) provides for the use of such a 
trusted entity not only for secure computations but also for detection of modifications by the 
host (although this requires the mobile agent to be migrated to the trusted entity after leaving 
a remote host). Most of the systems that provide cryptography methods also include a 
certification authority in the design for the purpose of key generation and distribution. 
Examples of such systems are Agent Tcl (Gray, 1996), Concordia (Kiniry & Zimmerman, 
1997), and D’Agents (Gray et al., 1998).
The creation of a trusted environment by using either hardware (WASP (Fünfrocken & 
Mattern, 1999)) or software (aZIMAs (Nalla et al. (2002)) means is supported by a few 
systems. The creation of proxy agents to assist in protecting the agent by providing some 
sort of barrier for accessing the agent is provided by Aglets (Karjoth et al., 1997) and 
Ajanta (Karnik & Tripathi, 2000).
Countermeasures
A few systems include logging capabilities whereby either the data required at the host or the
identity of the host is sent to the agent’s owner, for detection purposes (for example 
Anchor toolkit (Mudumbai et al., 1999), S-agent (Makino et al., 2000) and SOMA 
(Corradi et al., 1999)). 
Ajanta (Karnik & Tripathi, 2000) and Jumping Beans (Jumping Beans®) provide for the 
creation of logs that can be appended to the agent for providing audit trail information. The 
ARA system (Peine, 1998) supplies methods for creating logs of the hosts visited, while 
encryption of the current state of the agent is possible within S-agent (Makino et al., 2000), 
SeMoA (Roth & Jalali, 2001) and SOMA (Corradi et al., 1999). Ajanta (Karnik & 
Tripathi, 2000) also include a method by which certain data carried by the agent is only 
made accessible to specific hosts, as well as incorporating a read-only container for 
protection of data.
ARA (Peine, 1998) also allows for dividing the agent into changing and unchanging parts, of 
which each can be protected separately. 
Security credentials
A number of systems include the notion of security credentials as part of the design of a 
mobile agent. For example in ARA (Peine (1998) a passport is added that contains 
information such as the time of creation and S-agent (Makino et al., 2000) make use of a 
ticket that contains the time of creation as well as the name of its owner. 
Policies
Mobile agent systems that provide for the creation of policies in order to aid in the 
protection of the mobile agent, include Aglets (Karjoth et al., 1997), AMETAS (Zapf et 
al., 1998) and SOMA (Corradi et al., 1999). As indicated in the analysis of the mobile 
agent frameworks and models, the inclusion of security policies for the agent is seen as an 
added measure for providing protection for the mobile agent.
Additional Requirements
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3 for determining the techniques to be integrated within the 
framework, it is essential to analyse the additional requirements imposed by the chosen 
techniques. The mobile agent systems evaluated provide for a number of countermeasures 
that are included in the design of the systems and are thus present and usable within the 
provided execution environments. 
Systems that make use of trusted authorities for various purposes means additional 
communication sessions required for the use thereof. The encryption and creation of digital 
signature also has an influence on the computational overhead for the creation as well as the 
verification of the agent. The use of path histories as a method to detect variations on the 
itinerary of the agent also has size implications on the agent itself (and thus bandwidth 
implications). 
4.4 Mobile Agent System Applications
In Section 4.2 we analysed existing frameworks, architectures and models within the mobile 
agent environment that incorporated measures for the protection of the mobile agent into the 
respective designs. Section 4.3 followed the same trend by studying available mobile agent 
tools that can be used for the development of mobile agent applications.
A number of applications have been developed by making use of existing mobile agent 
technologies. Examples of developed applications that provide no protection for the mobile 
agent are, Using mobile agents for analysing intrusion in Computer Networks  (Aslam 
et al., 2001), An intrusion detection system for Aglets (Vigna et al., 2002), Combining 
world wide web and wireless security (Claessens et al., 2001), Mobile agents 
supporting secure GRID environments (Robles et al., 2002) and A method of tracing 
intruders by use of mobile agents (Asaka et al., 1999). A small number of applications do
however provide security techniques to prevent or detect malicious modifications on the 
mobile agent. They are subsequently analysed of which a summary is provided in 4.4.1.
Attack resistant distributed hierarchical intrusion detection system
Mell & McLarnon (1999) used mobile agents to cast internal nodes of a distributed intrusion
detection system. These mobile agents randomly move around the network in such a way 
that an attacker is not able to locate their position. In the case where an attacker demobilises
a host, the remaining agents estimate the location of the attacker and automatically avoid 
those networks. Mobile agents that are killed are re-introduced into the system by a group 
of backups that retain all or partial state information.
Cherubim
The System Software Research Group at the University of Illinois, developed Cherubim, 
that employs a secure node architecture by using mobile agents and customised security 
policies (Campbell & Qian, 1998). Security functions are embedded in smart security 
packets in active networks. These smart packets implement user-level policies or 
capabilities as scripts.
The architecture has a pre-configured core security service, which provides basic public-key
encryption, authentication and auditing facilities upon which the meta-level structure is built. 
This core security service along with a set of default meta-level components forms a security 
manager with basic facilities supporting dynamic security agents. Thereafter new security 
measures can be dynamically injected into this basic system. 
MAgNET
Dasgupta et al. (1999) developed an e-commerce system that provides protection for both 
the mobile agent and the host. Every host is provided with a public-private key pair, and the 
mobile agent is divided into three portions, namely a header, code and data. The header 
consists of the mobile agent’s identifier and the identifier of the owner, which are encrypted 
with the owner's private key. The code, which can only be executed with a license, is 
obtained from the owner. The license is attained once the host acknowledges receipt of the 
mobile agent. The data obtained at different hosts on the itinerary is encrypted with the 
private key of the host. The host also computes a checksum of the data and sends this to the 
owner.
Mobile agent based transactions in open environments
De Assis Silva & Popescu-Zeletin (2000) developed a transaction model for open 
environments based on mobile agents. In this protocol, if an agent executing at a host 
becomes unreachable for a certain period of time, the agent (and its execution) can be 
recovered and executed at another host. The protocol is based on the division of the mobile 
agent task/s into a number of subtasks that is each executed by a different agent.
Secure electronic transactions
Kotzanikolaou et al. (1999) proposed a mobile agent-oriented model for collecting and 
evaluating purchasing contracts, signed by Internet merchants. A master-slave distributed 
agent architecture is used as well as making use of permission-tokens. For every host on the 
itinerary, a static master agent creates a mobile slave agent. The slave agents are 
collaborative agents and each are provided by a permission-token used as authentication 
proof for hosts. Each slave agent migrates to a specific host and negotiates on behalf of the 
buyer. Upon execution completion on the host, each slave agent returns home with purchase 
contracts signed by the hosts. The master agent is responsible for the evaluation of the 
contracts as well as initiating the buying of the selected products. Authentication of hosts is 
done by sending the host’s certificate to the master agent, along with the signature of the 
permission-token. Slave agents do not carry any secret keys or sensitive information and is 
thus not likely to be manipulated by the hosts. 
SIAS
Shopping Information Agent System (SIAS) is a web-based mobile agent system that 
conducts information searches on products in an electronic marketplace. SIAS is 
implemented on top of the Concordia API using Java as programming language. The SIAS 
system makes use of a public-key infrastructure. Each host and mobile agent in the mobile 
agent system is required to own a pair of keys for encryption and decryption. Each mobile 
agent or host can encrypt or digitally sign the data of the mobile agent for protection. SIAS 
makes use of a key server for facilitating public key cryptography. The RSA encryption 
algorithm is used for encrypting the mobile agent's data. Each mobile agent and host must 
have a public key certificate registered at the key server for encryption purposes. By doing 
this, a closed network of hosts is established. 
Each host is required to encrypt the results of the mobile agent with the agent's public key 
and can only be decrypted by the owner. These results are also digitally signed by the hosts 
in order to provide integrity. In protecting the itinerary of the mobile agent, every host has to 
encrypt the itinerary by using its private key in order to form a chain of encrypted itineraries 
(Chan et al., 2000). 
Virtual Internet Pets
Gupta et al. (2001) developed an application whereby life-like pets are simulated by using 
Java-enabled mobile agents. The architecture of the application consists of two core 
components, namely a mobile agent monitor and a graphical user interface. The mobile 
agent monitor consists of an agent server responsible for executing the mobile agents and a 
stationary master agent instantiated by the agent server and used for inter-agent 
communication, interaction with the user and creating local agents. A proxy is used to act as 
a shield that protects an agent from malicious hosts. 
4.4.1 Evaluative summary of mobile agent applications
The mobile agent applications that provide security techniques for the protection of the 
mobile agent from malicious modifications by the remote host were analysed in the previous 
section, and the results are subsequently summarised:
Encryption and authentication
Applications such as Cherubim (Campbell & Qian, 1998), MAgNET (Dasgupta et al. 
(1999), Secure electronic transactions (Kotzanikolaou et al. (1999) and SIAS (Chan et 
al., 2000) makes use of digital signatures as a means of providing authentication abilities 
within the applications. Public / private encryption methods are also used in the mentioned 
systems for the encryption and decryption of the mobile agents.
Auditing
Auditing facilities are implemented in most of the applications for the purpose of detecting 
possible malicious manipulations. The auditing facilities include the encryption and digital 
signing of aggregated results as well the digital signing of the remote hosts visited by the 
mobile agent. Examples of applications that provide such measures are Cherubim 
(Campbell & Qian, 1998), MAgNET (Dasgupta et al. (1999) and SIAS (Chan et al., 
2000).
As auditing facilities are present in the analysis of the mobile agent frameworks, systems, 
models and applications, it is deemed necessary that the security framework include 
techniques for providing such facilities
Additional requirements
Secure electronic transactions (Kotzanikolaou et al. (1999) and Mobile agent based 
transactions in open environments (De Assis Silva & Popescu-Zeletin, 2000) require the 
subdivision of the mobile agent into a number of slave agents in order to split the secret data 
amongst a number of agents. As indicated in the analysis of mobile agent frameworks, 
models and systems, the use of coordinated agents results in additional communication costs 
as well as computational overhead. SIAS (Chan et al., 2000) also requires the inclusion of a 
trusted entity to act as a key server for the management and distribution of keys used for 
encryption / decryption purposes.
4.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse mobile agent frameworks, systems and 
applications (that are either proposed or implemented), for providing insights into the 
development of criteria for designing a mobile agent security framework. Notable from the 
analysis is the dependence of a mobile agent security framework on the application and the 
distinction between open and closed (or trusted) environments. Furthermore, it also seems 
to be important to distinguish between the use of different countermeasures instead of having 
an all-inclusive type of security package, which could heavily burden a system’s 
performance.  
A worrying aspect in many of the studied models / frameworks / systems, is the restraints 
that the security framework of a particular mobile agent system often imposes on autonomy 
of the agents. As hinted before, there are situations where trusted environments, with known 
hosts are desirable, but to impose a trusted environment restriction on mobile agent 
behaviour in general, goes against the very basis of mobile agent definitions.  Another point 
of concern in the studied systems is the additional requirements that are often demanded 
from remote hosts as well as the mobile agent system as a whole in order to implement 
acceptable security measures. In the next chapter, we take the discussion of this chapter 
further as a step towards proposing a security framework for mobile agents against 
malicious hosts.
 
CHAPTER 5
SECURITY ISSUES IN MOBILE AGENTS
5.1 Introduction
The security issues in mobile agent systems as outlined in the previous chapters accentuate 
the need for an integrated framework to address mobile agent security. In this chapter we 
investigate criteria for such an integrated security framework. These criteria will then form 
the pillars of our proposal as outlined in Chapter 6. We also examine the available standards 
for mobile agent systems, to place our research in context. Although security issues are not 
addressed per sé in these standards, we nevertheless find it essential to the understanding of 
the system components involved that can be affected by security threats. 
5.2 Mobile Agent Standards
There are currently two standards specified for mobile agent technology, namely the Mobile 
Agent System Interoperability Facility (MASIF) developed by the Object Management 
Group (OMG) and the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) developed by 
companies and universities under Swiss law. 
The purpose of MASIF is to address interoperability between agent systems and not 
between agent applications and agent systems. It defines the interfaces at the agent system 
level of the agent rather than focusing at the agent level itself. Four main areas of 
standardisation are contained in MASIF namely: Agent Management, Agent Transfer, 
Agent and Agent Systems Names and Agent System Type and Location Syntax (MASIF
version 1.0). MASIF's security is based on the CORBA security model. Currently there 
exists no specific standardisation model for mobile agent security (Milojicic et al., 1998). 
The purpose of FIPA is to enable interoperability of intelligent agents. The FIPA 
specifications are grouped into five categories, namely Applications, Abstract 
Architectures, Agent Communication, Agent Management and Agent Message 
Transport. As can be deduced from the name of these categories, the FIPA standards are 
primarily focused on agent communication languages, agent services and supporting 
management ontology’s for agent systems in general. No specific emphasis is placed on 
mobile agent systems and hence agent mobility and many other features specific to mobile 
agents are excluded from this standard. Obviously this also excludes any FIPA standards for
mobile agent security.
The specification for agent communication saw the development of an Agent 
Communication Language (ACL), which is a high level language that allows 
communication between agents. Inter-agent communication is conducted via messages that 
consist of two parts.  The first part is an envelope that conveys information necessary for 
transportation, while the second part is the actual message contained in a message body.  
The agent communication language is based on the Speech Act Theory, for more 
information see Poslad et al. (2000).  
According to Poslad & Calisti (2000) there are several reasons contributing to the current 
lack of mobile agent security standards. Some of these reasons include:
Security issues are complex and cannot be developed by ordinary mobile agent 
programmers, as specific skills and expertise are required for security programming.
Security cover generally falls outside the scope of current mobile agent architectures.
This is due to the general conception of programmers and users that the software 
architecture of the mobile agent platform will take responsibility of security 
coverage.
Because security is both domain and platform dependent, it would be naïve to think 
that a general architecture will be suitable for applications and implementations. 
5.3 Challenges in Mobile Agent Security
The protection of mobile agents against malicious hosts has introduced a new field in the 
security arena. For the first time it is deemed necessary to protect an application (in this case 
the mobile agent) from manipulations by the executor (the host) of the application (Jansen, 
2000).  As can be summarised from previous chapters in the mobile agent paradigm, the 
agent is sent between hosts in order to achieve its goal. At every host the agent is executed, 
information is exchanged between the agent and the host and the state of the agent is 
updated accordingly. This execution at a foreign site introduces specific security challenges 
in relation to the protection of the agent. In the next few paragraphs specific challenges in the 
deployment of adequate security techniques for the protection of mobile agents against 
malicious entities are described. 
5.3.1 Requirement for sound autonomy and mobility
According to Chan & Lyu (1999), the autonomy property of a mobile agent makes security 
of an agent the most challenging area of mobile code security. A truly autonomous agent is 
required to make independent itinerary decisions, based on its current environment and 
aggregated data. The trust model is one of the most popular techniques that are implemented
in mobile agent computing to secure both the agent and the host.  According to this model, 
security is applied according to the level of trust allocated to each host visited by the agent.  
This implies, that the hosts to be visited are known beforehand (and trusted to various 
degrees), which compromises the requirement of autonomy. Furthermore, the autonomy of 
an agent is inextricably related to its mobility. Therefore, it is important that integrated 
security techniques do not compromise its mobility either. These two characteristics of 
mobile agents (and also mobile agent systems) increase the complexity inherent to the design 
and maintenance of such a system. Added to the mentioned complexity is the fact that 
multifaceted systems with many components have a higher possibility of failure or breach; on 
the other side, simplistic systems can be vulnerable (Mitroviæ & Arribalzaga, 2002).
5.3.2 Tolerating changing network and application environments
Mobile agents have to operate in a dynamic communication environment, which contributes 
to specific challenges in the development of an adequate mobile agent security framework. 
According to Campbell & Qian (1998) a mobile security system should accommodate 
changes in security schemes that are imposed by changes in the network environment. The 
dynamic communication environment challenge also implies that different mobile agents 
(either involved in various or in the same mobile agent system) may require dissimilar 
security protection mechanisms, which leads to different levels of security. 
5.3.3 Anticipating remote host support
In order to protect the mobile agent from malicious entities, a host has to conform to the 
security policy of the mobile agent. The challenge in this is that the mobile agent, as a single 
entity cannot provide adequate protection for itself and relies on its environment and its host 
for providing the required protection. It is therefore considered necessary that a host 
possesses intrinsic mechanisms to support the security requirements of the agent. Different to
the predefined policies and means of trust that are provided on trusted host environments, 
these types of support measures, provide a way for agents to anticipate security support 
from its execution environment, without necessarily trusting the host. It implies the 
procurement of additional security functions and services, according to the needs of the 
application and hence the agent (Albayrak & Wieczorek, 1999). Examples of support 
measures include the availability of decryption algorithms or digital signature procedures on a
host that are made available to the agent; an ability (for the agent) to audit its host’s services 
(Jansen, 2000), et cetera.  
5.3.4 Anticipating the required level of security support
According to Jansen & Karygiannis (1999), there are a number of factors that play an 
important role in determining the required level of security for a mobile agent application. 
Examples of these factors include available security mechanisms, performance requirements, 
costs, sensitivity of the mobile agent's code and data, the maximum acceptable risk, et 
cetera. It therefore makes sense to consider these factors when evaluating the application in 
order to determine its required level of protection, as these will inevitably influence the 
efficiency as well as computational costs required to establish a secure execution 
environment. 
5.3.5 Avoiding multiple communication sessions
Current mobile agent systems and proposed countermeasures employ multiple 
communication sessions either between mobile agent and local host or between local host 
and remote hosts.  The purpose of these multiple sessions are usually either to establish a 
handshake protocol (such as exchanging session keys) between the agent and its remote 
host, or to convey aggregated results back to the local host. However, the need for multiple 
sessions compromises the advantage of minimum bandwidth requirements that are typically 
associated with mobile agents as described in earlier chapters.  
5.3.6 Minimising the computational cost for the deployment countermeasures
Whilst most applications have insufficient countermeasures to create a secure execution 
environment for the mobile agent, runtime efficiency can seriously be compromised with the 
deployment of unnecessary countermeasures.  It is therefore a challenge to find the balance 
between the required number of security measures and an over-burdened system. For 
example, many detection mechanisms require excessive computations at the local host 
once the detection trace data is accumulated from the different remote hosts. This implies 
that if a specific application does not require the full extent of detection mechanisms, it is a 
waste of computational time and cost.
5.4 Requirements for a Mobile Agent Security Framework
As stated in Chapter 2, the criteria that protects a mobile agent against a malicious host is 
based on the fundamental concerns or requirements of users gaining access of computer 
network services, namely integrity, availability, confidentiality and authentication. 
These concerns together with the challenges discussed in the previous section, are used as 
the basis for establishing the requirements for an integrated mobile agent security framework.
We propose the following eight requirements for an integrated mobile agent security 
framework:
1. The framework must provide different levels of security, depending on the type of 
implementation environment in which the mobile agent would be deployed.
2. The framework must incorporate different levels of security depending on the type 
of application and agent objectives.
3. The framework must maintain and not hamper the autonomy and mobility factor of 
the agent.
4. Additional security implementations on the remote hosts (and the system as a 
whole) must be kept to the minimum, to reduce cost and time. This includes both 
additional hardware and software requirements.
5. The number of communication sessions between the remote hosts (and between 
remote hosts and other entities) must be minimised. There also needs to be no 
permanent connection between the agent and the local host.
6. Computational cost of implementing countermeasures and maintenance thereof 
must be as low as possible. 
7. The cost of implementation should be affordable or at least minimised. The 
financial costs of implementing countermeasures need to be in direct relation with 
the degree of security required.
8. The host must possess intrinsic mechanisms to support the security requirements of 
the agent. This implies the provision and integration of additional security 
functions and services, according to the needs of the application and hence the 
agent.
5.5 Evaluation of proposed and current countermeasures, frameworks, 
architectures, models, systems and applications
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the different proposed and current 
countermeasures, frameworks, architectures, models, systems and applications against the 
requirements as described in 5.4. 
5.5.1 Evaluation of countermeasures
Chapter 3 provides a detailed view on the countermeasures on mobile agent security threats 
that are currently available in literature. We use the requirements of an integrated mobile 
agent security framework (as described in 5.4) to evaluate the different countermeasures 
and assign an applicability property to the different countermeasures for specific 
requirements. Also included in the evaluation is the countermeasure that came forward from 
the discussion of the mobile agent frameworks, architectures and models (see Chapter 4), 
namely the use of watermarking techniques.
Requirements 1, 2, 8: 
The first two requirements insist on the framework offering different levels of security that 
are based on the agent execution environment as well as the type of application. Since these 
two requirements involve the incorporation of various countermeasures or potentially the 
implementation of different degrees thereof, it is not sensible to evaluate them in terms of 
individual countermeasures. The requirements for different levels of security (requirements 1 
& 2), as well as the requirement for the procurement of additional services (requirement 8) 
are discussed in greater detail in 5.5.2, 5.5.3 & 5.5.4, as it is not sensible to evaluate 
individual countermeasures in terms of these requirements 
Requirement 3: Autonomy and mobility
A large number of countermeasures for protecting mobile agents against malicious acts from 
a remote host rely on the creation of a trusted environment. As mentioned before, one of the 
main disadvantages of a trusted domain is that it impedes the autonomy of the mobile agent 
by placing restrictions on the choice of service providers to be visited. 
To remind the reader, a trusted environment can either be created through the installation of 
tamper resistant hardware or specific software methods. Tamper resistant hardware such 
as proposed by Wilhelm et al. (1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000) and Fünfrocken & Mattern 
(1999), restricts the autonomy of the mobile agent because the agent can only migrate to a 
list of pre-defined hosts, which have installed the compulsory specialised hardware.  
The use of software methods to create a trusted environment entails the deployment of 
encryption and authenticating techniques, such as proposed by Sander & Tschudin (1998). 
As described before, the implementation of measures that enforce the use of specific 
(trusted or pre-listed) hosts restrict the autonomy of the agent.
In the case of a countermeasure employing encryption techniques, a trusted third party 
may be needed (depending on the type of implementation) as a certification authority for the 
management and maintenance of keys for encryption purposes. Such a mechanism does not 
inhibit the autonomy of the agent, but in the case of the trusted entity being used for secure 
computations (Feigenbaum & Lee, 1997), the autonomy and mobility are negatively 
affected.
Countermeasures based on recording and tracking techniques such as path histories 
(Ordille, 1996), detection objects (McDermott & Goldschlag, 1996), reference states 
(Hohl, 1999), state appraisal (Farmer et al., 1996) and proof carrying code (Necula & 
Lee, 1998) have no limiting effect on the autonomy of the agent. Countermeasures such as 
itinerary recording with replication and voting (Minsky et al, 1996; Schneider, 1997) 
and mutual itinerary recording (Roth, 1998) restrict the autonomy, as it requires the 
replication or tracking of the mobile agent by cooperating agents. Mutual itinerary 
recording (Roth, 1998) can potentially inhibit the autonomy of a mobile agent by requiring 
the establishment of an authenticated channel between the two agents. 
Phone home (Grimley & Monroe, 1999) places a requirement for a continuous link 
between the executing host and the local host, as results that are obtained at every host are 
sent back to the local host. Not only does this mechanism violate many of the requirements 
established in 5.4, but it also affects the autonomy negatively as the local host requires 
persistent communication with its agent. Splitting the agent into cooperating agents (Yee, 
1997) also limits the autonomy of the agent as the itinerary of such an agent is pre-defined 
and no dynamic changes are possible without direct communication channels between the 
cooperating agents.
Cryptographic techniques that have no influence on the autonomy and mobility of the mobile 
agent include anonymous itinerary (Westhoff et al., 1999), cryptographic traces (Vigna, 
1998), computing with encrypted functions (Sander & Tschudin, 1998), environmental 
key generation (Riordan & Schneier, 1998), partial result encapsulation (Chess et al., 
1995; Jansen, 2000; Yee, 1997) and digital signatures (Sander & Tschudin, 1998).
Countermeasures based on code obfuscation and time techniques (namely code 
obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998), code transformation (An et al., 2002) and time 
sensitive agents (Grimley & Monroe, 1999)), as well as watermarking (Jalali, et al., 
2000) do not restrict the autonomy or mobility of the mobile agent.
Requirement 4: Additional requirements for implementation
The use of tamper resistant hardware (see Wilhelm et al. (1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000) 
and Fünfrocken & Mattern (1999)) requires each host to incorporate specialised equipment 
in order to provide a secure environment for incoming mobile agents. Hosts that are not able 
to provide guarantees for the implementation of such required hardware will not be able to 
host mobile agents.  Tamper resistant hardware therefore places additional requirements for 
the implementation of security countermeasures, which is undesirable for secure autonomous 
mobile agents.
Software methods to create a trusted environment (Sander & Tschudin 1998) rely on 
encryption and authentication methods and require the host to provide methods for 
supporting the agent. The additional requirements for cryptographic methods are related to 
the algorithms and protocols being used for implementation. For example, if the system 
requires encryption algorithms that are based on the underlying virtual machine, then the 
additional requirements are minimum. The countermeasures discussed in Chapter 3 are 
merely propositions and lack implementation details; in cases where cryptographic 
techniques are incorporated into the countermeasures, additional requirements for 
implementation are positively stated. Examples of such measures are anonymous itinerary 
(Westhoff et al., 1999), cryptographic traces (Vigna, 1998), environmental key 
generation (Riordan & Schneier, 1998), et cetera.
Trusted third parties (Feigenbaum & Lee, 1997) require extra hardware to be 
implemented (for both certification authority as well as secure computations). In the case of 
the third party acting as a certification authority, the additional requirements can be a 
minimum if these entities already exist within the specified domains. 
Detection objects (McDermott & Goldschlag, 1996) are application specific and require 
the creation and maintenance of the objects within the agent as additional requirements. 
Itinerary recording with replication and voting (Minsky et al, 1996; Schneider, 1997) 
requires some method of duplication for execution, while mutual itinerary recording 
(Roth, 1998) requires a duplicate of the agent, a trusted environment for the duplicated 
agent as well as the creation of an authenticated channel between the two agents.
Phone home (Grimley & Monroe, 1999) requires a direct link between the remote host and
the local host of the owner in order to convey results retrieved and the use of a mobile 
agent system (Yee, 1997), needs the creation of distributing cooperating agents as 
additional implementation requirements. A number of the measures listed, require only 
additional methods to be implemented on the local host and not any of the remote hosts. 
Examples of these measures are code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998), proof-carrying 
code (Necula & Lee, 1998), code transformations (An et al., 2002) and watermarking 
techniques (Jalali, et al., 2000), where the code of the mobile agent needs to be 
transformed or proof’s added before migration to the first host on the itinerary.
Requirement 5: Number of communication sessions 
Remote hosts that make use of tamper resistant hardware (Wilhelm et al. (1998, 1999, 
1999a, 2000); Fünfrocken & Mattern (1999)) to protect mobile agents, accept the mobile 
agent after migration, upon which the agent is sent to the specialized hardware component. 
No additional communication sessions need to be established between remote hosts during 
the migration process but depending on the location of the physical trusted component, extra 
sessions between the host and its tamper resistant hardware may be required. 
When using software methods (Sander & Tschudin, 1998), to create a trusted 
environment, the communication sessions can increase noticeably depending on the 
implemented approach. For example, when the chosen algorithm requires a public/private 
key pair for implementation, additional communication sessions may be needed for the 
establishment of keys, especially if the certification authority is an external entity. 
The amount of communication sessions between a remote host and the trusted third party 
will also increase if either trusted entities are used as certification authorities, or if secure 
places of computations are established. In this scenario, the mobile agent requires 
communication sessions with the trusted entity during execution at a specific remote host for 
the purpose of transferring secret data or for requiring keys for encryption/decryption.
Recording and tracking techniques such as itinerary recording with replication and 
voting (Minsky et al, 1996; Schneider, 1997) and mutual itinerary recording (Roth, 
1998) require the establishment of additional communication sessions in order to allow for 
the sending of information between the cooperating agents. Another example is phone 
home (Grimley & Monroe, 1999) where it is necessary to establish a communication link 
between the agent and the local host for the transfer of aggregated data after execution at 
every host.
Countermeasures that are based on some form of cryptographic techniques may possibly 
require the establishment of additional communication sessions depending on the 
implementation details. For example, systems that rely on certification authorities for the 
distribution of keys, will require communication lines between the remote hosts and the 
trusted entity.  Digital signatures (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) and anonymous itinerary 
(Westhoff et al., 1999) are examples of such systems. In execution traces (Vigna, 1998) a 
receiving host first has to authenticate the mobile agent before acceptance and execution, 
which leads to a considerable increase in communication between subsequent remote hosts.
Proof-carrying code (Necula & Lee, 1998) does not make use of cryptography or trusted 
third parties, but does however require links with proof validators for authenticating the 
agent. 
Measures based on code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998) and time techniques (Grimley 
& Monroe, 1999) require no additional communication sessions between entities in the 
system. The same is true for watermarking techniques (Jalali, et al., 2000)
Requirement 6: Computational costs 
Tamper resistant hardware (see Wilhelm et al. (1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000) and 
Fünfrocken & Mattern (1999)), have no implication of computational costs since the agent 
is executed as normal, but only in the context of specialised hardware. 
Computational costs involved in software methods depend on the implementation algorithm 
used. Computational costs implications for software methods used in the creation of a 
trusted environment (such as Sander & Tschudin, 1998) depend on the chosen 
cryptographic algorithms. This is also true for any countermeasures that use cryptographic 
methods for signing or encrypting the agent or parts thereof, being that different encryption 
algorithms require different amounts of computational resources. Examples of such systems 
are environmental key generation (Riordan & Schneier, 1998), anonymous itinerary 
(Westhoff et al., 1999), digital signatures (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) and execution 
traces (Vigna, 1998).
The use of trusted third parties (Feigenbaum & Lee, 1997) does not have an affect on the 
computational cost of the remote host or the system as a whole, being that the computation 
is transferred to the trusted entity.
Path histories (Ordille, 1996) and reference states (Hohl, 1999) require the host to be 
able to digitally sign the agent or parts thereof. If any, the costs involved are dependent on 
the methods required for signing purposes. After a host has digitally signed an agent (or 
parts thereof) in the path histories countermeasure, it is sent to the next host. The receiving 
host then has the opportunity to authenticate the agent before acceptance into the system. 
As the number of hosts on the itinerary of the agent increases, so does the computational 
costs required from each host. 
Countermeasures based on the detection of malicious acts such as partial result 
encapsulation (Chess et al., 1995; Jansen, 2000; Yee, 1997) and detection objects 
(McDermott & Goldschlag, 1996), cause large increases of overhead costs on the local 
host of the agent. This is due to the log reports and reference information being encapsulated 
and sent back to the owner for determining if malicious modifications had occurred. 
Countermeasures based on tracking techniques such as mutual itinerary recording (Roth, 
1998) require the creation of an authenticated channel between the cooperating agents. In 
this case, added cost in terms of computations is also required as the agent is executed both 
at the remote host and the trusted entity. With reference states (Hohl, 1999) the agent is 
re-computed and the initial and final state digitally signed - these mechanisms obviously also 
increase the computational cost of the method.
Code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998) and code transformations (An et al., 2002) imply 
an increase in computational costs for the owner or creator of the agent due to the 
scrambling of the code being done at the local host. The creation of a watermark (Jalali, et 
al., 2000) requires additional computational costs at the local host. The validation thereof 
also requires additional costs for the remote hosts.
Requirement 7: Financial implications
Trusted hardware components (Wilhelm et al., 1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000; Fünfrocken & 
Mattern, 1999), are costly to implement and has deterred service providers from using this 
technology due to the financial implications. 
Costs involved for software methods depend on the implementation algorithm used. The 
use of trusted third parties acting as certification authorities for the management and 
distribution of keys, can have extra financial implications if such trusted units do not exist 
within a specified domain. For use as a secure environment for computations such entities 
need to be created and maintained and can thus instigate additional costs.
Countermeasures based on tracking techniques such as mutual itinerary recording (Roth, 
1998) require the creation of an authenticated channel between the cooperating agents. 
The financial implications of using cryptographic techniques depend on the implementation 
software being used. Some software is available free of charge and commercial versions 
negatively affect the financial costs of these countermeasures. It is also noted that some 
cryptography methods are available from the core system being used (such as the underlying 
Java virtual machine). Examples of measures that incorporate cryptographic techniques are 
anonymous itinerary (Westhoff et al., 1999), cryptographic traces (Vigna, 1998) and 
encrypted functions (Sander & Tschudin, 1998). Path histories (Ordille, 1996) and 
reference states (Hohl, 1999) only require the host to be able to digitally sign the agent or 
parts thereof. If any, the costs involved are dependent on the methods used for signing 
purposes.
For code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998), code transformation (An et al., 2002) and 
proof carrying code (Necula & Lee, 1998), specialised software is needed only by the 
local host for the scrambling of the agent. Proof carrying code (Necula & Lee, 1998) also 
falls in this category, due to the creator of the agent requiring special software.
The different countermeasures evaluated against the established requirements for an 
integrated mobile agent security framework are summarised in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Evaluation of countermeasures
Requirements
Countermeasures Inhibits autonomy & mobility Additional requirements
Additional communication sessions Additional computational costs Additional 
financial costs
Tamper resistant hardware Yes Yes No No Yes
Trusted execution environment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trusted third party - certification authority No Yes Yes No
Yes
Trusted third party - computations Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Path Histories No Yes No Yes Yes
Detection objects No Yes No Yes No
Itinerary recording Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mutual itinerary recording Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference states No Yes No Yes Yes
Phone home Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Mobile agent system Yes Yes Yes Yes No
State appraisal No Yes No Yes Yes
Proof carrying code No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Anonymous itinerary No Yes No Yes Yes
Cryptographic traces No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Encrypted functions No Yes No Yes Yes
Environmental key generation No Yes No Yes Yes
Partial result encapsulation No Yes No Yes Yes
Digital signatures No Yes No Yes Yes
Code obfuscation No Yes No Yes Yes
Code transformation No Yes No Yes Yes
Time sensitive agents No No No No No
Watermark techniques No Yes No Yes Yes
5.5.2 Frameworks, architectures and models
Whilst we have evaluated the available or proposed countermeasures against our 
requirements for an integrated security framework in 5.5.1, we will continue this trend in this 
section and evaluate proposed and implemented mobile agent security frameworks, 
architectures and models. (These models were described in Chapter 4). A summary of the 
evaluation is depicted in Table 5.2.
Requirement 1: Type of implementation environment
As illustrated in Chapter 4, we categorised the different mobile agent frameworks, 
architectures and models into proposed systems based on the notion of a trusted 
environment and those that can be employed in an open environment. A number of the 
proposed systems that were discussed indicated the necessity to distinguish between 
different security mechanisms for dissimilar implementation environments in which the agent 
will be deployed. Proposals such as M&M (Marques et al, 2001), Mansion (Van’t 
Noordende et al, 2002) and Plain text algorithm (An et al, 2002) incorporate various 
security approaches into their designs based on the implementation environment in which the 
mobile agent is to be deployed. The same indication is also further emphasised if one 
considers the variation in security methods employed in proposed systems that operate in a 
trusted environment as opposed to an open environment.
Proposed frameworks in an open environment (such as SAWMA (Luo, 2001) and Agent 
factory (Brazier et al., 2002)) do not provide for the choice between different 
implementation environments.
Requirement 2: Type of mobile agent application areas
Various proposed frameworks, models and architectures are designed specifically for 
unique mobile agent applications. This leads to the incorporation of different security 
mechanisms for different types of applications. For example, FILIGRANE (Jalali et al, 
2000), M&M (Marques et al, 2001), Mansion (Van’t Noordende et al, 2002), PLANET 
(Kato et al, 1996), Distributed transactions (Vogler et al, 1997) and Plain text 
algorithm (An et al, 2002) are all proposed systems for providing mobile agent security 
within a specific application. According to the different applications (such as information 
retrieval for obtaining flight information versus the actual booking agent for a flight), different 
security technologies are incorporated within the design.
Although proposed systems such as FILIGRANE (mobile commerce), Mansion 
(distributed applications) and Self-protecting mobile agents (distributed) are application 
specific systems, different levels of security are not incorporated into their designs. 
Requirement 3: Autonomy and mobility
Although the notion of a trusted environment goes against the autonomy and mobility feature 
of the mobile agent, some systems, due to restraints such as costs and sensitivity, require 
deployment in a trusted setting.
A large number of the proposed frameworks, architectures and models require a trusted 
environment as a core feature on which it is built. Different methods of creating a trusted 
environment are used, for example FILIGRANE (Jalali et al, 2000) and Electronic 
supermarkets (Wu, 2000) incorporate trusted hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998, 1999, 
1999a, 2000) while the POM (Guan et al, 2000) and Supervisor-worker (Fischmeister, 
2000) frameworks make use of a trusted entity within domains for accepting agents into the 
domain as well as to create slave agents for acquiring information on behalf of the mobile 
agent. Mansion (Van’t Noordende et al, 2002) only allows the agent to migrate according 
to a pre-defined list of trusted hosts. The use of a trusted entity to act as a certification 
authority is implemented by a number of systems such as Security enhanced mobile 
agents (Varadharajan, 2000), M&M (Marques et al, 2001) and Distributed transactions 
(Vogler et al., 1997), for the distribution and management of keys. This feature does not 
inhibit the autonomy or mobility of the agent, as certification authorities are used as a general 
means of providing security in computer systems. 
Systems such as FILIGRANE (Jalali et al, 2000) require the use of smart cards by the 
hosts before a mobile agent is able to migrate to the host. This limits the autonomy of the 
agent, due to the implementation specifics of the design. Planet (Kato et al., 1996) also 
makes use of trusted hardware component, with the advantage that it is virtually already 
available on all computers. PLANET (Kato et al., 1996) and Proxy agents (Mitroviæ & 
Arribalgaza, 2002) also requires a trusted entity as a point of entry into a domain, in which 
the hosts are required to register and from which the agent is allowed to migrate to the 
specified hosts. This feature places a prominent restriction on the autonomy of the agent.
Systems developed for an open environment such as SAWMA (Luo, 2001) and Three-tier 
protection model (Sameh & Fakhry, 2002) do not influence the autonomy of the mobile 
agent.
Requirement 4: Additional requirements for implementation
The analysis of the current and proposed frameworks, architectures and models revealed 
that proposed systems that are based on the creation of a trusted environment require a 
large number of additional costs (in some instances) in terms of implementation. Systems 
such as POM (Guan et al., 2000) and Supervisor-worker framework (Fischmeister, 
2000) require a trusted host to secure computations in every domain. Where a trusted entity 
is used to serve as a certification authority, the additional requirements depend on the 
existing infrastructure within a specific domain. Examples include the Security enhanced 
mobile agents (Varadharajan, 2000), M&M (Marques et al, 2001) and Distributed 
transactions (Vogler et al., 1997). The implementation of trusted entities rely on the size of 
these domains, the number of mobile agents within a domain, as well as the current existence 
of such units within a domain.
The use of specialised trusted hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000) 
requires hosts to have the devices installed before acceptance into a domain. Examples are 
Electronic supermarkets (Wu, 2000), PLANET (Kato et al., 1996) and FILIGRANE 
(Jalali et al, 2000). The latter also requires code obfuscation and watermarking methods to 
be available.
As discussed in the analysis of the countermeasures contained in the previous section, 
systems that incorporate cryptographic techniques require appropriate software for the 
implementation of these techniques. Examples of frameworks that include cryptographic 
techniques are Mansion (Van’t Noordende et al, 2002), Distributed transactions (Vogler 
et al., 1997), and DNX (Schütz et al., 2000).
Some of the suggested frameworks or proposed systems incorporate countermeasures not 
discussed in the previous section. For example SAWMA (Luo, 2001) uses code 
obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998) and Java watermarking techniques. The latter requires 
additional software for the local host in order to obfuscate code and to create legitimate 
watermarks.
Requirement 5: Number of communication sessions 
As described earlier, it is desirable that the number of communication sessions between local
hosts, executing remote hosts as well as external hosts (for example a trusted third party) 
must be kept to a minimum. In the case of systems operating in a trusted environment, the 
communication sessions between the different entities depend on the methods used in the 
creation of the trusted environment. Proposed systems such as POM (Guan et al., 2000) 
and Supervisor-worker framework (Fischmeister, 2000) require a trusted entity for secure 
computations (Wilhelm et al., 1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000), which doubles the sessions as 
opposed to the agent just migrating to the remote hosts as specified on the itinerary. When 
incorporating a trusted entity as certification authority (for key management), the 
communication session between the remote host and the certification authority will at least 
double. Other factors such as the encryption protocol might even escalate this figure. 
Examples of these types of proposed systems are Security enhanced mobile agents 
(Varadharajan, 2000) and Distributed transactions (Vogler et al., 1997).
FILIGRANE (Jalali et al, 2000) and Electronic supermarkets (Wu, 2000) that make use 
of trusted hardware (Wilhelm et al., 1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000) do not require additional 
communication sessions if the specialised hardware is located on site of the host. M&M 
(Marques et al., 2001) requires additional communication sessions due to the agent being 
authenticated first (by sending the identification of the agent), before migration to the remote 
host. Distributed transactions (Vogler et al., 1997) requires the establishment of session 
keys, which increases the number of communication sessions between hosts.
In the case of an agent that is only allowed to migrate to a pre-defined list of trusted hosts 
such as Mansion (Van’t Noordende et al, 2002), no extra communication sessions are 
recorded. DNX  (Schütz et al., 2000) only requires the agents to be encrypted before 
sending and depending on whether a certification authority is used; no extra communication 
sessions are required.
In the Security framework for a mobile agent system (Bryce, 2000) replication and 
voting is used. Furthermore, the Mobile code security framework  (Tan & Moreau, 
2002)) requires cryptographic traces (Vigna, 1998)), which leads to large increases in 
communication session. Self-protecting mobile agents (D’Anna et al., 2003) requires 
additional communication sessions in order to allow communication between agentlets. 
Requirement 6: Computational costs
Where computations are performed within a trusted hardware component, no additional 
computational costs are incurred (for example FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000) and 
Electronic supermarkets (Wu, 2000). However, mobile agents that are required to 
conduct their computations on a trusted entity (separate from the remote host), cause a 
decrease in computational cost on the remote host. Due to the computation being moved to 
the trusted third party, the cost of conducting the computation is transferred from the remote 
host to the trusted entity. Proposed frameworks, architectures and models in this category 
are for example POM (Guan et al., 2000), and Supervisor-worker framework 
(Fischmeister, 2000). 
Systems that incorporate encryption/decryption techniques require the host to perform 
encryption/decryption on the agent or parts thereof before and after execution. This might 
also increase the computational costs (depending on the specific algorithm). Examples are 
Mansion (Van’t Noordende et al, 2002), Distributed transactions (Vogler et al., 1997), 
DNX (Schütz et al., 2000) and Planet (Kato et al., 1996). In Proxy agents (Mitroviæ & 
Arribalgaza, 2002) the agents are decrypted within the trusted third party present in every 
domain. Once decrypted and authenticated the agent can move freely within the domain. 
This means that the computational costs are moved from the host to the trusted entity.
M&M (Marques et al., 2001) incorporates partial results authentication codes (Yee, 
1997) as a method of creating log reports, which leads to an increase in computation at the 
remote host.
Requirement 7: Financial implications
In general, the inclusion of specialised hardware for the secure computation of mobile agents 
incurs additional financial costs (example FILIGRANE (Jalali et al, 2000), Electronic 
supermarkets (Wu, 2000)). 
Systems that require the incorporation of a trusted host for the purpose of secure 
computations such as POM (Guan et al., 2000) and Supervisor-worker framework 
(Fischmeister, 2000) induce additional financial costs on the creation of the security system. 
This is due to a dedicated machine being set-up per domain, and depending on the size of 
the domains and the number of mobile agents that need to be processed, the possibility of 
increased expenses arises. The maintenance of these machines is also something to keep in 
mind. In terms of creating a trusted entity for key management (in systems such as Security 
enhanced mobile agents (Varadharajan, 2000) and Distributed transactions (Vogler et 
al., 1997)) additional costs are implied, if no such an authority currently exists. If such an 
authority does exist, additional costs can occur when making use of the service
The use of methods to encrypt the mobile agent or parts of the agent can require additional 
financial costs depending on the encryption methods to be used (or if underlying system such 
as Java is used). Examples are Mansion (Van’t Noordende et al., 2002), Distributed 
transactions (Vogler et al., 1997), DNX (Schütz et al., 2000), and Planet (Kato et al., 
1996).
The incorporation of code obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998) and watermarking techniques 
into systems (such as SAWMA (Luo, 2001)) require the use of specific software, which 
have financial cost implications.
Requirement 8: Choices of countermeasures
Mobile agent frameworks, architectures and models (as discussed in Chapter 4) that require 
a trusted environment for deployment, are usually not permitted to make a decision on 
specific countermeasures to be used for a specific type of application. In general, choices 
regarding the countermeasures are based on the creation of the trusted environment.  Once 
the desired environment is created no additional protection is required for the mobile agent. 
Examples of such systems are POM (Guan et al, 2000), Planet (Kato et al., 1996) and 
Supervisor-worker framework (Fischmeister, 2000). Systems such as Security 
enhanced mobile agents (Varadharajan, 2000) that incorporates the use of trusted entities 
to act as a certification authority provide the possibility of the use of different measures to 
combat attacks, for example the use of different encryption algorithms.
A number of proposed systems make use of security mechanisms  (depending on the goal of 
the agent), which are applicable to all agents without any selection opportunities. Example 
are FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000), which uses encryption, smart cards, code obfuscation 
and watermarking techniques; M&M (Marques et al., 2001), and Distributed 
transactions (Vogler et al., 1997) both use encryption and the creation of log reports. 
Some of the proposed frameworks, architectures and models are based on security 
mechanisms that are provided by the underlying infrastructure of the system in which it is 
implemented. For example, FILIGRANE (Jalali et al., 2000), M&M (Marques et al., 
2001) and DNX (Schütz et al., 2000) make use of the Java security manager as a basis for 
providing cryptographic techniques.
Different types of mobile agent frameworks, proposed systems and implementations are 
evaluated against the established requirements for an integrated mobile agent security 
framework are summarised in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Evaluation of frameworks and models
Requirements
Frameworks / architectures / models Provide environment levels
Provide application levels Inhibits autonomy and mobility Additional 
requirements
POM No No Yes Yes
Security enhanced mobile agents No No Yes
Yes
FILIGRANE No No Yes Yes
M&M Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distributed transactions No No Yes
Yes
Mansion No No Yes Yes
DNX No No No No
Planet No No Yes Yes
Proxy agents No No Yes Yes
Electronic supermarkets No No Yes
Yes
Supervisor worker No No Yes Yes
SAWMA No No No Yes
Agent Factory No No No No
Security framework for mobile agent system No No No
No
Mobile code security framework No No No
Yes
Self protecting mobile agents No No No
Yes
Plaintext algorithm Yes Yes No Yes
Clone No No No Yes
Three tier protection model No No No
Yes
Table 5.2: Evaluation of frameworks and models (cont.)
Requirements
Frameworks / architectures / models Additional communication 
sessions Additional computational costs Additional financial costs
Counter choices
POM Yes No Yes No
Security enhanced mobile agents Yes Yes Yes
Different encryption methods
FILIGRANE No No Yes No
M&M Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distributed transactions Yes Yes Yes
No
Mansion No Yes Yes No
DNX CA? Yes Yes No
Planet Yes Yes Yes No
Proxy agents Yes No Yes No
Electronic supermarkets No No Yes
No
Supervisor worker Yes No Yes No
SAWMA Yes Yes Yes No
Agent Factory No No No No
Security framework for mobile agent system Yes Yes Yes
No
Mobile code security framework Yes Yes No
No
Self protecting mobile agents Yes No No
No
Plaintext algorithm No Yes No No
Clone Yes Yes Yes No
Three tier protection model Yes Yes Yes
No
5.5.3 Mobile agent systems and tools
Chapter 4 saw discussions on a number of mobile agent systems that can be used as a basis 
for the generation of mobile agent applications. A large number of these systems are the 
result of research projects initiated by academic and research institutions. As the acceptance 
of mobile agent systems is reliant on their ability to provide protection for the mobile agent, it 
is essential to evaluate the described mobile agent systems against the requirements for a 
security framework (see 5.4), in order to aid in the process of defining such a framework. 
This section provides the mentioned analysis of which a summary is listed in Table 5.3.
Requirement 1: Type of implementation environment
The analysis of the mobile agent systems and tools as described in the previous chapter, 
displayed that none of the systems provide for different levels of security depending on the 
type of implementation environment. A large number of these systems are built on the 
security designs of the underlying operating system, language or virtual machine and only 
make use of encryption and digital signature algorithms for providing security to the agent. 
Requirement 2: Type of mobile agent application areas 
None of the mobile agent systems and tools analysed, integrate different levels of security 
according to the type of application for which the mobile agent will be used. 
Requirement 3: Autonomy and mobility
A large number of systems (such as ADK (ADK), D’Agents (Gray et al., 1998) and 
SOMA (Corradi et al., 1999)) do not inhibit the autonomy and mobility of the agent. 
Systems that do however place a restriction on the autonomy or mobility of the mobile agent 
are for example Agent TCL (Gray, 1996), which requires the agent to register at the remote 
host before migration, aZIMAs (Nalla et al., 2002), that makes use of a trusted set of hosts 
and Jumping Beans (Jumping Beans) that entails the agent being transferred to a trusted 
central host between migrations. 
Requirement 4: Additional requirements for implementation 
Mobile agent systems such as (ADK (ADK), Aglets (Karjoth et al., 1997), Ajanta 
(Karnik & Tripathi, 2000), AMETAS (Zapf et al., 1998), Anchor Toolkit (Mudumbai et 
al., 1999), aZIMAs (Nalla et al., 2002), Concordia (Kiniry & Zimmerman, 1997), 
D’Agents (Gray et al., 1998), S-agent (Makino et al., 2000), SeMoA (Roth & Jalali, 
2001) and WASP (Fünfrocken & Mattern, 1999)) are built on the Java platform, which 
require the installation of the Java virtual machine before the implementation of the agent 
systems. Agent TCL (Gray, 1996) and TACOMA (Johansen et al., 1995) are built on the 
Tcl scripting language.
Systems such as ADK (ADK) and AMETAS (Zapf et al., 1998) incorporate digital signing 
of parts of the agent, which will require a certification authority for the provision of 
private/public key pairs. It is also possible that the certification authority can form part of the 
functions of the current host. Agent Tcl (Gray, 1996) requires an additional server within a 
domain for registration and key management purposes of the mobile agent. 
Requirement 5: Number of communication sessions
Additional communication sessions for the distribution of keys will depend on the location 
(or use) of a certification authority. For example ADK (ADK) and AMETAS (Zapf et al., 
1998), make use of digital signing and will require the generation of public / private key pairs 
either by the host (no additional communication sessions) or a certification authority 
(additional communication sessions). Agent Tcl (Gray, 1996) requires the agent to first 
register at a server for encryption and signing purposes, before being sent to the first remote 
host. This implies additional communication sessions. 
Requirement 6: Computational costs
Additional costs in terms of computations are considered in cases where the mobile agent 
system makes use of cryptography techniques for encryption and signing purposes. 
Examples of mobile agent systems that incorporate digital signing and certificates are ADK 
(ADK), Agent Tcl (Gray, 1996) and AMETAS (Zapf et al. (1998). Ajanta (Karnik & 
Tripathi, 2000) also incorporates the use of logs for detection purposes that have added 
computational costs.
Requirement 7: Financial implications
A number of systems are being developed as research projects at various institutions, of 
which some progressed to become commercial systems. A mobile agent system that can be 
used for research purposes (but needs to be paid for if used commercially) is ADK (ADK). 
Examples of systems that are available for deploying mobile agent applications free of 
charge are Aglets (Karjoth et al., 1997) and Agent Tcl (Gray, 1996) of which the latter 
also requires an additional server (such as a certification authority) for registering and signing 
the agent. 
               
Requirement 8: Choices of countermeasures
A large number of systems don’t provide the owner or developer of the mobile agent with a 
choice of possible countermeasures. Systems such as ADK (ADK), only provide for the 
digital signing of parts (or whole) of the agent, while systems such as Agent Tcl (Gray, 
1996) also incorporates encryption techniques. 
It is however possible to incorporate possible additional countermeasures based on the 
system used for development and deployment of the mobile agent system. For example Java 
provides a number of possibilities such as encryption as well as different encryption 
algorithms and programs. Ajanta (Karnik & Tripathi, 2000) provides three layers of 
protection, namely read-only containers, append-only logs and only accessible to certain 
hosts. 
Table 5.3: Evaluation of mobile agent systems
Requirements
Mobile agent systems Provide environment levels Provide 
application levels Inhibits autonomy and mobility Additional requirements
ADK No No No Yes
Agent TCL No No Yes Yes
Aglets No No Yes Yes
Ajanta No No Yes Yes
AMETAS No No No Yes
Anchor No No Yes Yes
ARA No No No No
aZIMAs No No Yes Yes
Bee-gent No No No No
Concordia No No No Yes
D’Agents No No No Yes
Jumping Beans No No Yes No
S-agent No No No Yes
SeMoA No No No Yes
SOMA No No No Yes
TACOMA No No No Yes
WASP No No Yes Yes
Table 5.3: Evaluation of mobile agent systems (cont.)
Requirements
Mobile agent systems Additional communication sessions Additional 
computational costs Additional financial costs Counter choices
ADK Yes Yes Yes No
Agent TCL Yes Yes Yes No
Aglets Yes Yes No No
Ajanta Yes Yes No Yes
AMETAS No Yes No No
Anchor No Yes No No
ARA No Yes No No
aZIMAs No No No No
Bee-gent No Yes No No
Concordia No Yes No No
D’Agents No Yes No No
Jumping Beans No Yes Yes No
S-agent No Yes No No
SeMoA No Yes No No
SOMA No Yes Yes No
TACOMA No No Yes No
WASP No No Yes No
5.5.4 Mobile agent system applications
The process of analysing mobile agent countermeasures, models, frameworks, architectures 
and systems against the requirements for a security framework, is continued in this section 
with the analysis of mobile agent system applications (as detailed in Chapter 4). Table 5.4 
provides a summary of the analysis results.
Requirement 1: Type of implementation environment
Current applications developed within the mobile agent paradigm, are mostly developed for 
a specific environment. This has the effect that none of the systems that were evaluated 
make provision for different levels of security according to the environment in which the 
agent are deployed.
Requirement 2: Type of mobile agent application areas
All of the analysed mobile agent applications were developed for a specific application. This 
means that the security techniques incorporated within the applications are related to a 
specific environment and multi-levels of security are not catered for.
Requirement 3: Autonomy and mobility
The autonomy and mobility of the agent is restricted in systems such as MAgNET (Dasgupta
et al., 1999) that requires the licensing of the agent, Mobile agent based transactions in 
open environments (De Assis Silva & Popescu-Zeletin, 2000) that incorporate the split of 
the agent into multi-agents and SIAS (Chan et al., 2000) that requires a trusted set of hosts.
Requirement 4: Additional requirements for implementation
SIAS (Chan et al., 2000) incorporates the use of a key server for the distribution and 
management of keys, while MAgNET (Dasgupta et al., 1999) requires the licensing of 
mobile agent code. Applications such as Mobile agent based transactions in open 
environment (De Assis Silva & Popescu-Zeletin, 2000) and Secure electronic 
transactions (Kotzanikolaou et al., 1999) requires the mobile agent to be split into multi-
agents of which each are required to complete a sub-task of the mobile agent.
Requirement 5: Number of communication sessions
Additional communication sessions are required by Mobile agent based transactions in 
open environment (De Assis Silva & Popescu-Zeletin, 2000) and Secure electronic 
transactions (Kotzanikolaou et al., 1999) due to the inter-agent communication sessions 
between the slave agents. SIAS (Chan et al., 2000) also requires additional communication 
sessions with the key server that is used for key distribution and management.
Requirement 6: Computational costs
Additional computational costs are reflected in applications that incorporate digital signatures
or encryption techniques. Examples of such applications are MAgNET (Dasgupta et al., 
1999), Secure electronic transactions (Kotzanikolaou et al., 1999) and SIAS (Chan et 
al., 2000).
Requirement 7: Financial implications
SIAS (Chan et al., 2000) makes use of a key server to manage key distributions. This 
aspect can have additional financial implications if such a server does not exist within a 
specified domain.
Requirement 8: Choices of countermeasures
Cherubim (Campbell & Qian, 1998) is the only analysed mobile agent system application 
that allows for the incorporation of different countermeasures. The architecture has a pre-
configured core security service; after which new security measures can be dynamically 
injected into this basic system. 
Table 5.4: Evaluation of mobile agent system applications
Requirements
Mobile agent systems and tools Provide environment levels
Provide application levels Inhibits autonomy and mobility Additional 
requirements
Attack Resistant Distributed Hierarchical IDS No No No
No
Cherubim No No No Yes
MAgNET No No Yes Yes
Mobile agent based transactions No No Yes Yes
Secure Electronic Transactions No No Yes Yes
SIAS No No Yes Yes
Virtual Internet Pets No No Yes Yes
Table 5.4: Evaluation of mobile agent system applications (cont.)
Requirements
Mobile agent systems and tools Additional communication sessions
Additional computational costs Additional financial costs Counter 
choices
Attack Resistant Distributed Hierarchical IDS No No No
No
Cherubim Yes Yes No Yes
MAgNET Yes Yes No No
Mobile agent based transactions Yes No No No
Secure Electronic Transactions Yes No No No
SIAS Yes Yes Yes No
Virtual Internet Pets Yes No No No
5.6 Conclusion
The requirements for a mobile agent security framework were proposed upon which the 
different countermeasures, frameworks, architectures, models, mobile agent systems and 
applications were evaluated against the proposed criteria. This provides essential analysis 
information for the creation of a mobile agent security framework, which forms the focus of 
the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 6
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
6.1 Introduction
The criteria and requirements of a mobile agent security framework were outlined and 
described in Chapter 5.  We used these requirements to evaluate the individual mobile agent 
countermeasures as well as mobile agent systems, frameworks, architectures, models and 
applications. These evaluation results directed us to the proposal of a mobile agent security 
framework, as outlined in this chapter.
6.2 Establishing Security Levels
The identification of the challenges (see 5.3) and the requirements (see 5.4) of a mobile 
agent security framework brings us closer to establishing a security framework that is 
appropriate for different mobile agent applications. As the first step in providing an 
integrated security framework, we distinguish between different levels of security. In doing 
this (depending on the application and the environment), the mobile agent can be deployed 
in various degrees of a trusted environment.
Classification of mobile agent application areas 
The different uses and applications of mobile agents, as described in Chapter 2, lead to the 
following grouping into three categories: 
Information retrieval: Applications in this category are responsible for searching and 
retrieving information from different hosts and then to convey these results back to the 
owner of the mobile agent. Examples of such applications are search engines and 
requesting prices for specific goods at different vendors. These types of applications 
request a mere lookup of a database or table and return the information to its owner. 
Information conveying and retrieval: This category includes the functionality of the 
previous category, with additional roles. Applications that not only retrieve information 
but also convey results between the different hosts, or between hosts and the mobile 
agent’s owner. Examples include network testing and the confirmation of information. 
As can be seen from the examples, these types of applications take the information that 
they gather along to a next host where the host is able to make informed decisions based
on the information that it has received.  As stated above, such a host is not necessarily 
the mobile agent’s owner.
Computations: Besides the retrieval and transport of information, this category also has 
the added ability of performing some computations (to different degrees) on the different 
hosts. E-commerce applications and the well-known airline ticket reservation system are 
examples of this category. Different to the previous category, where the gathered 
information enabled a host to make informed decisions, the gathered information is 
usually used (in this case) by the mobile agent to make informed decisions.
The different groups of applications necessitate different levels of security that must be 
incorporated in the mobile agent security framework. 
Classification of implementation environments
As suggested by the analysis of the mobile agent system frameworks and models in Chapter 
4, an agent security framework is not just dependent on the applications but also on the 
environment in which the applications operate. We categorise mobile agent applications as 
being able to operate in three different implementation environments, namely in a trusted 
environment, in a pre-defined environment and in an open environment. 
A trusted environment is a network consisting of trusted nodes and a mobile agent is only 
deployed amongst these trusted hosts. The level of trust between the owner of the mobile 
agent and the hosts can vary according to the requirements of the application. An example 
of such an environment is an intranet environment of a company or organisation and mobile 
agents are deployed within this intranet environment. The mobile agent may for example be 
required to migrate between service providers belonging to the same organisation. In this 
specific scenario, the mobile agent has reason to trust the hosts that it visits.
A pre-defined environment on the other hand consists of a number of pre-defined hosts that 
a mobile agent should visit.  In such a case, the mobile agent owner simply specifies the 
itinerary of hosts to be visited before the mobile agent is deployed. The hosts indicated 
beforehand are not necessarily seen as trusted entities, but the mobile agent owner might 
have a better idea of where problems could have been encountered once the mobile agent 
returns home. Examples of this category are environments in which the service providers to 
be visited are determined beforehand, such as a flight booking between a choice of airlines 
(ex. only Virgin, British Airways or American Airlines).
An open environment is seen as the World Wide Web (WWW), in which the agent roams 
freely without its owner specifying a pre-determined itinerary. The mobile agents are able to 
autonomously migrate between hosts and make decisions in order to reach their goals. This 
type of environment is the most difficult to protect against and extensive security methods 
have to be incorporated.
Framework security levels
According to the criteria of a mobile agent security framework, as well as the analysis and 
discussions in the previous chapters regarding the countermeasures, frameworks, systems 
and applications, we propose the following six levels of security within the framework:
Basic closed: The basic closed level is a trusted environment in which the mobile agent 
is deployed. This trusted environment is typically a local area network (such as an 
Intranet) within a specific organisation. The level of trust in this environment is high. The 
mobile agent system executing on the basic closed level will mainly be used for 
information conveying and retrieval with no computations taking place on the different 
hosts.
Extended closed: This security level is a local area network that can possibly be 
extended by incorporating two or more Intranets. It is basically a trusted network of 
nodes and the mobile agent deployed at the extended closed security level is used not 
just for information searching and conveying, but also for computations. The level of 
trust is high.
Basic Restricted: Applications operating on the basic restricted level will make use of 
hosts on the Internet, where the hosts are pre-determined by the owner. Applications 
operating in the basic restricted level are mainly for information retrieval and 
conveying, but with no computations. The level of trust on this level is low.
Extended Restricted: As in the previous framework level, hosts to be visited in this type 
of framework are predefined.  Additional to the information retrieval and conveying, 
mobile agents will also have no restrictions on the functions executed at the different 
hosts, which means that computations are allowed.  As before, the level of trust is low.
Basic Open: In the basic open framework level, Internet hosts are included without the
restriction of a predefined itinerary.  However, at this level, mobile agents are only used 
for information conveying and retrieval with no computations on the different hosts. The 
level of trust is nil.
Extended Open: As in the previous framework level, the extended open framework 
level includes Internet hosts without the restriction of a predefined itinerary.  
Applications in this environment have no restriction on accessing and computational 
functions on the different hosts. Since the level of trust is extremely low, it is important 
that all components of the agent are protected.
It is necessary to distinguish between mobile agents that is tasked to convey and / or retrieve 
information and mobile agents whose ultimate goal include computations on the different 
hosts. Agents that fall in the latter category will need additional protection in terms of 
information required throughout their journey as well as the protection of the actual 
computational results. Figure 6.1 summarises the discussion on the different security levels. 
In the diagram the x-axis depicts the different types of execution environments, while the 
application categories are depicted along the y-axis.
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Figure 6.1: Proposed framework security levels
6.3 Countermeasures for Security Levels
As described in the previous section and depicted in Figure 6.1, the different framework 
security levels depend on the definition of specific application environments in which mobile 
agents are likely to be deployed. These application environments range from a highly trusted 
environment to an untrusted open environment. In the rest of this section, we consider the 
most appropriate countermeasures to be integrated into a particular environment in order to 
improve the security without risking performance.  The suggested framework has a dynamic 
nature. Although the framework itself appears static in the number of solutions it seems to 
offer, the ability to use any countermeasure or combination of countermeasure for different 
security demands, lends a dynamic character to the proposed framework.  This implies that 
although there may be various appropriate countermeasures available for a specific security 
level, only a selected few of these may be suitable for a particular application. This in turn 
depends on what degree of security the application is expecting from the framework.  
Closed Security Level
The creation of a highly trusted environment for the closed security level, can be achieved by
either hardware or software methods. Hardware methods involve the implementation of 
tamper resistant components on each host (see Wilhelm et al. (1998, 1999, 1999a, 2000) 
and Fünfrocken & Mattern (1999)). The main disadvantage of introducing specialised 
hardware components is the costs involved. This method does however provide a high level 
of computational trust for the mobile agent and protects the agent against attacks when 
executing at a remote host. These types of countermeasures are recommended within 
environments that require a high level of security, where the protection of the agents verifies 
the high implementation costs.
 
Software methods for the creation of a trusted execution environment can also be achieved 
by setting up a trusted set of network nodes. This can be done for example by using 
encryption and authentication techniques (Sander & Tschudin, 1998). Yee (1997) also 
introduced a number of alternative methods to achieve trust in a mobile agent system, 
namely blind trust, trust based on reputation, trust based on control and punishment, or 
trust based on policy enforcement where an agent had a prior (contractual) relationship 
with the host.
In a specific local area network such as an Intranet, trust can be achieved by being part of a 
certain corporation or company. In this case the mobile agent is deployed amongst entities 
with the same goal in mind and possible malicious intent by a remote host is diminished. In 
this type of environment introduction of additional hardware or software methods might not 
be necessary, because of the high level of trust that is already present.
A trusted third party used as a certification authority as well as for the distribution and 
management of keys, can be incorporated into the basic closed.  This trusted entity could 
also be extended to the extended closed level with the trusted third party being used for 
secure computations. The transferring of data and computation results from each remote 
host to the local host is also incorporated into the closed levels as a method to provide for a 
trusted execution environment. In determining the countermeasures for the different levels of 
security within the framework, distinction is made between measures that can detect 
malicious behaviour and those that prevent malicious behaviour. Countermeasures included 
in the closed security levels provide preventative measures for protecting the agent. The list 
of techniques incorporated within the closed security level is depicted in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Countermeasures for closed security level
Basic closed  Prevention methods: Trusted execution environment Tamper resistant 
hardware Trusted third party - (certification authority)   Extended closed  Prevention 
methods: Trusted execution environment Tamper resistant hardware Trusted third party - 
(certification authority) Trusted third party - (computations) Phone home
The creation of the basic closed level as well as the extended closed level is divided into 
two different ways, namely by using trusted hardware components or by incorporating 
software techniques. The steps for the creation of a trusted execution environment by using 
tamper resistant hardware are shown in Figure 6.2, and involves the following steps:
(1) Upon creation of the mobile agent, its itinerary is defined which only include 
remote hosts that have a tamper resistant hardware device installed. This step also 
includes the creation of a security policy for the mobile agent that specifies its 
security definitions and requirements.
(2) Once the itinerary of the mobile agent is defined, the public key of the first remote 
host is requested from the tamper resistant module located on the specified remote
host.
(3) Using the public key of Remote Host A, the mobile agent is encrypted and 
transferred to the tamper resistant hardware module located on Remote Host A.
(4) Remote Host A decrypts the received mobile agent by using its private key and 
subsequently executes the agent.
This process is repeated at every remote host on the itinerary encrypting the mobile agent by 
using the public key of the next host, until the itinerary is exhausted and the agent returns to 
the local host.
Figure 6.2: Creation of closed level by using tamper resistant hardware
The use of software methods to create a trusted environment entails the creation of security 
policies as well as certification and authentication techniques. Figure 6.3 depicts the 
communication sessions that take place between the local host and Remote Host A.
(1) Upon creation of the mobile agent, a security policy is defined for the mobile agent 
outlining its security requirements. The list of hosts to be visited is scheduled within 
the itinerary of the agent. A public / private key pair is created for every remote host 
either by using a certification authority or by the remote hosts themselves. Figure 6-3
outlines the key creation process as done by the remote hosts. 
(2) The mobile agent authenticates itself by creating a digital certificate and sends the 
certificate to Remote Host A. 
(3) Upon verification of the agent, Remote Host A responds by sending a digital 
certificate authenticating itself, back to the mobile agent.
(4) The local host encrypts the mobile agent and sends it to Remote host A.
(5) Remote Host A decrypts the agent and continues with the execution of the agent.
This process continues with every remote host listed on the itinerary required to authenticate 
itself, as well as to encrypts / decrypts the mobile agent.
Figure 6.3: Creation of closed level by using software methods
The protection of the computational results on the extended closed level by means of either 
a trusted computing entity or by conveying the results back to the local host requires the 
following steps (as outlined in Figure 6.4):
(1) The mobile agent migrates from the local host to Remote Host A, where it is 
executed.
(2) Secure computations are completed at the trusted entity and the results are 
conveyed back to the agent.
(3) Results obtained at Remote Host A are conveyed back to the local host.
(4) The mobile agent migrates to Remote Host B.
(5) Secure computations are completed at the trusted entity and the results are 
attached to the agent.
(6) Results obtained at Remote Host B are conveyed back to the local host.
(7) The mobile agent migrates to Remote Host C, and the same process for 
secure computations is followed.
(8) The mobile agent migrates from Remote Host N back to the local host.
Figure 6.4: Trusted computing base and phone home
Restricted security level
The restricted security levels of the framework operate in a predefined environment. The 
requirement for this environment is that the itinerary of the mobile agent be pre-determined 
by its owner (or creator) before migration to the first remote host. Although the hosts are 
known beforehand, the restricted security level is not seen as a trusted environment and a 
trusted environment is not created, as was the case in the closed levels.
The list of countermeasures that can assist in the creation of the restricted security level is 
shown in Table 6.2. These countermeasures are divided into methods that can be used for 
detection purposes and methods that can be incorporated for the prevention of mobile agent 
threats.
Table 6.2: Available countermeasures for restricted level
Basic restricted  Detection methods: Detection objects Digital signatures Itinerary 
recording Path histories Proof carrying code Watermarking  Prevention methods: 
Anonymous itinerary Code obfuscation Code transformations Computing with encrypted 
functions Environmental key generation Mobile agent system Partial results encapsulation 
Time sensitive agents  Extended restricted  Detection methods: 
Detection objects Digital signatures Execution tracing Itinerary recording Path histories 
Proof carrying code Reference states State appraisal Watermarking  Prevention 
methods: Anonymous itinerary Code obfuscation Code transformations Computing with 
encrypted functions Environmental key generation Mobile agent system Partial results 
encapsulation Time sensitive agents 
The analysis of the measures indicated in Table 6.2 according to the requirements of a 
mobile agent security framework (see 5.5.1) will assist us in determining methods to be 
included within the framework. Countermeasures to be included in the restricted level of 
the framework are subsequently discussed.
Detection objects (McDermott & Goldschlag, 1996) provide a way for detecting changes 
within the code of the mobile agent. It requires the creator of the agent to insert the dummy 
values and also implies additional computational overhead at the local host when determining 
if the inserted values have been modified. The limitations of detection methods are the 
increase in computational costs, and because it is deemed necessary that the creator of the 
mobile agent is provided with a choice of detection methods, it is included in both the basic 
restricted as well as the extended restricted levels.  
The encryption and authentication of the agent is present as a feature in most of the mobile 
agent systems and from the analysis of these systems as well as the frameworks and 
applications (Chapter 5), is thus seen as a primary requirement for all levels of the mobile 
agent security framework.
As indicated in the Chapter 4 & Chapter 5, techniques that make use of cooperating agents 
in order to protect the mobile agent, have limiting effects on the autonomy and mobility 
properties of the mobile agent. Although the restricted security levels make use of a 
predefined itinerary and thus inhibits the autonomy and mobility of the mobile agent in a 
certain sense, Itinerary recording with replication and voting (Minsky et al., 1996) 
requires the establishment of a set of cooperating agents and is in violation of all the 
requirements of the security framework and are thus not included within the framework. 
The Path Histories (Ordille, 1996) countermeasure is included within the basic restricted 
as well as the extended restricted levels for providing a trail of hosts visited. The downside 
once again of a detection method is the additional computational costs in validating the 
histories.
Proof-carrying code (Necula & Lee, 1998) requires the existence of a proof-validator 
within the domain in which the mobile agent will be deployed, as well as additional 
communication sessions between the remote hosts and the mentioned validator. This method 
is thus not included within the framework.  Watermarking techniques (Jalali et al., 2000) 
provide a way of assessing if the mobile agent is valid and require the creator of the agent to 
create and insert the watermark, which implies additional overhead costs. Watermarking 
techniques need to be available on the basic restricted as well as the extended restricted 
levels of the framework. 
Prevention mechanisms include the use of anonymous itinerary (Westhoff et al., 1999) in 
order to provide anonymity with regards to the remote hosts to be visited. The prevention of 
attacks aimed at the code of the mobile agent can be achieved by combining code 
obfuscation (Hohl, 1997, 1998) and time techniques (Grimley & Monroe, 1999) as well 
as code transformations (An et al., 2002) and time techniques (Grimley & Monroe, 
1999). Computing with encrypted functions (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) does provide 
protection for the agent and is included within the basic restricted and extended restricted 
levels of the framework. 
Environmental key generation (Riordan & Schneier, 1998) is a method of encrypting the 
agent and providing means of key generation for decryption purposes. The use of a mobile 
agent system (Yee, 1997) restricts the autonomy and mobility property of the mobile agent 
as well as demanding a huge increase in computational costs and is not included within the 
framework. Partial result encapsulation (Chess et al., 1995; Jansen, 2000; Yee, 1997) is 
included in the framework on both the basic restricted and the extended restricted levels.
A summary of the countermeasures included in the basic restricted security level is depicted
in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Countermeasures for basic restricted security level
Basic Restricted 
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Auditing      Path histories Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques  Keeping the 
agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  Protecting itinerary:      
Anonymous itinerary  Auditing:      Partial result encapsulation
On the extended security level protection needs to be provided for the state of the mobile 
agent. Detection methods for protecting state information include cryptographic traces 
(Vigna, 1998), reference states (Hohl, 2000) and state appraisal (Farmer et al., 1996). 
Cryptographic traces (Vigna, 1998) induces a huge amount of additional communication 
sessions as well as computational costs, which implies restricting two of the requirements of 
a security framework and is thus not included within the framework. State appraisal 
(Farmer et al., 1996) and reference states (Hohl, 2000) are included in the extended 
restricted level.
Table 6.4 provides a summary of the measures included in the extended restricted security 
level.
Table 6.4: Countermeasures for extended restricted level
Extended Restricted 
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Audit trail:      Path histories  State protection:      Reference states      
State appraisal Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques      Environmental 
key generation  Keeping the agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  
Protecting itinerary:      Anonymous itinerary  Auditing:      Partial result encapsulation 
Open Security Level
Any remote host can form part of the list of hosts visited by a mobile agent in the open 
security levels. The open environment is for example the Internet and the mobile agent has 
the ability to migrate between any of the hosts available. No assumptions are made 
regarding the level of trust of the remote host before migration. 
Table 6.5 provides the lists of current appropriate countermeasures for the open security 
levels.
Table 6.5: Available countermeasures for open level
Basic open  Detection methods: Detection objects Digital signatures Itinerary recording 
Mutual itinerary recording Path histories Proof carrying code Watermarking  Prevention 
methods: Code obfuscation Code transformations Computing with encrypted functions 
Environmental key generation Partial results encapsulation Time sensitive agents  
Extended open  Detection methods: 
Detection objects Digital signatures Execution tracing Itinerary recording Mutual itinerary 
recording Path histories Proof carrying code Reference states State appraisal Watermarking 
Prevention methods: Code obfuscation Code transformations Computing with encrypted 
functions Environmental key generation Partial results encapsulation Time sensitive agents 
The only countermeasure not discussed on the previous levels is mutual itinerary 
recording (Roth, 1998). This method inhibits the autonomy and mobility of the agent (which 
is essential in an open environment), it is not included in the framework. Table 6.6 provides 
the countermeasures included within the basic open security level.
Table 6.6: Countermeasures for basic open level
Basic Open 
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Auditing      Path histories Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques  Keeping the 
agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  Auditing:      Partial result 
encapsulation
The countermeasures included within the extended open level have been reviewed as part 
of the discussions surrounding the restricted security levels. Table 6.7 lists the 
countermeasures for the extended open level.
Table 6.7: Countermeasures for extended open level
Extended Open
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Audit trail:      Path histories  State protection:      Reference states      
State appraisal Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques  Keeping the 
agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  Auditing:      Partial result 
encapsulation  
The different countermeasures listed within the different security levels were discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, while the shortcomings resulting from implementing and testing of the 
measures are outlined in Chapter 8. 
6.4 Conclusion
In the previous chapters we have studied and discussed the available literature on mobile 
agent security with specific reference to the malicious host problem. Through this research 
we were able to identify the most salient characteristics in available security frameworks and 
mobile agent systems, but also isolate the drawbacks, which up to this point, still leaves a 
mobile agent vulnerable for malicious hosts attacks. In Chapter 6, the accumulated 
background knowledge and arguments were used to describe a dynamic mobile agent 
security framework that is based on the definition of multiple security levels, depending on 
the type of deployment environment as well as type of application.  Under these conditions, 
it is possible to assess the security requirements of a particular mobile agent system and to 
assemble a custom-made security plan for the particular mobile agent system that would not 
interfere with the system’s performance or make the deployment of such a system 
expensive.  In the next chapter, we describe the implementation and analysis of our multi-
level security framework.
CHAPTER 7
IMPLEMENTATION
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5 the environment in which a mobile agent will or can be deployed, as well as the 
type of mobile agent application have been evaluated against a set of criteria that have been 
developed earlier for efficient mobile agent systems. This evaluation led to the definitions of 
different security levels, which form the basis of the proposed mobile agent security 
framework. In the research effort pertaining to this thesis, the proposed framework has been 
prototyped and tested against current and proposed countermeasures, systems and 
implementations (Chapter 6). The implementation specifics are described in this chapter, that
include the prototype being implemented and through experimentation tested for different 
scenarios in order to ascertain the practicality of the proposed framework. The line of 
reasoning is then continued with an analysis and interpretation of the testing results. 
7.2 Summary of the Proposed Mobile Agent Security Framework
In the previous chapter a mobile agent security framework has been propositioned based on 
eight requirements that have been established to enable secure, yet effective mobile agent 
systems.  In summary, the following requirements are imposed on a security framework for 
mobile agent systems, which render a secure yet efficient and goal driven system:
1. The framework must provide different levels of security, depending on the type of 
implementation environment in which the mobile agent would be deployed.
2. The framework must incorporate different levels of security depending on the type 
of application and agent objectives.
3. The framework must maintain and not hamper the autonomy and mobility factor of 
the agent.
4. Additional security implementations on the remote hosts (and the system as a 
whole) must be kept to the minimum, to reduce cost and time. This includes both 
additional hardware and software requirements.
5. The number of communication sessions between the remote hosts (and between 
remote hosts and other entities) must be minimised. There also needs to be no 
permanent connection between the agent and the local host.
6. Computational cost of implementing countermeasures and maintenance thereof 
must be as low as possible. 
7. The cost of implementation should be affordable or at least minimised. The 
financial costs of implementing countermeasures need to be in direct relation with 
the degree of security required.
8. The host must possess intrinsic mechanisms to support the security requirements of 
the agent. This implies the provision and integration of additional security 
functions and services, according to the needs of the application, and hence the 
agent.
Based on these requirements, available countermeasures as well as available mobile agents 
systems (and frameworks) or proposed mobile agent systems / frameworks were evaluated. 
This resulted in the proposal of six levels of security for mobile agents and mobile agent 
systems.  These levels are summarised as follows:
1. Basic closed: a trusted execution environment that allows information retrieval and 
conveying without computations.
2. Extended closed: a trusted execution environment that allows information retrieval 
and conveying with computations.
3. Basic restricted: a potentially untrusted, but predefined execution environment that 
allows information retrieval and conveying without computations.
4. Extended restricted: a potentially untrusted, but predefined execution environment 
that allows information retrieval and conveying with computations.
5. Basic open: an untrusted and also unknown execution environment that allows 
information retrieval and conveying without computations.
6. Extended open: an untrusted and also unknown execution environment that allows 
information retrieval and conveying with computations.
These predefined execution environments enable the careful evaluation of available 
countermeasures and selection of applicable measures based on the specific objectives of 
the mobile agent (system) as well as the anticipated execution environment.  
The practical implication of these different levels of security is that it becomes possible to 
identify appropriate security countermeasures for particular deployment environments.  
Table 7.1 summarises the options that are typically available to a mobile agent system 
programmer when designing a secure mobile agent system that is protected against malicious 
hosts attacks. 
Table 7.1: Countermeasures for security levels
Basic Open Extended Open
 Detection methods:     Detection objects      Watermarking     Digital signatures     Path 
histories      Prevention methods:     Code obfuscation      Code transformation      Time 
techniques     Computing with encrypted functions     Partial result encapsulation 
Detection methods:     Detection objects   
Watermarking     Digital signatures     Path histories     Reference states     State appraisal  
Prevention methods:     Code obfuscation      Code transformation      Time techniques     
Computing with encrypted functions     Partial result encapsulation 
Basic Restricted Extended Restricted
Detection methods:     Detection objects      Watermarking     Digital signatures     Path 
histories      Prevention methods:     Code obfuscation      Code transformation      Time 
techniques     Anonymous itinerary     Computing with encrypted functions     Partial result 
encapsulation Detection methods:     Detection objects   
Watermarking     Digital signatures     Path histories     Reference states     State appraisal 
Prevention methods:     Code obfuscation      Code transformation      Time techniques     
Environmental key generation     Anonymous itinerary     Computing with encrypted 
functions     Partial result encapsulation  
Basic Closed Extended Closed
Prevention methods: Trusted execution environment Tamper resistant hardware Trusted 
third party - (certification authority) Prevention methods: Trusted execution 
environment Tamper resistant hardware Trusted third party - (certification authority) Trusted 
third party - (computations) Phone home
7.3 Implementation Specifications
To test whether the mobile agent security framework as proposed in the previous chapter 
can be implemented, we could either have constructed a new mobile agent development 
platform or use an existing mobile agent development system that allows for the creation and 
management of agents.  We chose the latter, as the research question pertaining to this study 
is focussed on the security aspects and not to improve current creation, control or migration 
capabilities of mobile agents.  To test our propositions, we searched for an existing mobile 
agent development system that could form the basis from where our framework could be 
implemented and tested. Our system requirements for such a basis included the following:
As a basis, the selected system had to provide the infrastructure for the initialisation 
and controlling of mobile agents
As a basis, the selected system also had to provide for, or facilitate an execution 
environment with capabilities such as migration and communication.
The selected system’s code had to be available for modification so that specific 
security measures could be implemented as desired. 
7.3.1 Primary software environment
As discussed in Chapter 4, a number of mobile agent systems are currently available to aid 
the development of mobile agent applications. An analysis of the mentioned systems against 
our specific requirements has lead to the choosing of the Aglets software development kit, 
developed by IBM Japan. Although Aglets are not one of the newest mobile agent systems 
around, the choice of Aglets was further supported by (1) its availability as open source on 
the Internet and (2) the number of applications that are already developed by using Aglets. 
The latter provided us with a certain level of persistence and confidence in the technology, 
especially at this level, where we deemed it unnecessary to waste coding time on already 
existing technology. The first version of Aglets was released in 1996, with the latest version 
(v. 2) being available as open source. The Aglets system is written in Java and requires the 
Java virtual machine for implementation. The Aglet API is a set of Java classes and 
interfaces that allows for the creation and management of mobile agents. Network 
communication is done through the Aglet Transfer Protocol (ATP). 
With the development kit of the Aglet system, a graphical user interface named Tahiti is also
used to simplify the management and control of aglets that are created within a specified 
environment. Tahiti contains a network daemon that listens for incoming aglets as well as a 
security manager that include measures for protecting the host. Take note however, that the 
security manager is only concerned with the protection of the host and not the aglet.
The Aglet model consists of four basic elements, namely an aglet, which is a mobile agent, 
or as described in literature, a mobile Java object; a proxy representing the aglet; a context, 
which is the aglet’s workplace and an identifier, which is globally unique and bound to each 
aglet (Lange & Oshima, 1998). Lange & Oshima (1998) describe the fundamental 
operations of an aglet as: 
creation - occurring within an aglet context; 
cloning  - producing a copy of an aglet; 
dispatching - moving an aglet between aglet contexts; 
retraction - removing an aglet from the current aglet context;
activation / deactivation - temporary halt or restart of the aglet; 
disposal - removing an aglet from the current context 
The Aglet programming model is event-based where customised listeners are employed to 
catch events within the life cycle of the aglet and subsequently allow the developer to code 
appropriate actions. There are three different listeners defined in this context, namely
a clone listener - listening for cloning events; 
a mobility listener - listening for dispatch, retract or arrival messages of an aglet; 
a persistence listener  - listening for activation or deactivation messages for a an 
aglet in order to facilitate specific actions based on the message it receives
The Aglet communication model is implemented by using message passing, which allows for 
the creation and exchange of messages in flexible ways. A proxy aglet is used to protect 
aglets against other aglets (not hosts).  For this process, a proxy is initiated upon creation of 
an aglet. The proxy provides a way of accessing the aglet. Any aglet that instigates 
communication with another aglet first has to access the proxy of the aglet and then has to 
interact via the proxy.
The life cycle of an aglet is depicted in Figure 7.1 and shows the fundamental operations 
available on aglets as discussed above (Lange & Oshima, 1998).
Figure 7.1: Aglet life cycle
7.3.2 Experimentation environment and equipment
In our research effort, we set to create a simple implementation environment where the Aglet
Software Development Kit (ASDK) could be deployed.  The implementation environment 
consists of three hosts forming a network. Each host in our experiments has the following 
configuration: Pentium II, 200MHz processor with 128 MB RAM; Windows 98 operating 
system with Java Software Development Kit (version 1.4), Java Virtual Machine (version 
2); Aglets Software Development Kit (version 2.1) installed. We further use the Aglet 
Transfer Protocol (version 1.2) and the Tahiti aglets server (version 1.0b5).
The implementation and testing of the proposed framework set to test whether existing 
countermeasures can be used to provide a dynamic set of measures in order to proof the 
viability of the framework. The purpose of the implementation is not to define new measures 
but to incorporate existing methods by making use of the Aglets Software Development Kit 
as a platform.
7.4 Aglet Security Model
In this section we describe the available security features of ASDK. The Aglet security 
model as described by Lange & Oshima (1998), is based on the definition of security 
policies as well as a description of how and where these policies are enforced.  
Furthermore, the model defines several principals (important entities) that can be 
authenticated to support the intended security.  The primary principals are those in the aglet 
system, the aglet context and the network domain.  The principals in the aglet system 
include the aglet itself, the aglet manufacturer and the aglet owner, while those in the 
aglet context are the context itself, the context manufacturer and the context owner. 
Finally, the principals in a network domain are the hosts.
The Aglet security model provides methods for the protection of the host and also 
protection of the aglet against other aglets. No capabilities for the aglet to protect itself 
against a malicious host are incorporated into the model. Even though our interest lies 
specifically in the protection against malicious hosts, we find it necessary to discuss the 
Aglet security model in order to specify the security policies that are required for the 
creation and distribution of aglets.
Permissions within the Aglet security model define the capabilities of executing aglets by 
setting access restrictions and also limitations on resource consumption. Permission is 
defined as a resource and the abstract syntax of permissions is based on the JDK policy file 
definition. The permission structure for aglets include the following types of permissions:
file permissions, controlling access to the local file system; 
network permissions, controlling access to the network;
window system permissions, for controlling the opening of windows;
context permission, for granting permission to services provided by the context;
 aglet permission, for controlling methods provided by an individual aglet.
Besides setting permissions for a particular aglet that is intended to keep a tight rein on the 
aglet, it is also possible to define a particular level of protection for the aglet. Even though 
protections are not defined in a way that they can safeguard the agent from a malicious 
host, they facilitate a minor degree of safety for the aglet.  For example, a protection can be 
set to specify that only the owner of a specific aglet can dispose of the aglet.  
Another component of the Aglet security is the definition of security policies by 
authorities. The authorities are typically the aglet owner, the context owner and the 
network domain owner.  The security policies are sets of rules containing the protection 
level within the permission structure. For this purpose, a security policy file is defined and 
presented at each host that an aglet is to visit.
When setting up a security policy file, all permissions are initially allowed on the different 
hosts. Figure 7.2 shows an extract of a sample policy file (the complete file can be viewed in 
Addendum A).
grant codeBase "atp://*:*/" {   permission java.io.FilePermission 
"codebase", "read";   permission java.io.FilePermission "codebase", 
"read, write,                                                   
execute";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "browser", 
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.rmi.*", 
"read";   permission com.ibm.aglets.security.ContextPermission "*",   
"create,receive,retract";   protection 
com.ibm.aglet.security.AgletProtection "*",                  
"dispatch,dispose,deactivate,activate,clone,retract";   protection 
com.ibm.aglet.security.MessageProtection "*", "*"; };
Figure 7.2: Aglet security policy file
7.5 Implementation of Framework
To implement and test our proposed framework (as detailed in Chapter 6), it is necessary to 
design and generate aglets for the different application levels of the framework (namely the 
three basic and the three extended levels).
Applications in the basic security category are responsible for retrieving information from the
different remote hosts, as well as conveying results either between the different hosts or 
between the remote hosts and the local host of the owner. For the purpose of this particular 
implementation an aglet (named RetrievalAglet) is created. RetrievalAglet is tasked to 
collect the prices of specific goods at various host sites and once information at a particular 
host has been collected, the retrieved information is saved in a file and attached to the agent 
as part of its aggregated data.  Upon its return to the local host, the data is viewed and 
printed by the owner / creator of the aglet.
In this specific implementation, the required information is contained in a file located at every 
host. The structure of RetrievalAglet is supplied in Figure 7.3, with the full source code 
listed in Addendum B. As illustrated in the outline given in Figure 7.3, the RetrievalAglet 
class contains three methods namely, onCreation that is initiated when an object of class 
RetrievalAglet is created, run that contains the steps to be completed by the agent on 
each remote host (in this case the retrieval of prices for specific goods) and 
NextDestination() that provides the steps for transferring the agent to the next remote host.
public class RetrievalAglet extends Aglet {   //specifications of requested information    public 
void onCreation(Object init) {       addMobilityListener(    new MobilityAdapter() {             public 
void onArrival(MobilityEvent b) {    }    }  ); }   public void run() {   try {    //retrieve information         
//add retrieved information to aglet    }    } catch (Exception e) {    System.out.println
(e.getMessage());   }  }     void NextDestination() {   try {    //migrate to next remote host   }   }
catch (Exception e) {   System.out.println(e.getMessage()); }  } } 
Figure 7.3: RetrievalAglet
The implementation and testing in the extended category of the framework requires an 
application that besides the retrieval and transport of information also has the added ability 
of performing some computations (to different degrees) on the different hosts. To 
demonstrate this an aglet (named ComputationAglet) is created that is based on the 
concept of RetrievalAglet, with the added ability of not only commanding the price of 
goods available on each host, but also to make a computation (in order to find the lowest 
price between the hosts). The lowest price as well as the URL of the host at which it is 
obtained is saved in a file, attached to the mobile agent and printed at the local host.
Figure 7.4 lists the structure of ComputationAglet, of which the full source code is 
available in Addendum C. The methods of the ComputationAglet are similar to those of 
the RetrievalAglet.  However, take note of the additional code required in the run method,
which is necessary for the computational facilities of this class.  
public class ComputationAglet extends Aglet {                     //specifications of requested 
information    public void onCreation(Object init) {        addMobilityListener(     new 
MobilityAdapter() {               public void onArrival(MobilityEvent b) {     }    }   );   }   public void 
run() {   try {    //Retrieve information                                       //Determine lowest price             
//If lowest price, require aglet context and add to aglet          } catch (Exception e) {    
System.out.println(e.getMessage());   }  }   void NextDestination() {   try {    //migrate to next 
remote host   }catch (Exception e) {   //Failed to initialize next destination   System.out.println
(e.getMessage()); }  } }
Figure 7.4: ComputationAglet
7.5.1 Basic Closed Level
As portrayed in Chapter 6, the countermeasures incorporated into the basic closed security 
level are methods to create and sustain a trusted environment. To remind the reader, the 
measures are repeated in Table 7.2.  Below we discuss the implementation issues of these 
prevention methods for the basic closed environment. 
Table 7.2: Countermeasures for basic closed level
Basic closed  Prevention methods: Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution 
environment Trusted third party - (certification authority) 
The implementation of tamper resistant hardware requires additional hardware components 
to be installed on the different remote hosts. As this implies additional financial costs, we are 
not implementing trusted hardware modules for testing purposes. Tamper resistant hardware 
components are however available commercially, examples are nShield, which is a secure 
server peripheral for the management of cryptographic keys and the protection of sensitive 
applications, as well as utimaco, that enables the use of trusted hardware platforms for 
secure mobile computing.  These devices can be implemented directly on the remote hosts 
and thus require no additional communication sessions between the host and the trusted 
hardware module. The disadvantage of this type of countermeasure (according to the 
requirements of a mobile agent system framework) is the additional requirement in terms of 
the installation of specialised hardware, which in turn has financial implications. 
The creation of a trusted execution environment (Sander & Tschudin, 1998) can also be 
achieved by using software techniques to provide a reliable environment.  This method 
incorporates encryption and authentication techniques by requiring the remote hosts and the 
mobile agent to be authenticated before migration to the different entities, as well as the 
encryption of the mobile agent between hosts. 
The first step in creating a trusted environment for RetrievalAglet to be dispatched in 
(according to the specifications provided in Chapter 6) is that the local host needs to digitally
sign and encrypt the aglet. 
A number of different implementation methods are available for digitally signing classes and 
objects. Java provides the ability of digitally signing code as well as the creation of 
private/public key pairs, with the use of the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA). The 
JCA framework contains the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), which (by default) is 
used for the creation and verification of digital signatures. DSA is a public key algorithm 
where the secret key operates on the message hash generated by the Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA-1). For verification of the signature, the hash of the message is re-
computed, the public-key used to decrypt the signature and the results compared. 
With Aglets being written on Java, it is possible to digitally sign the aglet class by using the 
Java Cryptographic Architecture. This process consists of creating a Java Archive File 
(JAR) containing the aglet, creating a private/public key pair and the creation of a certificate, 
which (by default) is valid for a period of 90 days. The created JAR file is subsequently 
signed with the generated private key; the generated certificate is attached and both are 
incorporated and sent as a signed JAR file to the first remote host. Figure 7.5 illustrates how 
a certificate can be generated in Java. The methods listed in Figure 7.5 are jar that creates 
an archive file by using the RetrievalAglet class, keytool -genkey that generates a private / 
public key pair which is saved within a keystore file, jarsigner creates a digital certificate of 
the created archive file by making use of the generated private key and keytool -export that 
exports the resulted certificate as well as the keys used in generating the certificate.
//creation of JAR file             jar cvf RetrievalAglet.jar RetrievalAglet.class //creation of keys 
keytool -genkey -alias localhostkey -keypass privpass -keystore                                  C:\keys
\keyfile -storepass keyfilepass  //signing the file jarsigner - keystore C:\keys\keyfile -signedjar 
RetrievalSigned.jar                   RetrievalAglet.jar localhostkey //exporting the keys keytool -
export -keystore C:\keys\keyfile -alias localhost -file                   SignedRetriev.cer 
Figure 7.5: Signing RetrievalAglet
After receiving the signed aglet, the remote host needs to validate the certificate by using the 
generated public key. The validation steps are outlined in Figure 7.6 and consist of the 
method keytool -import required for importing the certificate as well as the public key for 
verification purposes.
//import the certificate              keytool -import -alias remotehostkey -file SignedRetriev.cer -
keystore keyfile
Figure 7.6: Verifying signed RetrievalAglet
 
Another method that can be used for creating digital signatures is the incorporation of the 
Java Cryptographic Extension  (JCE) package, which is an extension of the Java 
language. JCE provides a number of cryptographic services. These services include the 
creation and validation of digital signatures, encryption implementations such as DES, Triple 
DES, and Blowfish, as well as key generators for generating keys appropriate for the 
different encryption algorithms. 
The SignedObject class provided with the JCE extension is used to digitally sign 
RetrievalAglet. Figure 7.7 illustrates the creation as well as the verification of the signature. 
The process of signing the object consists of the generation and initialisation of a 
KeyPairGenerator object that specifies the algorithm to be used as well as the key-size 
and a source for randomness. 
The Signature class provides the functionality of a cryptographic digital signature algorithm 
and an object of the SignedObject class is instantiated for creating the digital certificate and 
subsequently verifying the signature. 
//Signing object   KeyPairGenerator genKey = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA","SUN");  
SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG", "SUN");  genKey.initailize
(1024,random);  KeyPair getkeys = genKey.generateKeyPair();  PrivateKey private_key = 
getkeys.getPrivate();  PublicKey public_key = getkeys.getPublic();  Signature algorithm = 
Signature.getInstance("SHAwithDSA", "SUN");  algorithm.initSign(private_key);   SignedObject 
signedaglet = new SignedObject(init, private_key, algorithm);    //Verifying signature   boolean 
verify = signedobject.verify(public_key, algorithm);  signedaglet.getObject(); 
Figure 7.7: Digital signature with SignedObject class
A security manager class (SecMan) is available as an extension to the ASDK that provides 
encryption/decryption and keystore services for aglets. This class is based on the JCE and 
the digital signing of the aglet is done in the same way as specified in Figure 7.7. It also 
includes methods for public, private and session key generation and the object is signed with 
a SignObject method.
The authentication of the remote host can be incorporated for example, by creating a 
stationary aglet on the server to act as a security manager for verifying incoming agents. The 
procedure of creating such a digital signature uses the same procedures as specified for the 
authentication of an aglet.
The generation and verification of a digital certificate by using either of the methods specified 
above lead to an increase in computational costs. The additional requirements are available 
as part of either the Java or the Aglet package, with additional communication sessions only 
required if the keys sent are not a part of the serialized object. As the public key is used for 
verification of the generated certificates, no additional security threats are implied if the 
public key is migrated along with the aglet. The methods implemented for digital signatures 
require no additional financial cost in that the available packages within the creation 
environment have been used.
The encryption of RetrievalAglet can also be achieved by using a variety of encryption 
algorithms within certain cryptography packages. The JCE package can be used to provide 
encryption/decryption according to specified providers such as DES and Blowfish. Open 
source toolkits such as OpenSSL can also be used to incorporate cryptographic functions, 
such as encryption and digital certificates. OpenSSL implements Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) network protocols. Figure 7.8 
outlines an example of a command for encrypting the aglet by making use of the OpenSSL, 
with Base64 as the encryption algorithm. 
openssl base64 -in RetrievalAglet.class -out EncryptedRetrieval.class
Figure 7.8: Encryption of RetrievalAglet
Another method for encrypting the aglet is by using the SealedObject class, provided as 
part of the JCE package. This class enables a programmer to create an object and protect 
its confidentiality with a cryptographic algorithm. Figure 7.9 lists the code for encrypting and 
decrypting RetrievalAglet by using the SealedObject class. 
The listing consists of initialising a Cipher object that provides the functionality of a 
cryptographic cipher for encryption and decryption purposes, the generation of a secret key 
by using the SecretKey class, as well as the sealing of the resulted encrypted object by 
making use of the SealedObject class. The decryption of the object consists of initialising a 
Cipher object and decrypting the object by using the generated secret key.
//Encrypting and sealing object  Cipher des_encrypt;  SecretKey key_for_des;  KeyGenerator 
genKey = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");  Key_for_des = genKey.generateKey();  
des_encrypt = Cipher.getInstance("DES");  des_encrypt.init
(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,key_for_des);  SealedObject sealed = new SealedObject(init, 
des_encrypt);  //Decrypting object  Cipher des_decrypt  des_decrypt.init
(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key_for_des);  try {   sealed.getObject(des_decrypt);  } catch 
(Exception e) {   System.out.println(e.getMessage();  }
Figure 7.9: Encryption with SealedObject class
As with the creation of a digital signature, the SecMan class can also be used. This security 
manager class also provides methods for key generation and the encryption / decryption of 
an aglet.
The process of encrypting and decrypting RetrievalAglet indicate an increase in 
computational costs. Upon revisiting the requirements for a mobile agent system framework, 
the implementation of a trusted execution environment in Aglets and Java, have additional 
requirements in terms of computational costs, and with the implementation being without a 
trusted third party, no additional communication sessions are required. No additional 
requirements have been incorporated due to existing toolkits and packages being used, 
which also relates to no financial implications.
A trusted third party can be used for the generation and management of keys and certificates
(which are currently implemented as being on every remote host), which will lead to an 
increase in communication sessions within the framework. A number of such certification 
authorities are in place, (for example Thawte and VeriSign) which do have financial cost 
implications. 
The implemented results for the basic closed security level, evaluated against the criteria of a 
mobile agent security framework are shown in Table 7.3. Cells within the table that contains 
a yes indicate that the specific countermeasure (listed on the different rows) do not meet the 
specified requirement as listed in the different columns. A no indicates that the specified 
requirement is met by the corresponding countermeasure. For example in the 3rd column, 3rd 
row, it is shown that tamper resistant hardware inhibits the autonomy and mobility of the 
mobile agent, while the 5th column, 4th row indicates that a trusted execution environment 
requires no additional communication sessions.
Table 7.3: Implementation results of basic closed level. 
Requirements
Countermeasures Inhibits autonomy & mobility Additional requirements
Additional communication sessions Additional computational costs Additional 
financial costs
Tamper resistant hardware Yes Yes No
No Yes
Trusted execution environment Yes No No
Yes No
Trusted third party - certification authority Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
The creation and management of a trusted set of hosts is thus possible with the use of 
tamper resistant hardware as well as software techniques. The points of concern for 
software methods used in the creation of a trusted environment, is the distribution of keys 
between the different hosts. Although the a certification authority can be used for this 
purpose, the mobile agent still depends on the host for decryption and possible malicious 
behaviour can still occur. 
7.5.2 Extended closed security level
The objective of the extended-closed level is to create a trusted environment for applications
that require information retrieval as well as computations on every remote host, if such an 
environment does not exist. Table 7.4 lists the countermeasures incorporated for this 
purpose (as taken from Chapter 6).
Table 7.4: Countermeasures for extended closed level
Extended closed  Prevention methods: Tamper resistant hardware Trusted execution 
environment Trusted third party - (certification authority) Trusted third party - 
(computations) Phone home
The use of tamper resistant hardware for the creation of a trusted environment is the same as
discussed in the basic closed level. The digitally signing and encryption of 
ComputationAglet is done in the same manner as for RetrievalAglet, with the same 
methods being used. 
Additional countermeasures listed on the extended closed security level are Phone home 
and the use of a trusted entity for secure computations. Phone home requires the sending 
of computational results (as computed at each remote host) directly to the local host before 
migration of the aglet to the next remote host. In order to achieve this, a class is created 
from which an aglet is instantiated that is sent to the local host, before every migration. 
Figure 7.10 lists the code for the Phone-Home class. The listing contains the creation of a 
proxy for the aglet (by using the AgletProxy class) for handling the communication with the 
local host. Upon completing the required computation at the remote host, a message 
(method sendMessage) is sent to the local host containing the results of the computation.
public class PhoneHomeClass extends Aglet {    File results = null;  AgletProxy proxy = null;   
public void onCreation(Object init) {   dir = (File)((Object[])init)[0];   proxy = (AgletProxy)((Object
[])init)[1];      addMobilityListener(    new MobilityAdapter() {     public void onArrival
(MobilityEvent me) {      try {       proxy.sendMessage(new                                                       
Message("Result",results));      }catch (Exception e) {       dispose();      } } } ); } }
Figure 7.10: Phone home class
The instantiation of the servant aglet that is responsible for conveying the information back to 
the local host is done within ComputationAglet by making use of the methods listed in 
Figure 7.11. The Phonehome method includes the creation of an aglet (createAglet 
method) as well as a proxy for the created aglet (AgletProxy class) and the dispatching of 
the proxy to the local host (dispatch method). The handleMessage class is responsible for 
handling the results received from the remote host. 
void Phonehome() {  try {  URL homeaddress = new URL("atp://RemoteC.tut");  File resultsfile 
= new File("C:/data/resultsfile.dat");  AgletContext context = getAgletContext();  AgletProxy 
thisProxy = getProxy();  Object[] init = new Object[] {directory, thisProxy};  AgletProxy proxy = 
context.createAglet(getCodeBase(),"PhoneHomeClass", init);  proxy.dispatch(homeaddress);  }
catch (Exception e) {   System.out.println(e.getMessage());}  }   public boolean handleMessage
(Message msg) {  if(msg.sameKind("Results")) {   String[] list = (String[])msg.getArg();   for(int 
i=0; i<list.length;)    System.out.println(i+": "+list[i++]);   return true;  } else   return false; }
Figure 7.11: Phone home method
As shown, implementation of the Phone home countermeasure is relatively straightforward, 
with only a message containing the data send to the local host and not the agent itself.  
However, it has the downside of increased communication sessions as well as the availability 
of communication lines between the local host and the different remote hosts.
The same method that is used for the Phone home implementation is also deployed to test 
the use of a trusted host for computations. In this case the local host is seen as a trusted 
host and the results obtained is sent to the local host where the computations are completed 
at the originator site of the agent. This method leads to an increase in computational costs for
the local host as well as additional communication sessions. 
According to the discussion and the implementation results, the analysis of the 
countermeasures in the extended closed level according to the requirements of a mobile 
agent security framework (as detailed in Chapter 6), is shown in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5: Implementation results of extended closed level
Requirements
Countermeasures Inhibits autonomy & mobility Additional requirements
Additional communication sessions Additional computational costs Additional 
financial costs
Tamper resistant hardware Yes Yes No No
Yes
Trusted execution environment Yes No No
Yes No
Trusted third party - certification authority Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Phone Home Yes Yes Yes No No
Trusted third party - computations Yes Yes Yes
No Yes
7.5.3 Basic restricted security level
The restricted security level consists of the mobile agent migrating according to a pre-
defined itinerary. Although the hosts are known beforehand, the restricted security level is 
not seen as a trusted environment and a trusted environment is not created, as was the case 
in the closed levels. The detail of the basic restricted level (as determined in Chapter 6) is 
once again outlined in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6: Countermeasures for basic restricted level
Basic Restricted 
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Auditing      Path histories Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques     Environmental 
key generation  Keeping the agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  
Protecting itinerary:      Anonymous itinerary  Auditing:      Partial result encapsulation
As explained in an earlier chapter, the use of detection objects as a method to detect illegal 
tampering of the mobile agent entails the insertions of dummy data items within the mobile 
agent code, upon creation of the agent. Once the mobile agent has returned to its home 
environment the detection objects are checked and verified if they have changed. If they 
are still intact, then the agent is assumed to be unmodified. As detection objects form a 
complex research field on their own, for the purpose of this research, detection objects 
have mainly been implemented in a database scenario and not as part of the source code or 
data of an aglet. The details of the creation and updating of such detection objects fall 
outside the scope of this thesis. It is however noted that detection objects can be used to 
successfully detect manipulations of the agent and the agent’s data. A possible 
implementation can be for example the insertion of small parts of code or data items into the 
aglet at creation.
A number of watermarking tools are available for use in devising as well as verifying a 
watermark. A number of these tools also include code obfuscation and code 
transformation techniques in the process of creating a watermark. One such tool, namely 
Sandmark was developed by the University of Arizona and provides features for software 
watermarking, tamper-proofing and code obfuscation of Java programs. By using the 
Sandmark tool, a watermark was added to RetrievalAglet upon creation and verified at 
the subsequent remote hosts. The results indicated increases in computational costs as well 
as the watermarking tool being an additional requirement. The financial implications of using 
this particular tool were none due to the tool being non-commercial.
The creation and verification of a digital signature has been implemented on the closed 
security levels and is thus not shown again. It is however necessary to note that with the 
itinerary being set before migration of the agent, it is possible for the agent and the host to be 
digitally authenticated. The authentication of the hosts can also be done upon arrival of the 
agent at the remote host. If the current host is invalid then the aglet is disposed. The code 
segment for authentication of the host is listed in Figure 7.12, and contains the 
AuthenticateHost method that obtains the context in which the aglet has migrated to, as 
well as the remote host listed in the itinerary of the aglet. If the obtained two addresses do 
not correspond the aglet is disposed.
void AuthenticateHost() {   URL getCurrentHostURL;   AgletContext CurrentContext = 
getAgletContext();   getCurrentHostURL = CurrentContext.getHostingURL();   if (!
(destination.equals(getCurrentHostURL)))   {    dispose();   }  }
Figure 7.12: Authentication of host
The creation of a path history pertains the signing of the itinerary in order to ensure that the 
aglet migrated to the remote host as specified on the itinerary of the aglet.  This 
countermeasure is implemented by forcing the current remote host to add its context to the 
itinerary and digitally sign the URL. Upon arrival at the next remote host, the signature is 
verified in order to check for inconsistencies. The implementation code for creating path 
histories is listed in Addendum D.
The creation and verification of digital signatures is resource extensive, with increases in 
computational costs. No additional requirements are needed for the implementation thereof 
because an extension to the Java framework is used.
Code obfuscation and code transformation techniques and programs are widely available 
as both commercial products and open source products. These programs make use of a 
number of techniques in order to scramble the code into an illogical format. Examples of 
such programs are Retroguard, Smokescreen and Sandmark. As it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to devise methods for code obfuscation and code transformations, existing 
programs were used and modified in order to test its ability to be incorporated into the 
framework. The Sandmark tool has once again been used for introducing the code 
transformation and code obfuscation to the aglet. 
As code obfuscation and code transformation techniques are optimised with the inclusion 
of time techniques, our aglet was only allowed a certain amount of time to complete its 
tasks. Upon creation of an aglet, the system time was added to the AgletInfo class. By 
using the creation time (Figure 7.13), constraints can be added to an aglet in order to retract 
or dispose the aglet once the time has expired. The creation time of the aglet is retrieved (in 
the OnCreation method) and can be measured against the system time of the remote host in 
order to determine the current existence time of the aglet. 
public void onCreation (Object init) {  try {  AgletProxy proxy = getProxy();  AgletInfo info = 
proxy.getAgletInfo();  long time createTime = info.getCreationTime(); } 
Figure 7.13: Time sensitive aglet
The results that were obtained implied additional computational costs and also added 
requirements in terms of the required software.
No implementation of computations with encrypted functions as defined by Wilhelm et al. 
(1999) could be found.  It seems that encrypted functions offer a mathematically sound, but 
quite complex method to protect against certain aspects of the malicious host problem. 
Furthermore, it seems that the complexity of the proposition is steep and as a result it 
hinders the method’s implement-ability.  Further investigation into this specific 
countermeasure is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Environmental key generation relies on the encryption of the aglet. Decryption is only 
done once the slave aglet has retrieved some environmental data from the remote host. At 
this stage, it becomes possible to allow the decryption of the key and subsequently the aglet 
code. The encryption and decryption possibilities for an aglet have been discussed earlier 
and are not covered again. The code for the creation of a slave agent that determines the 
environmental data is listed in Figure 7.14. The onArrival method lists the code whereby 
the specified environment variable is obtained and the aglet is subsequently decrypted if the 
required state of the environment variable has been reached.  
public class Environmental extends Aglet {    File Keyfile=null;  AgletProxy proxy = null;    
public void onCreation(Object init) {   Keyfile = (File)((Object[])init);   proxy = (AgletProxy)
((Object[])init);      addMobilityListener(    new MobilityAdapter() {     public void onArrival
(MobilityEvent me) {                   getEnvironmentvar();                                                              
if (true)                                                                                decrypt();        dispose();      }     
}    }   );  } } 
Figure 7.14: Environmental key generation
Partial results encapsulation requires the retrieved data to be encrypted at each host. The 
local host of the agent then decrypts the layers of encrypted data once the agent has 
returned. The source code for encapsulating partial results is available in Addendum E. 
The encryption and decryption of the aggregated data shows an increase in computational 
costs, with no additional requirements in terms of tools and software. 
The encryption of the itinerary of the aglet in order to hide the destinations is a possible 
countermeasure that can be implemented. The implementation of this countermeasure is 
done in the same manner as the encryption and decryption of the aggregated results 
(Addendum E). The security manager class (SecMan), also provides for the encryption of 
a static itinerary.
The countermeasures that are incorporated as well as the implementation results are detailed 
in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: Implementation results of basic restricted level
Requirements
Countermeasures Inhibits autonomy & mobility Additional requirements
Additional communication sessions Additional computational costs Additional 
financial costs
Path Histories No No No Yes No
Detection objects No Yes No Yes
No
Proof carrying code No Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Anonymous itinerary No No No Yes
No
Partial result encapsulation No No No Yes
No
Digital signatures No No No Yes
No
Code obfuscation No Yes No Yes
No
Code transformation No Yes No Yes
No
Watermark No Yes No Yes No
Time sensitive agents No No No No
No
7.5.4 Extended restricted level
A large number of the countermeasures listed, discussed and implemented in the basic 
restricted level, also form part of the extended restricted level (as listed in Table 7.8). The 
implementation results of those countermeasures are thus not discussed again. 
Table 7.8: Countermeasures for extended restricted level
Extended Restricted 
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Audit trail:      Path histories  State protection:      Reference states      
State appraisal Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques      Environmental 
key generation  Keeping the agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  
Protecting itinerary:      Anonymous itinerary  Auditing:      Partial result encapsulation
Additional countermeasures for this level include Reference states and State appraisal as 
detection methods. Reference states can be included by signing the state of the aglet. A 
way to accomplish this is by capturing the state of the object for signing purposes. The code 
of achieving this is listed in Figure 7.15, where an object of class ByteArrayOutputStream 
is used as input to an object of class ObjectOutputStream. As Aglets implements weak 
migration, the final state needs to be signed and recomputed at the next remote host. 
    ByteArrayOutputStream bout = new ByteArrayOutputStream();     ObjectOutputStream out 
= new ObjectOutputStream(bout);
Figure 7.15: Capturing the state of an aglet
The use of state appraisal functions requires the creation of these functions to verify the 
state as well as the code of the aglet. The creation of a state appraisal function is captured 
by first requiring the mobile agent to define a security policy (containing permissions to be 
followed by the remote hosts). The created security policy is added to the agent and the 
mobile agent is digitally signed. Upon arrival at the remote host the agent as well as its state 
is verified by using the attached policy. An example of such a security policy is contained in 
Figure 7.16, where only the owner of the aglet is allowed to dispose of the aglet. 
grant codeBase http://*:*/, ownedby "owner", {   
protection.com.ibm.aglet.security.AgletProtection                     
"owner" "dispose";  };
Figure 7.16: Aglet policy file
The digital signing of the aglet is covered in detail in previous sections and the same methods 
are followed to authenticate the agent for implementation of the state appraisal 
countermeasure. Figure 7.17 lists the code for the stateAppraisal method. Upon arrival at 
the remote host (method onArrival), the remote host validates the agent as well as its state, 
by computing the message digest of the aglet’s state (method VerifySignature) as well as 
enquiring if set permissions in the aglet security file has been violated by the previous host 
(methods RetrieveAgletPolicy and VerifyAgletPolicy).
public class StateAppraisal extends Aglet {    public void onCreation(Object init) {        
addMobilityListener(     new MobilityAdapter() {               public void onArrival(MobilityEvent b) {  
VerifySignature();                                                                                                                  
RetrieveAgletPolicy();                                                             VerifyAgletPolicy();                   
}    }   );   }  
Figure 7.17: State appraisal
The implementation results for the extended restricted level are listed in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9: Results of extended restricted level
Requirements
Countermeasures Inhibit sautonomy & mobility Additional requirements
Additional communication sessions Additional computational costs Additional 
financial costs
Path Histories No No No Yes No
Detection objects No Yes No Yes
No
Reference states No No No Yes
No
State appraisal No Yes No Yes Yes
Anonymous itinerary No No No Yes
No
Environmental key generation No Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Partial result encapsulation No No No Yes
No
Digital signatures No No No Yes
No
Code obfuscation No Yes No Yes
No
Code transformation No Yes No Yes
No
Watermark No Yes No Yes No
Time sensitive agents No No No No
No
7.5.5 Basic Open Security Level
The countermeasures included in the basic open security level as well as the extended open 
level are listed in Table 7.10 and Table 7.11 respectively. The included measures have been 
implemented and discussed in the previous sections and are not discussed again. The 
countermeasures available to provide protection of the agent in the open levels, is a concern. 
This problem can however be alleviated by the maturity of countermeasures such as 
computing with encrypted functions, for example. 
Table 7.10: Countermeasures for basic open security level
Basic Open 
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Auditing      Path histories Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques  Keeping the 
agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  Auditing:      Partial result 
encapsulation
Table 7.11: Countermeasures for extended open security level
Extended Open
Detection methods Prevention methods
Detecting code modifications:     Detection objects /     Watermarking  Authentication:  
Digital signatures  Audit trail:      Path histories  State protection:      Reference states      
State appraisal Preventing code modifications:     Code 
obfuscation & time techniques     Code transformation & time techniques  Keeping the 
agent secret:     Computing with encrypted functions  Auditing:      Partial result 
encapsulation  
For implementation results of the open security levels, the reader is referred to Tables 7.7 
and 7.9.
7.6 Evaluation of Framework
The countermeasures incorporated within the framework as well as the implementation 
results of the countermeasures in the different levels is evaluated against the analysis of 
threats and countermeasures as discussed in Chapter 3. The results are depicted and 
subsequently discussed in the next few tables and sections. 
Integrity Interference
The protection provided against integrity interference attacks on the different framework 
levels are shown in Table 7.12, Table 7.13, Table 7.14 and Table 7.15. A yes within the 
tables indicate that the specific level of the framework provides adequate protection for the 
specified part of the agent that is threatened, while a no specifies that no protection is 
provided. For example (Table 7.12) if an agent is incorrectly transmitted, the 3rd column, 3rd 
row implies that the Basic Closed level provide protection for the code of the agent, while 
the 5th column, 4th row, states that the Basic Restricted level provide no protection for the 
state of the agent. Grey areas stipulate the parts of the agent that is not affected by the 
mentioned threat.
Table 7.12: Integrity interference protection
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Integrity Interference
Transmitting mobile agent incorrectly BC EC BR ER
BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Threat Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Data ID Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Itinerary Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Initial data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aggregated data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Aggregated essential data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Required data Threat Yes Yes No No No No
The closed security levels provide security protection against the incorrect transmission of 
the mobile agent (illustrated in columns BC, BR and BO). The basic restricted and basic 
open levels only provide protection for the initial, aggregated and aggregated essential data 
(illustrated in columns BR and BO and relevant rows). 
The ASDK provides a way of protecting the aglet from other aglets by making use of a 
proxy. This method can be extended into protecting the aglets’ information, such ID and 
time of creation, by only allowing access to this information via the proxy. By certifying the 
aglet, the aglet can also be protected in that the verifying host would detect discrepancies. 
Through encrypting the itinerary, it can be protected, although this is not possible within the 
open environments. 
Table 7.13: Integrity interference protection (cont.)
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Integrity Interference
Transmitting agent to host not on itinerary BC EC BR ER
BO EO
Code No effect
State No effectControl FlowNo effectDataIDNo 
effectItineraryThreatYesYesYesYesYesYes
Initial data No effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential dataNo 
effectRequired dataNo effect
The protection against transmitting the agent to a host not on the itinerary is possible on all 
levels (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO and EO) either by using path histories 
or anonymous itinerary.
Table 7.14: Integrity interference protection (cont.)
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Integrity Interference
Not executing the mobile agent completely BC EC BR ER
BO EO
Code No effect
StateThreatYesYesNoYesNoYes
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes No No No No
Data ID No effect
ItineraryNo effectInitial data No effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential 
dataNo effectRequired dataThreatYesYesNoYesNoYes
The closed levels provide protection against not executing the agent completely  (illustrated 
in columns BC and EC and relevant rows), while the basic restricted (illustrated in columns 
BR and BO and relevant rows) and basic open levels (illustrated in columns ER and EO and 
relevant rows) provide no protection. The extended restricted and extended open levels 
provide protection due to the inclusion of measures such as reference states and state 
appraisal (illustrated in columns ER and EO and relevant rows).
Table 7.15: Integrity interference protection (cont.)
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Integrity Interference
Executing mobile agent arbitrarily BC EC BR ER BO
EO
Code No effect
StateThreatYesYesNoYesNoYes
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes No No No No
Data ID No effect
ItineraryNo effectInitial data No effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential 
dataNo effectRequired dataThreatYesYesNoYesNoYes
The mobile agent can be protected from the host executing it arbitrarily on the closed levels
(illustrated in columns BC and EC and relevant rows), with the basic restricted and basic 
open levels providing no protection (illustrated in columns BR and BO and relevant rows). 
The extended restricted and extended open levels provide protection for the agent’s state 
and required data (illustrated in columns ER and EO and relevant rows) with the inclusion of 
measures such as reference states. 
Integrity modification
Integrity modification protection as provided on the different levels is listed in Table 7.16.
Table 7.16: Integrity modification protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Integrity Modification
Deleting, corrupting, manipulating, altering, misinterpreting, incorrect 
execution. BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data ID Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Itinerary Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aggregated data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Aggregated essential data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Required data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All levels of the framework can protect against the deletion, manipulation, alteration, 
misinterpretation and incorrect execution of the agent (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, 
ER, BO and EO and relevant rows). This is achieved by the inclusion of techniques such as 
code obfuscation and reference states.
Availability
The protection that the different levels of the framework provide against availability attacks 
is detailed in the Tables 7.17, 7.18, 7.19, 7.20 and 7.21.
Table 7.17: Availability protection
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Availability
Execution resources (memory & CPU denied) BC EC BR
ER BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Flow No effect DataIDNo effectItineraryNo effectInitial data No 
effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential dataNo effectRequired dataNo effectThe 
denial of execution resources by the remote host can be countered by adding time 
limitations to the existence of the agent. All the levels of the framework thus provide 
protection against these types of attacks (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO and 
EO and relevant rows).
Table 7.18: Availability protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Availability
Data denied / Bombarded with irrelevant information BC EC BR
ER BO EO
Code No effect
State No effectControl FlowNo effectDataIDNo effectItineraryNo effectInitial 
data No effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential dataNo effectRequired 
dataThreatYesYesNoNoNoNo
The host bombarding the agent with irrelevant information can only be prevented within a 
trusted environment (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO and EO).
Table 7.19: Availability protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Availability
Execution resources (memory & CPU delayed) BC EC BR
ER BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Flow No effect DataIDNo effectItineraryNo effectInitial data No 
effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential dataNo effectRequired dataNo effect
The protection provided against the host delaying execution resources is the incorporation of 
time limitation techniques as well as the use of trusted environment. All the levels of the 
framework thus provide protection for the agent (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, 
BO and EO and relevant rows).
Table 7.20: Availability protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Availability
Data is delayed BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code No effect
State No effectControl FlowNo effectDataIDNo effectItineraryNo effectInitial 
data No effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential dataNo effectRequired 
dataThreatYesYesYesYesYesYes
Protection against the host delaying the supply of requested information is countered by the 
inclusion of time constraints on the lifetime of the agent or by releasing the agent only within a
trusted environment. All the levels of the framework provide protection for the agent against 
the delay of data (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO and EO).
Table 7.21: Availability protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Availability
Transmission refusal BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data ID Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Itinerary Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aggregated data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Aggregated essential data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Required data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All levels of the framework provide protection against the host refusing to transmit the agent 
by including time sensitive agents on the restricted and open levels and the use of 
technologies for creating a trusted environment (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, 
BO and EO and relevant rows).
Confidentiality
The protection provided against confidentiality attacks are shown in the next number of 
tables (Tables 7.22, 7.23 and 7.24)
Table 7.22: Confidentiality protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Confidentiality
Eavesdropping BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data ID Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Itinerary Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aggregated data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Aggregated essential data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Required data No effect 
All levels of the framework provide protection against eavesdropping attacks (illustrated in 
columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO and EO and relevant rows). This is achieved by the inclusion 
of techniques such as code obfuscation and environmental key generation.
Table 7.23: Confidentiality protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Confidentiality
Theft BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes No No No No
State Threat Yes Yes No No No No
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes No No No No
Data ID Threat Yes Yes No No No
No
Itinerary Threat Yes Yes No No No No
Initial data Threat Yes Yes No No No No
Aggregated data Threat Yes Yes No No No
No
Aggregated essential data Threat Yes Yes No No No
No
Required data No effect
The only way, in which the agent can be protected against theft by the host, is by creating a 
trusted environment  (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO and EO and relevant 
rows).
Table 7.24: Confidentiality protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Confidentiality
Reverse Engineer BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Flow Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data ID Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Itinerary Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aggregated data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Aggregated essential data Threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Required data No effect
The inclusion of techniques such as code obfuscation and code transformation in the 
framework counter reverse engineering attacks. All the levels of the framework provide 
protection for the reverse engineering of the mobile agent (illustrated in columns BC, EC, 
BR, ER, BO and EO and relevant rows).
Authentication
The protection of authentication techniques is list in the next two tables (Tables 7.25 & 
7.26).
Table 7.25: Authentication protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Authentication
Masquerading BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code No effect
State No effectControl FlowNo effectDataIDNo effectItineraryNo effectInitial 
data No effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential dataNo effectRequired 
dataThreatYesYesYesYesYesYes
A host masquerading as another can supply incorrect data as requested by the agent. 
Protection techniques for these types of threats include authentication of the host, as well as 
the digital signing of aggregated data. All the levels of the framework provide protection for 
the agent (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO and EO and relevant rows) against 
masquerading attacks.
Table 7.26: Authentication protection 
(BC= Basic Closed, EC=Extended Closed, BR=Basic Restricted, ER=Extended Restricted, BO=Basic 
Open, EO=Extended Open)
Authentication
Cloning BC EC BR ER BO EO
Code No effect
State No effectControl FlowNo effectDataIDThreatYesYesYesYesYesYes
ItineraryNo effectInitial data No effectAggregated data No effectAggregated essential 
dataNo effectRequired dataNo effect
The aglet is protected against cloning attacks (illustrated in columns BC, EC, BR, ER, BO 
and EO and relevant rows), being that a unique identifier (ID) is assigned via a proxy and on 
a cloning event the ID of the clone is changed. 
7.7 Conclusion
Our proposed mobile agent security framework has been implemented by using the Aglets 
Software Development Kit (ASDK). In this chapter we used simple aglets and 
implemented various types of countermeasures based on the different levels of security that 
were established in our proposed framework. A number of the specified countermeasures 
could not be implemented due to the methods only proposed in theory (such as computing 
with encrypted functions). The implementations were tested and as a result we found a 
security structure that allows for the dynamic integration of various types of countermeasures 
based on an evaluation of the deployment area and type of application. This framework has 
the added benefit that new countermeasures that are defined by other researchers, or 
methods that mature over time (such as encrypted functions) can be added to this structure.  
In the next chapter we discuss the implementation and test results in the context of other 
similar research and conclude our findings.
CHAPTER 8
RESEARCH SUMMARY, EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Summary of Propositions
The introduction of mobile agents as a computing paradigm established new possibilities for 
conducting business in a network and especially the Internet environment. The paradigm 
introduces several advantages such as alleviating bandwidth problems (Suri, et al., 2000) 
and providing means for intelligent information retrieval (Aerts, et al., 2002). 
The development of applications based on mobile agent technology has however been 
burdened by the security problems introduced by the paradigm itself.  Jansen (2000) 
categorises mobile agent threats into four distinct classes, namely threats imposed by (1) an 
agent on a host; (2) a host on an agent; (3) an agent on another agent; and (4) network 
entities on an agent. (In each case, an “agent” refers to a mobile agent.) The protection of 
hosts against malicious agents is based on security techniques in the subject field of General 
Computer Security. However, threats imposed by malicious hosts on agents introduced a 
new research area since current computer security solutions cannot simply be transferred to 
resolve these types of threats. This is largely due to the autonomy and mobility 
characteristics of mobile agents, which imply that an agent carries its code, data, attributes 
and state from site to site, where the site itself might be an unsafe execution or hosting 
environment. Whilst current computer security solutions enable practitioners to safeguard a 
particular site against malicious agent attacks, these solutions are unable to protect mobile 
code travelling to potentially unsafe environments.  It is this very property of a mobile agent 
to be executed at various (potentially unsafe) sites, which is often most desirable of this 
specific technology. 
The framework proposed in this study has been designed through several research phases, 
which we consequently summarise. As a first step, a mobile agent threat model has been 
established based on the five fundamental concerns or requirements of users gaining access 
of computer network services, namely integrity, availability, confidentiality, 
authentication and non-repudiation (ISO (7498-2), 1988). The intention of this model 
was to categorise the different types of threats that a malicious host could impose on an 
agent.  
In the second research phase, current countermeasures for protecting a mobile agent against 
malicious host attacks were analysed and categorised into particular countermeasure 
classes, including trust based computing, recording and tracking techniques, 
cryptographic techniques and obfuscation and time techniques. This analysis provided 
specific information regarding the protection of specific components of the mobile agent.
In the third research phase, mobile agent systems, models, frameworks and architectures 
were studied and evaluated. This evaluation provided insights into the most salient security 
elements of the studied structures as well as their inherent drawbacks. 
These insights led us to the fourth research phase, which continued research on available 
solutions to identify the security challenges that we are currently faced with.  
The observations from the previous two research phases were combined to establish a set 
of requirements for a security framework (research phase 5). These requirements stipulate 
what a security framework has to adhere to in order to provide comprehensive security 
measures without inhibiting application performance or introducing unnecessary financial 
implications. In summary, these requirements insist on -
1. distinguishing between different types of deployment environments;
2. distinguishing between different application objectives (types of mobile agent 
applications);
3. preserving the autonomous and mobile character of a mobile agent ;
4. limiting requirements for additional hardware and software;
5. restraining the number of communication sessions;
6. regulating computational cost; 
7. minimizing implementation costs;
8. providing a dynamic structure that could include security functions and services as 
required. 
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Figure 8.1: Security levels forming the basis of the proposed framework
Notable from these requirements is the importance to distinguish between different kinds of 
mobile applications, as well as the kinds of execution environments where these applications 
are to be deployed. These distinctions were captured in the definition of security levels 
(research phase 6), which are summarised in Figure 8.1. In a seventh research phase, the 
outcomes of the analysis of the countermeasures (phase 2) were integrated into the different 
security levels.  The implication of phase 7 is illustrated in Figure 8.2. This led to the 
establishment of a dynamic mobile agent security framework that could be used by 
practitioners when designing mobile agent systems. (We describe the full advantages and 
significance of the proposed model in the following section.)  Implementation and testing 
were done in research phase 8.
After implementing and testing the proposed framework, we returned our attention to the 
studied mobile agent frameworks, architectures, models, systems and applications (phase 3) 
to (a) determine if a security framework exists that adhere to requirements defined in 
research phase 5, and (b) evaluate the proposed security framework against current mobile 
agent security solutions. The investigation, done in phase 9, revealed that no framework, 
architecture, model or system could be found in literature that is based on a dynamic security
framework adhering to the stated requirements.
Figure 8.2: Evaluation of countermeasures for specific security levels
The research phases described above are summarised in Figure 8.3.
The results obtained from the implementation and testing revealed that the proposed 
framework provide protection for a mobile agents on a number of levels, including against 
integrity modification attacks, certain availability attacks, certain confidentiality 
attacks and authentication attacks. However, the framework is only intended to provide 
guidelines to use current available countermeasures. Since the framework is a dynamic 
structure, it is the responsibility of the mobile agent developer / owner to carefully evaluate 
the deployment environment as well as the mobile agent system’s objectives in order to 
make informed decisions regarding countermeasures to be integrated into the intended 
system. 
8.2 Evaluation of Proposed Framework
Before considering the outcomes of our research effort, the objective and relevance of this 
study are revisited for a moment. To determine whether the objective of this study is 
scientifically sound, we asked ourselves why it was necessary to design a security 
framework, rather than, for example, design new countermeasures for the malicious host 
problem? The necessity for a framework can best be described by using an analogy to that 
of the processes involved in the building of a factory (industrial unit). The development of an 
industrial unit involves steps such as the design, construction of the structure, building or 
assembling of walls, interior decoration, et cetera. The inclusion of the design plan and 
building of the structure processes is essential to the ultimate assembly of the factory. A 
structure is needed to establish the outlines and requirements of the design, as well as to 
provide specifications of how and where the building blocks have to be placed. Without 
such a structure (in our case the framework), the building blocks (in our case the 
countermeasures) will be unorganised modules lying in disarray.
The importance of a mobile agent security framework can be seen in the large number of 
proposals in this area (see Mobile Agent List (2003)). The process of proposing a mobile 
agent security framework necessitates the establishment of criteria and subsequently a set of 
requirements to which the framework needs to abide to (Fischmeister et al., 2001). Yet, 
literature reveals the inexistence of such a set of requirements and as a result, also a lack of a
comprehensive model that is based on such a set of requirements. In fact, our literature 
review described the details of many different countermeasures for malicious host attacks, 
without much interaction and integration possibilities. Furthermore, literature pointed out that 
different degrees of protection are required for the malicious host problem, but lack due to 
the non availability of requirements to aid mobile agent developers to design of secure 
systems (Orso et al., 2001). Our proposal thus answers to a research problem that has 
been expressed by more than one researcher in the field of mobile agent technology. 
In this study, the search for an existing security framework that adhere to our set of 
requirements, proved to be futile. However, as illustrated in Chapters 4 and 6, a number of 
proposals for an integrated security framework do indeed exist, but an analysis indicated 
that they don’t provide adequate protection for all components of the mobile agent. This 
corresponds with Orso et al., (2001) about the requirement for an integrated security 
framework that provides protection for the mobile agent against malicious hosts. In the next 
three subsections, we briefly point out why our proposed framework overcomes 
deficiencies of current solutions by considering problems in current systems, problems in 
countermeasures and security level issues.
8.2.1 Problems in current systems
The study of mobile agent systems (to act as tools for the creation and maintenance of 
mobile agent applications), revealed a number of useful insights into the creation of an agent 
security framework. One of the main problems encountered by most of these systems is the 
fact that these systems have generally been designed without considering agent security (see 
Mobile Agent List (2003)).  It almost seems as though security against malicious hosts is 
generally not catered for. 
Mobile agent systems rely on an operating system or virtual machine to provide an 
installation platform where an execution environment can be established. Furthermore, the 
security methods that are incorporated into the design of mobile agent systems are mostly an 
extension of techniques provided by the underlying operating system or virtual machine (for 
example, Aglets (Lange & Oshima, 1998)). These underlying systems (operating system or 
virtual machine) are biased towards securing the system, rather than visiting code (the mobile
agent).  Hence, the resulting mobile agent system that relies on these types of security 
mechanisms often fails to provide adequate protection methods for the mobile agent. The 
processes involved in creating mobile agent systems are quite extensive and are often the 
result of years of research (see Mobile Agent List (2003)). Thus, instead of developing new 
mobile agent systems that adhere to our list of security requirements, it is more beneficial and
less expensive to provide a security framework that can be integrated into existing mobile 
agent systems. In this way, developers of mobile agent applications can incorporate our 
proposed security framework into their designs to provide much more protected mobile 
agents without creating new systems.
At this stage, mobile agent application developers are currently forced to develop their own 
execution environments in order to implement adequate security techniques (for example 
Cherubim (Campbell & Qian, 1998)). This situation is not ideal and defies the computing 
requirement of reuse. 
There exist quite a large number of mobile agent system tools that can be used for the 
development of mobile agent applications (see Mobile Agent List (2003)). The number of 
these systems that provide security related measures to be used in current applications is 
however small in relation to the number of tools available. This has the effect that a limited 
number of applications have been developed due to their inability to provide protection 
measures for the agent, and this has an influence on the development of the paradigm as a 
whole (Green & Hurst, 1997).
8.2.2 Countermeasures
The discussion on current and proposed mobile agent frameworks, architectures and models
(Chapter 4), as well as the evaluation of these systems against the proposed requirements of 
a security framework (Chapter 6), indicate that currently there exist no system that 
possesses an integrated system of security methods in order to provide optimum protection 
for the mobile agent against malicious hosts.
As shown in Chapter 3, countermeasures could be categorised by distinguishing between 
detection and prevention mechanisms. Literature shows that current mobile agent 
frameworks mostly integrate encryption and authentication techniques for prevention 
purposes, whilst the authentication of results is used for detecting potential interferences 
with, or damages done to the agent. As the distribution of keys within a cryptographic 
environment remains a question (Algesheimer et al., 2001; Fung et al., 2001), the 
prevention provided in these systems seems to be inadequate.
Our research also indicates that the results obtained by the application of protection 
mechanisms can be improved substantially by integrating such techniques with other 
countermeasures (such as code obfuscation and time techniques, as well as code 
obfuscation, watermarking and time techniques).
Because the security techniques of current systems are based on traditional security 
mechanism, the countermeasures used in these systems are mainly authentication and 
encryption techniques. Furthermore, these techniques provide better agent protection 
during transmission than during execution (where the malicious host has control) (Campbell 
& Qian, 1998). The proposed framework uses encryption methods to create trusted 
environments.
One of the most popular mechanisms to protect the mobile agent is to perform some sort of 
partitioning, such as splitting the agent into a security sensitive part and a no-security part, or 
making use of a distributed design where the agent is cloned and sent to the various hosts, or
splitting the objective of the agent amongst several agents. In the proposed framework the 
mobile agent is considered as a single entity with its own goals and requirements. However, 
this implies that although an agent is most probably part of a mobile agent system consisting 
of many cooperating agents, the agent can cooperate with, and make use of stationary 
agents to complete its objective, the agent is not split into several agents to achieve a 
particular goal.
8.2.3 Security levels
As different types of applications call for diverse security mechanisms, it is vital that the 
mobile agent developers are enabled with tools to build more secure mobile agent 
applications.  Distinguishing between types of applications and deployment environments is 
at the base of the proposed framework. Such a distinction offers several advantages 
including -
it allows the agent developer to do a proper evaluation of the potential threats of a 
specific deployment environment; 
it allows the agent developer to select only specific and necessary countermeasures 
that could defend against the potential threats;
it allows for the construction of a more light-weight and secure mobile agent 
application that target only threats that are a reality instead of carrying along 
superfluous countermeasures;
considering the above advantages, it allows for a more cost effective, yet protected 
mobile agent system;
once again, by considering the above advantages, it allows for the construction of 
an application with improved performance, where no unnecessary computations are 
conducted. 
A large number of current mobile agent security frameworks is designed and developed for 
specific mobile agent applications (for example Electronic supermarkets (Wu, 2000)). As 
a result specific designs can often not easily be reused, extended or transferred to other, 
different applications. This is where the proposed framework is significant, being both 
dynamic (adaptable) and not application specific. Even though, existing systems often use 
security measures inherent to the underlying operating system or virtual machine, the 
proposed framework offers the opportunity to add additional (needed) countermeasures 
based on environmental and application evaluation without redesigning the entire application. 
8.3 Practical Implementation of the Framework
In assessing the proposed framework it is vital to evaluate the proposal against current 
frameworks by using the devised requirements. Examples of applications that distinguish 
between different types of environments and different types of applications are minimal (see 
M&M (Marques et al., 2001) and Plain text algorithm (An et al, 2002)). Unfortunately 
(as pointed out in Chapter 5), these systems do not uphold some of the most salient 
characteristics of mobile agents such as autonomy and mobility, which are essential to be 
preserved.
It is these characteristics that form the essence of the mobile agent paradigm. To protect 
against malicious host attacks, many of the current systems require the creation of a trusted 
environment.  Such a requirement inherently restricts the mobile agent paradigm. Although 
some applications might benefit from the establishment of a set of trusted hosts (such as 
SIAS (Chan et al., 2000)), it remains necessary for a security framework to provide for 
environments in which the agent can roam freely. 
Figure 8.4 provides graphical information on the systems that restrict the agent as well as 
those that allow for the agent to visit any host. The x-axis portrays the different frameworks 
as discussed, while the y-axis depicts the restrictions placed by the different frameworks in 
terms of mobility and autonomy. These restrictions are sectioned into three categories, 
namely low, intermediate and high. A low indicates that either the mobility or the 
autonomy of the agent is constrained (for example Security enhanced mobile agents), 
intermediate specifies that the mobility and the autonomy of the agent is restricted (for 
example FILIGRANE) and a high points out that the autonomy and mobility of the agent is 
limited as well as the agent only allowed to roam within a trusted environment (for example 
Supervisor-worker). A zero level is indicated on the y-axis if no autonomy and mobility 
restrictions are enforced by the specific framework (for example our proposed framework).
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Figure 8.4: Autonomy & mobility restrictions
The costs of implementing different countermeasures must be in direct relation to the degree 
of security required. These types of costs include financial costs (in acquiring additional 
hardware or software) as well as computational costs (for example additional CPU and 
memory requirements). Figure 8.5 provides information with regards to the additional 
computation costs as required by the current frameworks, with the x-axis listing the different 
frameworks and the y-axis indicating three levels of computational costs incurred. The 
additional computational costs required by the implementation of the different frameworks 
are measured within three categories, namely low, intermediate and high. Frameworks 
within the low category such as DNX only make use of cryptographic methods to protect 
the agent, while frameworks within the intermediate category such as FILIGRANE 
incorporates two additional methods (both cryptographic methods and watermarking 
techniques). Frameworks categorized as high integrate into their designs three or more 
countermeasures that require additional hardware or software, such as our proposed 
framework (which include for example cryptographic measures, watermarking, code 
obfuscation and detection methods).
Our proposed framework as implemented has no additional financial implications but we did 
experience increases in computational costs. The high level of computational costs for our 
framework reflects the burden placed on the system if all the countermeasures on all the 
security levels (basic, restricted & open) are implemented in one application. This increase 
will be lessened if the developer of a mobile agent application makes informative decisions 
regarding the measures to be incorporated into the design.
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 Figure 8.5: Cost implications
Besides additional computational and financial costs, the implementation of countermeasures 
can also imply added requirements, such as a certification authority. Figure 8.6 details these 
added requirements, with the x-axis portraying the different frameworks and the y-axis three 
categories of additional requirements, namely low (which indicates only one additional 
requirements), intermediate (which indicates two additional requirements) and high (which 
indicates three or more additional requirements). For example Security enhanced mobile 
agents only make use of trusted entities, while Self protecting mobile agents include code 
obfuscation software as well as software used to divide the mobile agent into different sub-
agents. FILIGRANE need code obfuscation, watermarking as well as encryption software 
for implementation.  As seen our proposed framework has some additional requirements 
(specialised hardware in the creation of a trusted environment).
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Figure 8.6: Level of additional requirements
The different frameworks require additional communication sessions for purposes such as 
the exchange of session keys, or to convey aggregated results back to the local host. 
However, the need for multiple sessions compromises the advantage of minimum bandwidth 
requirements that are typically associated with mobile agents. Figure 8.7 outlines the 
additional communication sessions of the different frameworks by distinguishing between 
low (only additional communication sessions in terms of sending the agent to a trusted entity 
or by using techniques whereby results obtained are conferred to the local host) and high 
(additional communication sessions required by distributed agents as well as trusted entities). 
For example POM need additional communication sessions between trusted entities as well 
as different parts of the mobile agent, while M&M make use of a trusted entity and 
FILIGRANE illustrate no additional communication sessions upon implementation. As 
illustrated in Figure 8.7, our framework requires no additional communication sessions 
between different entities within the system. 
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Figure 8.7: Increase in communication sessions
Figure 8.8 provides a graphical interpretation for the countermeasures that are integrated 
into the different frameworks. As illustrated, the countermeasures are categorised into trust, 
recording & tracking, cryptography and time techniques. The evaluation of currently 
available mobile agent systems according to the number of countermeasures that are 
incorporated into each category is illustrated. As shown, a large number of systems rely on a 
trusted environment by using techniques such as authentication and encryption. (For sake 
of clarity, the use of conventional encryption to protect the agent between hosts is classified 
as being part of trust-based computing.). In figure 8.8 the x-axis contains the different 
frameworks grouped within the four mentioned categories of countermeasures, while the y-
axis provide information regarding the number of countermeasures included within the four 
categories. For example, POM has incorporated into its design one trusted measure (trusted 
entities) with no measures from the other three categories included. 
Our framework integrates methods within every countermeasure class and is thus provides 
more options in terms of protecting the agent.
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Figure 8.8: Integrated countermeasures
8.4 Drawbacks of the Proposed Framework
A number of drawbacks of our proposed framework are noted. Although the framework 
enables mobile agent application developers to secure an agent against many types of 
malicious host attacks, some parts of the agent are still vulnerable, specifically under certain 
conditions. For example, the discussed solutions are vulnerable when a host floods the agent 
with irrelevant information, or even steals the agent. This can partly be attributed to the fact 
that certain countermeasures (such as computing with encrypted functions) have not yet 
reached maturity. Furthermore, countermeasures that provide comprehensive protection in 
an open environment are minimal and research is desperately required for the expansion of 
this field (Roth, 2001).
Another drawback is the implication on computational costs if an agent is to operate in 
extreme conditions.  Extreme conditions are those where the application requires and thus 
implements all countermeasures that are listed on the framework in order to safeguard the 
agent against malicious host attacks. It is indeed possible, that certain applications operating 
in open environments, especially where fraud is a potential threat, might require extreme 
measures.  Further research is required in this area to attempt a reduction in the 
computational or financial costs.
A possible limitation of the current implementation of the proposed framework is the fact 
that the framework was only tested in the Java environment. With the development of new 
technologies the implement-ability thereof need to be tested in other environments such as 
.NET, where Java is not necessarily the language of choice.
Another implementation drawback arises from the current immature state of certain 
countermeasures (as hinted above). Although these measures are listed in the framework, 
they have to mature before implementation tests can be conducted. This implies that, 
considering the objectives of this research, it was not possible to test all the possible 
countermeasures against malicious host attacks.
The last potential drawback is at the same time one of the most salient elements of the 
proposed framework.  As the framework is a dynamic structure, its correct implementation 
depends on the mobile agent developer /owner to correctly evaluate the type of application 
as well as the deployment environment. The selection of particular countermeasures not 
only relies on this, but also on the free will of the developer.  
As mentioned before, the framework protects the mobile agent on a number of levels, such 
as against integrity modification attacks, certain availability attacks, certain 
confidentiality attacks and authentication attacks. Points of concerns are the protection 
of the mobile agent against theft; refusal of aggregated data and denial of data on the 
restricted and open levels of the framework as well as not executing the agent completely 
on the closed levels. Although the proposed framework might provide an improved 
measure of security, an agent might still be vulnerable to attacks from these types of threats.
8.5 Future Research and Possible Extensions
At the moment, the main target of the proposed framework is secure mobile agent 
applications.  This implies, that the proposed framework offers value especially to new 
developments that adhere to Internet demands (e-commerce applications).  However, the 
framework can also be extended to assist developers of mobile agent system tools.  For 
these types of developments, the evaluation of the application objective has to be 
reconsidered, since it might not always be predictable beforehand. 
A particularly useful extension to this framework will be the development of an intelligent 
computerised framework that could assist in the evaluation of the application objective 
(type of application) and deployment environment, based on inputs from the mobile agent 
developer / owner. The objective of such a system would be to use the given inputs, 
evaluate the security levels and make useful suggestions for countermeasures to be 
incorporated into the new mobile agent system. What would be even more useful is if this 
computerised framework can generate protection objects that could be integrated into the 
new system.
As described above, the proposed framework is particularly significant to practitioners and 
mobile agent system developers. However, the framework is also useful to fellow 
researchers within the mobile agent security field. The proposed framework provides the 
opportunity to researchers to determine methods to integrate their countermeasures into the 
framework. It also offers to an opportunity continue this research with the inclusion of an 
automatic intelligent component, that would reduce the chances of incorrect human 
evaluation.
Future research on specific countermeasures is required, as current measures seem to be 
inadequate in providing protection against all threats. Research into the role and specific 
requirements of trusted entities and if (and where) they exist determine whether they can 
provide services such as secure computations.
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ADDENDUM A
Aglet Security Policy File
grant codeBase "atp://*:*/" {   permission java.io.FilePermission 
"codebase", "read";   permission java.io.FilePermission "codebase", 
"read, write,                                                   
execute";   permission java.net.SocketPermission "localhost:*",       
"listen,resolve";   permission java.net.SocketPermission "codebase:
*", "connect";   permission java.awt.AWTPermission 
"showWindowWithoutWarningBanner";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "awt.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "hotjava.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "apple.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "file.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "line.separator", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "path.separator", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "http.maxConnections",                   
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "user.timezone", 
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "socksProxyHost", 
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "socksProxyPort", 
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "browser", "read";  
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.rmi.*", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "sun.rmi.*", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "http.proxyHost", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "proxyHost", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "user.*", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "os.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "java.*", "read";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission "createClassLoader";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.java.*";   
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission 
"accessClassInPackage.com.ibm.aglets.util.*";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission 
"accessClassInPackage.com.ibm.aglets.AgletProxyImpl";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.com.ibm.aglet.*";   
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "loadLibrary.JdbcOdbc";   
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission 
"accessClassInPackage.sun.jdbc.odbc";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.java.security.*";   
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission 
"accessClassInPackage.java.security.spec.*";   permission 
java.security.AllPermission "*", "*";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.AgletPermission "*", 
"dispatch,dispose,deactivate,activate,clone,retract";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.MessagePermission "*", "*";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.ContextPermission "*", "multicast,subscribe"; 
permission com.ibm.aglets.security.ContextPermission "*", 
"create,receive,retract";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.ContextPermission "property.*", "read,write"; 
protection com.ibm.aglet.security.AgletProtection "*", 
"dispatch,dispose,deactivate,activate,clone,retract";   protection 
com.ibm.aglet.security.MessageProtection "*", "*"; }; grant codeBase 
"http://*:*/" {   permission java.io.FilePermission "codebase", 
"read";   permission java.io.FilePermission "codebase", "read, write, 
execute";   permission java.net.SocketPermission "localhost:*",       
"listen,resolve";   permission java.net.SocketPermission "codebase:
*", "connect";   permission java.awt.AWTPermission 
"showWindowWithoutWarningBanner";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "awt.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "hotjava.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "apple.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "file.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "line.separator", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "path.separator", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "http.maxConnections",                   
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "user.timezone", 
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "socksProxyHost", 
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "socksProxyPort", 
"read";   permission java.util.PropertyPermission "browser", "read";  
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.rmi.*", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "sun.rmi.*", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "http.proxyHost", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "proxyHost", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "user.*", "read";   
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "os.*", "read";   permission 
java.util.PropertyPermission "java.*", "read";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission "createClassLoader";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.java.*";   
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission 
"accessClassInPackage.com.ibm.aglets.util.*";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission 
"accessClassInPackage.com.ibm.aglets.AgletProxyImpl";   permission 
java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.com.ibm.aglet.*";   
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "loadLibrary.JdbcOdbc";   
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission 
"accessClassInPackage.sun.jdbc.odbc";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.AgletPermission "*", 
"dispatch,dispose,deactivate,activate,clone,retract";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.MessagePermission "*", "*";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.ContextPermission "*", "multicast,subscribe"; 
permission com.ibm.aglets.security.ContextPermission "*", 
"create,receive,retract";   permission 
com.ibm.aglets.security.ContextPermission "property.*", "read,write"; 
protection com.ibm.aglet.security.AgletProtection "*", 
"dispatch,dispose,deactivate,activate,clone,retract";   protection 
com.ibm.aglet.security.MessageProtection "*", "*"; }; grant codeBase 
"file://-/" {   permission java.security.AllPermission "*", "*";   
protection com.ibm.aglet.security.AgletProtection "*", 
"dispatch,dispose,deactivate,activate,clone,retract";   protection 
com.ibm.aglet.security.MessageProtection "*", "*"; }; grant codeBase 
"file://c:/-" {   permission java.io.FilePermission "*", "read, 
write, execute";   permission java.security.AllPermission "*", "*";   
protection com.ibm.aglet.security.AgletProtection "*", 
"dispatch,dispose,deactivate,activate,clone,retract"; }; 
ADDENDUM B
Source code for RetrievalAglet
//An aglet of this class sends is send to two destinations to obtain information  //and store the 
retrieved values in a file.  public class RetrievalAglet extends Aglet {   File dir = new File
("C:/data/testFile.dat");  File ResultsFile = new File("C:/data/ResultsFile.dat");  String from = 
"Anti-Virus";  int finish = 0;    public void onCreation(Object init) {       addMobilityListener(    new
MobilityAdapter() {             public void onArrival(MobilityEvent b) {           finish++;    }    }  ); }   
public void run() {   try {    switch (finish) {     case 0: NextDestination();       break;     case 1: 
getInfo(dir,from);       NextDestination();       break;     case 2: getInfo(dir,from);       
NextDestination();       break;     case 3: PrintResultsFile();       dispose();    }          } catch 
(Exception e) {    System.out.println(e.getMessage());   }  }  //Read information file, get value, 
write value to ResultsFile  void getInfo(File file, String from) throws IOException {   FileReader 
readfile = new FileReader(file);   FileWriter writefile = new FileWriter(ResultsFile, true);   URL 
RetrievalURL;   String name;   int number;   int tokentype;   AgletContext RetrievalContext = 
getAgletContext();   RetrievalURL = RetrievalContext.getHostingURL();   StreamTokenizer 
inputStream = new StreamTokenizer(readfile);   PrintWriter results = new PrintWriter(writefile);   
tokentype = inputStream.nextToken();   results.println("Information search for "+from+" on host   
"+RetrievalURL);     while (tokentype != StreamTokenizer.TT_EOF)   {    name = 
inputStream.sval;     inputStream.nextToken();    number = (int)inputStream.nval;    if 
(name.equals(from)) {     results.println(number+"\t");    }    tokentype = inputStream.nextToken
();   }   readfile.close();   writefile.close();  }   //print results retrieved on every host  void 
PrintResultsFile() {   try {   FileReader readfile = new FileReader(ResultsFile);   String name;   
int number, retNum = 2;   int tokentype;   StreamTokenizer inputStream = new StreamTokenizer
(readfile);   String contents=new String();   inputStream.ordinaryChars(0x00,0x7F);   tokentype =
inputStream.nextToken();      while (tokentype != StreamTokenizer.TT_EOF)   {    
contents=contents+String.valueOf((char)tokentype);    tokentype = inputStream.nextToken();   }  
readfile.close();    System.out.println(contents);  } catch (Exception e) {   System.out.println
(e.getMessage());} }   //NextDestination contains the list of hosts to be visited.  void 
NextDestination() {   try {    URL destination;   switch (finish) {       case 0: destination = new 
URL("atp://RemoteA.tut");          dispatch(destination);       case 1: destination = new URL
("atp://RemoteB.tut");          dispatch(destination);       case 2: destination = new URL
("atp://RemoteC.tut");          dispatch(destination);   }   }catch (Exception e) {   //Failed to 
initialize next destination   System.out.println(e.getMessage());  } } } 
ADDENDUM C
Source code for ComputationAglet
public class ComputationAglet extends Aglet {  File dir = new File("C:/data/testFile.dat");  File 
LowestBidFile = new File("C:/data/LowestBidFile.dat");  String from = "Anti-Virus";  int finish = 
0;  URL LowestBidURL;  int LowestBid = 10000;    public void onCreation(Object init) {        
addMobilityListener(     new MobilityAdapter() {               public void onArrival(MobilityEvent b) {  
finish++;     }    }   );   }   public void run() {   try {    switch (finish) {     case 0: NextDestination();  
break;     case 1: getLowestBid(dir,from);       NextDestination();       break;     case 2: 
getLowestBid(dir,from);       NextDestination();       break;     case 3: PrintResultsFile();       
dispose();    }          } catch (Exception e) {    System.out.println(e.getMessage());   }  }  //Read 
file, get value, determine lowest bid and write to file  void getLowestBid(File file, String from) 
throws IOException {   FileReader readfile = new FileReader(file);   FileWriter writefile = new 
FileWriter(LowestBidFile);   String name;   int number;   int tokentype;   int LowestBid = 10000;  
AgletContext LowestBidContext = getAgletContext();   StreamTokenizer inputStream = new 
StreamTokenizer(readfile);   PrintWriter results = new PrintWriter(writefile);   tokentype = 
inputStream.nextToken();   while (tokentype != StreamTokenizer.TT_EOF)   {    name = 
inputStream.sval;     inputStream.nextToken();    number = (int)inputStream.nval;    if 
(name.equals(from)) {      if (number < LowestBid) {      LowestBid = number;      LowestBidURL 
=                                                                           LowestBidContext.getHostingURL();      
results.println(LowestBidContext.getHostingURL());      results.println(number);     }    }    
tokentype = inputStream.nextToken();   }   readfile.close();   writefile.close();  }     void 
NextDestination() {   try {    URL destination;   switch (finish) {    case 0: destination = new URL
("atp://RemoteA.tut ");     dispatch(destination);    case 1: destination = new URL
("atp://RemoteB.tut ");     dispatch(destination);    case 2: destination = new URL
("atp://RemoteC.tut ");     dispatch(destination);     }   }catch (Exception e) {   //Failed to 
initialize next destination   System.out.println(e.getMessage());  } }    //print results retrieved on 
every host  void PrintResultsFile() {   try {   FileReader readfile = new FileReader(LowestBidFile); 
String name;   int number;   int tokentype;   StreamTokenizer inputStream = new 
StreamTokenizer(readfile);   String contents=new String();   inputStream.ordinaryChars
(0x00,0x7F);   tokentype = inputStream.nextToken();      while (tokentype != 
StreamTokenizer.TT_EOF)   {    contents=contents+String.valueOf((char)tokentype);    
tokentype = inputStream.nextToken();   }    readfile.close();    System.out.println(contents);  } 
catch (Exception e) {   System.out.println(e.getMessage());} }  }
ADDENDUM D
Source code for implementation of Path Histories
//Sign Itinerary void CreateSignature() {  try {  FileOutputStream signaturefile = new                  
FileOutputStream(signature);  FileOutputStream keyfile = new FileOutputStream(keys);     
//Create a keypair generator.  KeyPairGenerator generatekey =                                                
KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA","SUN");     //Initialize the keypair generator  
SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG",                                       
"SUN");  generatekey.initialize(1024, random);     //Generate the keypair  KeyPair getkeys = 
generatekey.generateKeyPair();  PrivateKey private_key = getkeys.getPrivate();  PublicKey 
public_key = getkeys.getPublic();     //Sign the data   Signature algorithm = 
Signature.getInstance("SHAwithDSA", "SUN");     //Initialise the signature object  
algorithm.initSign(private_key);     //Supply the signature object to the data to be signed  
FileInputStream pathHistory = new FileInputStream(Itinerary);  BufferedInputStream bufferin = 
new BufferedInputStream(pathHistory);  byte[] buffer = new byte[1024];  int length;  while 
(bufferin.available() != 0) {   length = bufferin.read(buffer);   algorithm.update(buffer,0,length);  };  
bufferin.close();     //Generate the signature  byte[] createsignature = algorithm.sign();     //Save 
the Signature & Public key in files  signaturefile.write(createsignature);  signaturefile.close();     
//Save public key in file  byte[] key = public_key.getEncoded();  keyfile.write(key);  keyfile.close
();          } catch (Exception e) {             System.err.println("Caught exception " + e.toString());   
}     }
//Remote host verifies previous host void VerifySignature() {      try {      //Read in the encoded 
public key bytes.                FileInputStream keyfile= new FileInputStream(keys);                       
//The byte-array encryptionkey contains the encoded public key bytes              byte[] 
encryptionkey = new byte[keyfile.available()];                keyfile.read(encryptionkey);              
keyfile.close();                   //Key specification  X509EncodedKeySpec publicspec = new           
X509EncodedKeySpec(encryptionkey);  KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance
("DSA", "SUN");    //Generate a public key  PublicKey public_key = keyFactory.generatePublic
(publicspec);    //Input signature bytes  FileInputStream signaturefile = new FileInputStream
(signature);             byte[] verifysignature = new byte[signaturefile.available()];              
signaturefile.read(verifysignature);            signaturefile.close();              //Initialise the signature 
object for verification.   Signature signature = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA", "SUN");  
signature.initVerify(public_key);    //Signature verification  FileInputStream datafile = new 
FileInputStream(Itinerary);  BufferedInputStream bufferin = new BufferedInputStream(datafile);    
byte[] buffer = new byte[1024];  int length;  while (bufferin.available() != 0) {      length = 
bufferin.read(buffer);      signature.update(buffer, 0, length);  };    boolean verifies = 
signature.verify(verifysignature);   System.out.println("signature verifies: " + verifies);    
bufferin.close();          } catch (Exception e) {             System.err.println("Caught exception " + 
e.toString());         }     }     
ADDENDUM E
Source code for partial result encapsulation
public void EncryptFile() {  try {  switch (finish) {  case 1: Cipher des_encrypt1;   //Create a 
DES key   KeyGenerator generateKey1 = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");                 
//SecretKey   key_for_des1 = generateKey1.generateKey();    //Create the cipher   
des_encrypt1 = Cipher.getInstance("DES");      //Initialise cipher for encryption   
des_encrypt1.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,key_for_des1);     //Create cipher stream   File 
ResultsFile1 = new File("C:/data/ResultsFile.dat");   FileInputStream fileInput1 = new 
FileInputStream(ResultsFile1);   CipherInputStream cis1 = new CipherInputStream(fileInput1, 
des_encrypt1);   FileOutputStream writefile1 = new FileOutputStream(EncryptedResults, true);   
//encrypt data   byte[] buffer1 = new byte[8];   int length1 = cis1.read(buffer1);   while (length1 != 
-1) {    writefile1.write(buffer1, 0, length1);    length1 = cis1.read(buffer1);   };       writefile1.close
();    fileInput1.close();         case 2: Cipher des_encrypt2;   //Create a DES key   KeyGenerator 
generateKey2 = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");     //SecretKey   key_for_des2 = 
generateKey2.generateKey();      //Create the cipher   des_encrypt2 = Cipher.getInstance
("DES");      //Initialise cipher for encryption   des_encrypt2.init
(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,key_for_des2);      //Create cipher stream   File ResultsFile2 = new 
File("C:/data/ResultsFile.dat");   FileInputStream fileInput2 = new FileInputStream(ResultsFile2); 
CipherInputStream cis2 = new CipherInputStream(fileInput2, des_encrypt2);   FileOutputStream 
writefile2 = new FileOutputStream(EncryptedResults, true);     //encrypt data   byte[] buffer2 = 
new byte[8];   int length2 = cis2.read(buffer2);   while (length2 != -1) {   writefile2.write(buffer2, 0, 
length2);   length2 = cis2.read(buffer2);   };    writefile2.close();    fileInput2.close();  }  } catch 
(Exception e) {             System.out.println(e.getMessage());         }  }    
void DecryptFile() {      Cipher des_decrypt1;      Cipher des_decrypt2;            try {      
des_decrypt1 = Cipher.getInstance("DES");  des_decrypt1.init
(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,key_for_des1);             //Create decrypted file  FileInputStream 
encryptedFile1 = new FileInputStream(EncryptedResults);  FileOutputStream writefile1 = new 
FileOutputStream(DecryptedResults);  CipherInputStream cis1 = new CipherInputStream
(encryptedFile1, des_decrypt1);     int total;   //decrypt data  byte[] buffer1 = new byte[8];  int 
length1 = cis1.read(buffer1);  total = length1;  while (length1 != -1) {   writefile1.write
(buffer1,0,length1);   length1 = cis1.read(buffer1);   total = total + length1;      };  
encryptedFile1.close();               des_decrypt2 = Cipher.getInstance("DES");  des_decrypt2.init
(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,key_for_des2);             //Create decrypted file  FileInputStream 
encryptedFile2 = new FileInputStream(EncryptedResults);  CipherInputStream cis2 = new 
CipherInputStream(encryptedFile2, des_decrypt2);     //decrypt data  byte[] buffer2 = new byte
[8];  int length2 = cis2.read(buffer2);  while (length2 != -1) {   writefile1.write(buffer2,0,length2);   
length2 = cis2.read(buffer2);      };  writefile1.close();  encryptedFile2.close();            } catch 
(Exception e) {             System.out.println(e.getMessage());         } }    
